I wish to thank Dr. David Wurfel and Mr. Shinichi Nagai for inspiring me to initiate this research during 1962–63, and also Drs. Truong Buu Lam, Ben Kerkvliet, and the late Wesley R. Fishel, and Mr. Stephen Fitzgerald. Special thanks are due to those who shared their valuable experiences in Vietnam with me, without whom this research would not have been possible.

¹ Jones, F.C., Japan's New Order in East Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 391.Google Scholar

² Elsbree, Willard H., Japan's Role in Southeast Asia Nationalist Movements, 1940–1945 (Boston, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 23–24.Google Scholar

³ , Elsbree, Japan's Role, p. 43.Google Scholar

⁴ Truong Buu Lam, “Japan and the Disruption of the Vietnamese Nationalist Movement”, in Aspects of Vietnamese History, ed. Vella, Walter F. (Honolulu: Asian Studies Program, Univ. of Hawaii, Paper No. 8, 1973), pp. 237–69Google Scholar.

⁵ Hammer, Ellen J., The Struggle for Indochina (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955).Google Scholar

⁶ Silverstein, Joseph, “The Importance of the Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia to the Political Scientist”, in Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays, ed. Silverstein, Joseph (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series, no. 7, 1966), p. 4.Google Scholar

⁷ Smith, Ralph, “The Japanese Period in Indochina and the Coup of 9 March 1945”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (Sept. 1978): 268–301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Hattori, Takushiro, Daitoa Sensoshi (Tokyo: Masu-shobo, 1953), vol. 1, pp. 242–44.Google Scholar

⁹ Its members were the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Navy and the Army Ministers, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy and the Army.

¹⁰ Nakamura, Kikuo, Showa Seiji-shi (Tokyo: Keio-Tsushin, 1958), pp. 106–7.Google Scholar

¹¹ , Mantetsu-Toa-Keizai-Chosa-Kyoku, ed., Nanyo Sosho, vol. II, Futsuryo-Indoshina (Tokyo: Man-tetsu-Toa-Chosa-Kyoku, 1942), pp. 769–89.Google Scholar

¹² International Military Tribunal Far East (hereafter IMTFE), Exhibit (hereafter E) 620, “Outline of Japanese Foreign Policy”, 28 09. 1940.Google Scholar

¹³ 2 July 1941. After the approval at the Liaison Conference, Cabinet, and the Conference with the Presence of the Emperor, the plan was adopted as a national policy. An earlier guideline can be found in “Outline of Policy towards French Indochina and Thailand” (1 Feb. 1941), in , Hattori, Sensoshi, vol. I, pp. 107–8Google Scholar.

¹⁴ “The Draft of the Imperial Headquarters Re: Promotion of Measures towards the Southern Region” (21 June 1941), in , Hattori, Sensoshi, p. 135. The protracted war in Europe made some Japanese, particularly Navy, cautious. On the other hand, Army was planning an armed solution to the Southern Region questionGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ “Tairikushi” (Directive), no. 991 (6 Nov. 1941). Property of War History Room, Defense Agency. The Headquarters was specially organized in the Military Academy in Ichigaya, Tokyo. Also , Hattori, Sensoshi, vol. I, p. 323Google Scholar.

¹⁶ “Tairikumei” (Order), no. 564 (15 Nov. 1941), “Order to Capture the Strategic Areas in the Southern Region”. Property of War History Room, Defense Agency. Also , Hattori, Sensoshi, vol. I, p. 325Google Scholar.

¹⁷ , Hattori, Sensoshi, vol. I, pp. 286–88.Google Scholar Also see IMTFE, E 877.

¹⁸ , Hattori, Sensoshi, vol. I, p. 305.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Kenkyujp, Waseda Daigaku Shakai Kagaku, ed., Indoneshia no Nihon Gunsei Kenkyu (Tokyo: Kinokuniya Shoten, 1959), p. 119.Google Scholar

²⁰ “Tairikushi”, no. 991.

^2l “Tairikumei”, no. 564.

²² , Hattori, Sensoshi, vol. III, p. 370.Google Scholar

²³ Tojo's statement, in , Hattori, Sensoshi, vol. III, p. 374Google Scholar.

²⁴ Testimony by Masayuki Yokoyama at the Foreign Affairs Committee, Diet, on 21 Nov. 1959, in “Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes”, no. 13, Proceedings vol. I, no. 4.

²⁵ By that time, besides the JSEI and the 21st Division, the 34th Brigade, Kempeitai, the 34th Independent Automobile Company, and army hospitals had been established in Indochina.

²⁶ “Tairikumei”, no. 978.

²⁷ Toshiaki Harada was first employed at the Indoshina Keizai Kenkyu-jo (Institute of Indochinese Economy), which was founded by Michikazu Yamada in Hanoi. He was an ardent supporter of the nationalists, and he was greatly influenced by Vietnamese nationalists, including Ngo Dinh Diem and Viet Minh members. Later, when he joined the Yasutai, a secret agency, he worked as an intermediary between the Japanese and the Viet Minh. He was said to have been in touch with Vo Nguyen Giap, but on his third such mission, he was killed by a group of Viet Minh guerrillas (1945).

²⁸ Kiyoshi Komatsu, energetic and passionate young writer and scholar of French literature, visited Vietnam in 1943 without any special purpose. He met Oomiya and his sense of justice was awakened. Back in Japan, he organized an association of which Cuong De was the president. He soon returned to Vietnam and actively participated in providing assistance to the Vietnamese nationalists. He enjoyed a close relation with Ngo Dinh Diem as well.

²⁹ Komaki Oomiya, a labor law specialist and promoter of the Peasant Literature Movement, Tanemakuhito, went to Vietnam at the request of the Foreign Ministry in 1939. With the coming of the Japanese Army, he was drafted as an interpreter but was soon released, although he continued to provide indirect assistance. In 1943, when the Japanese Cultural Centers were established, he took charge of the Hanoi branch and enjoyed close contact with the Vietnamese nationalists. It is said that he was instrumental to the conclusion of the 6 March 1946 Agreement.

³⁰ Himeda, Yoshio, “Appendix” in Asia des Moussons, Jean D'Aureles (Tokyo: Ikuei-sha, 1942), p. 268.Google Scholar

³¹ The Former Staff of the Indoshina-Chuton-gun, “Sakusen Kiroku” [Records of Operations] ( A recollection of history of operations by the 38th Army and the JSFI, Tokyo, Fukuin-kyoku, 1946), property of War History Room, Defense Agency, p. 37.

³² Maruyama, Shizuo, Ushinawareta Kiroku [A Lost Record] (Tokyo: Koraku-shobo, 1950), p. 276.Google Scholar

³³ Ibid., p. 275.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ , Anon., Dai-Honei Kimitsu Senso-Nikki [Imperial Headquarters Secret War Diary], 26 08. 1944 (Property of the War History Room, Defense Agency). This diary was begun with the opening of the Pacific War by the Shido-han of the Sanbo-Honbu. Later the responsibility was transferred to the hands of the ISth Section and, finally in June 1945, into the hands of Riku-gun Gunmu-ka and was continued to the termination of the War.Google Scholar

³⁶ , Anon., Senso Nikki, 5 09. 1944.Google Scholar

³⁷ , Anon., Senso Nikki, 14 09. 1944. “Re: the 15th Supreme War Leadership Conference”, SWLC Proceedings, vol. X, Book 20, Issue 20; “Re: the Action toward Indochina according to the Change in Situation”.Google Scholar

³⁸ , Anon., Senso Nikki, 2 11. 1944.Google Scholar

³⁹ , Anon., Senso Nikki, 7 12. 1944.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ , Anon., Senso Nikki, 2312. 1944.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Interview with Yoshizawa, 11 June 1962; Matsumoto, 26 Aug. 1962; Tsuchihashi, 3 Aug. 1962.

⁴² “Tsukamoto's statement in “Indoshina Minzoku Dokuritsu no Hiwa” [Secret Stories behind the Independence of the Three States of Indochina] (Unpublished record of discussion that took place on the tenth anniversary of the Meigo Action, 1955). Matsumoto, however, denied that he went to Indochina with any clear plans regarding the takeover (interview, 26 Aug. 1962).

⁴³ Yokoyama, interview, 11 Aug. 1962.

⁴⁴ Minoda, interview, 5 Sept. 1962.

⁴⁵ Yuki Tsuchihashi, “Dai Sanju Hachigun Kiroku” [Records of the 38th Army: Memoir] (A memoir-type monograph, 1962), property of the War History Room, Defense Agency, pp. 21, 23–24.

⁴⁶ , Tsuchihashi, Memoir, pp. 16–18.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ , Tsuchihashi, Memoir, pp. 24–25; Tsukamoto, Dokuritsu no Hiwa.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ , Tsuchihashi, Memoir, pp. 29–30.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ A report by a staff officer who was sent to Indochina to investigate the attitude of the Japanese Army. , Anon., Senso Nikki, 26 01. 1945Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ , Anon., Senso Nikki, 2601. 1945; for the disagreements seen from the diplomats' side, seeGoogle Scholar, Smith, The Japanese Period, pp. 279–80, 282–83Google Scholar.

⁵¹ SLWC Decision, no. 16, 1 Feb. 1945; also see IMTFE, E661.

⁵² SLWC Decision, no. 16, 1 Feb. 1945. The order was sent to the Japanese Army in Indochina on 11 Feb. 1945.

⁵³ Concerning the discussions at the SWLC, see , Anon., Senso Nikki, 1 02. 1945.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ , Anon., Senso Nikki, 1 02. 1945.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ , Maruyama, Kiroku, pp. 231–32.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ “Re: Resorting to Military Action towards French Indochina” (26 February. 1945), SWLC Decision, no. 17. The orders were sent to the Japanese Army in French Indochina on 28 Feb. 1945; “Tairikushi”, no. 2400 and “Tairikumei”, no. 1266.

⁵⁷ “The decision as to whether or not the French Indochinese authorities accepted the demands of the Japanese Government was to be made by the 38th Army Commander Tsuchihashi in consultation with Ambassador Matsumoto.”

⁵⁸ A telegram sent on 31 Mar. 1945, from Ambassador Matsumoto to Daitoa-sho (Great East Asia Ministry) Minister and Foreign Minister, IMTFE, E 662.

⁵⁹ Yuki Tsuchihashi, “Furansu-gun o Buso Kaijo Suru” [Disarming the French Troops; the Truth about the Meigo Action], Special Edition of Shukan Yomiuri, “Nihon no Himitsusen” [Secret Wars carried out by Japan] ( , Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun-sha, 1955), p. 126Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ The French kept a sharp watch on all Japanese movements. General Mordant had already decided at the end of 1944 on a plan of operation for the day of Japanese attack; , Mordant, Au Service de la France en Indo-Chine, 1941–1945 (Saigon: IFOM, 1950), p. 121. When 1945 arrived, even Decoux sent a secret letter to local officials informing them that in case of Japanese aggression, the chiefs of local administration should give orders to their own officials;Google ScholarDecoux, Jean, A La Bane de l'Indochine: Histoire de Mon Government General, 1940–1945 (Paris: Plon, 1949), p. 322. At the end of February, the Resident Superior of Tonkin, being informed of the Japanese preparations, called chiefs of local administrative units to his office and gave precise instructions. Moreover, on 7 March, he received information even before the Governor General and the Commander of the Indochinese Army that Japan-Would execute a coup de force on the 9th or 10th of March. After giving a curfew order to the soldiers of the Citadelle, he left Hanoi on the 8th to carry out operations in the mountain regions;Google ScholarGaudel, Andre, L'Indochine Francaise en Face de Japan (Paris: Suisse, 1947), pp. 143–44. On the same day, the chief of the Surété in Hanoi sent a telegram saying that Japan would execute a military action on the 10th. The French Indochinese Army even held a mock battle all through the night of the 8th in Tonkin in preparation for the Japanese attack.Google Scholar, Tsuchihashi, Buso Kaijo, p. 160Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Terauchi left the discussion soon after they finished dinner (interview with Tsukamoto, 11 July 1962).

⁶² , Tsuchihashi, Buso Kaijo, p. 159.Google Scholar

⁶³ Tsukamoto's statement in Kokumin Gaikokai, ed., Dokuritsu no Hiwa.

⁶⁴ Kaneko, Seigo, “Annan Kimitsu-sen” [Annam Secret Unit: The Secret Maneuvers of Yasutai, Secret Agency], “Himitsu Sen”; Special Edition of Shukan Yomiuri, 8 12. 1955, pp. 161–62.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ This mopping up operation is referred to by a small circle of military leaders as “I-go Sakusen” (I-go Action). Later during the reparation negotiation with Vietnam after the Second World War, the question when the hostile relation with France started became a serious issue. The consensus reached was 25 Aug. 1944, as opposed to 9 Mar. 1945. A new order was given to the 38th Army on 15 May by the Southern Region Army: it was relieved of duty near the border with China and also of sending soldiers to Hainan. At the same time the 37th Division, the 22nd Division, and the 70th Independent Mixed Brigade were sent to the fronts. At the beginning of June, they finished planning for the new operation: the retreat to Northern Laos. The Headquarters was to move to Thakhek and the construction of new accommodations began. In April, construction of a new road was begun between Samneua and Ba Xat. The 21st Division began to concentrate its units in Hanoi and Hoa Binh (west of Hanoi) and the 2nd Division to Saigon and Loc Ninh (north of Saigon). In the middle of this concentration, Japan surrendered. The Former Staff, Sakusen Kiroku, pp. 59–60;Google Scholar, Senshishitsu,. Senshi Sosho, vol. “Shittan/Meigo Sakusen” (Tokyo: Choun-Shim-bunsha, 1969), p. 670Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ “Proclamation”, no. 1, IMTFE, E664.

⁶⁷ “Proclamation”, no. II, IMTFE, E664.

⁶⁸ “Proclamation”, no. 9, IMTFE, E 664.

⁶⁹ , Tsuchihashi, interview, 24 07 1962Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ “Proclamation”, no. 10, IMTFE, E664.

⁷¹ , Yokoyama, interview, 24 07 1962;Google Scholar, Maeda, interview 18 09. 1962Google Scholar.

⁷² , Tsuchihashi, interview, 24 07 1962Google Scholar.

⁷³ , Tsuchihashi, Memoirs, p. 213Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ , Tsuchihashi, interview, 24 07 1962Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ , Tsuchihashi, interview, 24 07 1962.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Interviews with Matsumoto, 5 Aug. and 26 Aug. 1962; Tsuchihashi, 24 July 1945, and 3 Aug. 1962; Mikuni, 14 Sept. 1962.

⁷⁷ Matsushita, who owned a business concern in Vietnam, says that he recommended giving military training to the Vietnamese (Kokumin-Gaiko-kai, ed., Dokuritsu no Hiwa). According to Kaneko, the Yasutai organized the Moi tribes (Kaneko, Kimitsu-sen).

⁷⁸ Oomiya's statement in Kokumin , Gaikokai, ed., Dokurilsu no Hiwa, p. 53Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Ibid.