^{page 103 note 1} The exact date seems to be uncertain; sometimes the date is given as 1905.

^{page 103 note 2} The Short Declaration was an “agreement;” though unilateral in character, regulating the relations between the Netherlands and the indigenous rulers. The ruler recognized the sovereignty of the Netherlands; promised not to enter into political relations with foreign powers and agreed to observe and execute all regulations issued in the name of the monarch or the governor general or his representatives.

^{page 104 note 3} The population of the three territories in 1961 was estimated as follows: Trust Territory of New Guinea (area, 93,000 square miles), 1,433,383 indigenous and 15,536 non-indigenous; Papua (area, 90,000 square miles), 513,480 indigenous and 9,794 non-indigenous; West New Guinea (area, 160,618 square miles), about 700,000 indigenous and 36,741 non-indigenous. Of the population of West New Guinea in 1954, 262,000 had been brought under regular Dutch administration and periodical contact had been established with another 129,000. The first comprehensive census taken in Australian New Guinea gave the eastern half of the island a population of 2,185,000 in 1966.

^{page 104 note 4} The formal ceremony of transfer took place on 27 December 1949.

^{page 105 note 5} Round Table Conference: Results as Accepted in the Second Plenary Meeting held on 2 November 1949 in the Ridderzaal in The Hague. Published by the Secretariat-General of the Round Table Conference (n.d.), p. 9.

^{page 105 note 6} Ibid., pp. 79, 80.

^{page 105 note 7} “The astonishing thing about the Dutch claim on the Irian question,” declared Prime Minister Natsir, “is that the Dutch government now maintains the right of self-determination for the population of New Guinea, while they had denied this very right during the Netherlands Indies period to the Indonesian people.” Quoted by Bone, Robert Jr., The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem (Ithaca, 1958), p. 97.Google Scholar Natsir was quite correct. But Indonesia also shifted its basic position. The two parties had exchanged positions. While Indonesia was a colony, Indonesians pressed the right of self-determination. Once Indonesia became independent it denied the right of self-determination to peoples within its territory and stressed legal argument.

^{page 106 note 8} On the last day of this conference the Indonesian delegation suggested, as a solution to the dispute, joint Dutch-Indonesian administration of the territory with the implication that sovereignty be recognized as adhering in Indonesia. The delegation had been recalled by its government which had resigned. Nothing came of this suggestion.

^{page 106 note 9} See Kahin, George McT., The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, 1955), p. 82.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 10} The 1957 resolution received 25 votes from Afro-Asian members (China voted against, Cambodia and Laos abstained and the Philippines was absent from the General Assembly when the vote was taken), all of the Communist countries voted for it; five of the Latin American members voted for it (nine voted against it); 15 West European states plus Australia, New Zealand and South Africa voted against it; Yugoslavia voted for it; the United States and Turkey abstained.

^{page 107 note 11} U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, 9th Session (1954), First Committee, p. 389.Google Scholar

^{page 107 note 12} Indonesia at first contended merely that the Netherlands in the Round Table Agreement had agreed to transfer sovereignty within the year; later it took the position that sovereignty had been transferred by the Agreement.

^{page 107 note 13} See Taylor, Alastair M., Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca, 1960), pp. 440–41Google Scholar, fn. 8. Mr. Taylor attended the Round Table Conference as a representative of the United Nations Committee for Indonesia.

^{page 108 note 14} Round Table Conference Results as Accepted in the Second Plenary Meeting. Published by the Secretariat-General of the Round Table Conference, p. 49. This is the only instance in the agreements in which the term “sovereignty” is used.

^{page 108 note 15} See Robert Bone, Jr., Op cit., pp. 97–98.

^{page 108 note 16} 20 November 1957, United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, 12th Session (1957), First Committee, p. 201.

^{page 108 note 17} United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, 9th Session (1954), First Committee, p. 394.

^{page 109 note 18} Ibid., p. 389.

^{page 109 note 19} Ibid., p. 397.

^{page 109 note 20} External Affairs Minister Casey, Richard G. expressed concern about the ability of Indonesia to promote the welfare of the inhabitants of West New Guinea. “Indonesia,” he wrote, “had the most complicated and intractable economic and political problems to solve in its present very extensive territories, which must provide distinct limits to its ability to ensure the proper administration, development and defense of New Guinea.” Friends and Neighbors (East Lansing, 1955), pp. 142–43.Google Scholar

H. J. van Mook, the Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies during the turbulent years of the revolution, felt that the administration of West New Guinea would be too much of a burden for the new state, though later, apparently for political reasons, he was opposed to excluding West New Guinea from Indonesian territory. See summary of his speech at the Den Pasar Conference in Den Pasar Bouwt Een Huis by Van Goudoever, W. A. (Government Information Office, Batavia, 1947), pp. 44–45.Google Scholar Also see Lijphart, Arend, The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea (New Haven and London, 1966), p. 14Google Scholar, fn. 10 and also Bone, op cit., p. 35.

^{page 110 note 21} Article 189, clause 4.

^{page 110 note 22} The Dutch undoubtedly had other reasons for favouring a federal system of government for Indonesia. It would restrict the power of Java and of the radical Republic in the central government and give greater autonomy and influence to the outer islands which were more favourably disposed towards the Netherlands and the West.

^{page 110 note 23} Dutch investments in Indonesia were estimated at about a billion dollars in 1940. There is evidence to indicate that many of the Dutch companies operating in Indonesia were able to remove their assets from the country and actually suffered little loss.

^{page 111 note 24} For a fuller discussion of the Australian position in the New Guinea dispute see Australia Faces Southeast Asia by , Amry and Vandenbosch, Mary Belle (Lexington, Ky., 1967).Google Scholar

^{page 111 note 25} Op. cit., 143. He added, “We have therefore a right to a voice in any discussions which would change its present status.” Whether propinquity gives rights under international law is a moot question.

^{page 111 note 26} Australia's interest in the territory was so great, Spender declared, that “should any discussions between the Netherlands and Indonesia trend towards any arrangements which would alter the status of West New Guinea, the matter is no longer one merely for those two parties themselves.” 8 June 1950, Current Notes on International Affairs, Department of External Affairs, Vol 21, p. 417.Google Scholar

^{page 111 note 27} U.N., General Assembly, Official Records, 9th Session (1954), First Committee, p. 399.

^{page 112 note 28} Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (hereafter referred to as “C.P.D.”) House, CCVIII, p. 3973ff., 8 June 1950.

^{page 112 note 29} Notably in the sessions of the Investigating Committee for Indonesian Independence which the Japanese set up in March 1945. Mohammed Yamin proposed a “Peoples State” which would include besides the Netherlands Indies, the Malay Peninsula, Portuguese Timor and northern Borneo (British Borneo). Sukarno declared himself in “full agreement with Yamin. Mohammed Hatta was not in favour of incorporating West New Guinea into Indonesia on the ground that “The Papuans have the right to be an independent nation.” See Brackman, Arnold, Southeast Asia's Second Front (New York, 1966), p. 122ff.Google Scholar

^{page 112 note 30} C.P.D., House, CCVIII, p. 3973.

^{page 112 note 31} Ibid., House, CCVIII, pp. 3975–76.

^{page 112 note 32} Ibid., House, CCXI, pp. 3182–83.

^{page 113 note 33} Ibid., House, CCVIII, pp. 3893–94.

^{page 113 note 34} Op. cit., p. 144.

^{page 113 note 35} 20 November 1957, U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, 12th Session (1957), First Committee, p. 200.

^{page 114 note 36} Sydney Morning Herald, 19 April 1961.

^{page 114 note 37} For an excellent discussion of the change of Dutch opinion see Arend Lijphart, op. cit.

^{page 115 note 38} See Schlesinger, Arthur N. Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), pp. 533–34.Google Scholar

^{page 115 note 39} Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation (Garden City, 1967), 371–80.Google Scholar

^{page 115 note 40} Almost immediately after having obtained control over West New Guinea, Sukarno turned against Malaysia for including Sarawak and Sabah, or British North Borneo, in the expanded federation. The Netherlands could have annexed these territories but, governed by its policy of “abstention,” it did not. The “white rajah” of Sarawak offered his state to the Netherlands in 1859. Had the Netherlands accepted, all of Borneo would now be Indonesian. Had North Borneo been made a part of the Federation of Malaya when it was formed in 1957 there might have been no problem with Indonesia about it. However, care must be taken not to over-simplify the problem. Sukarno had succeeded in ousting a small Western power from Southeast Asia; he was now seeking to remove the presence of a major Western power. By far the most populous country of Southeast Asia, Indonesia could easily be the dominant power in the region if only the American and British presence could be removed. However this may be, the Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia also illustrates how little the interests of the developing peoples are considered in state-making.

^{page 116 note 41} In a statement at a news conference, 3 April 1956. Department of State, Bulletin, 16 April 1956, pp. 638–43.Google Scholar

^{page 116 note 42} The resolution was adopted by a vote of 89 to 0, with 9 members abstaining (Australia, Belgium, Great Britain, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and the United States.)

^{page 117 note 43} South Moluccas declared its independence in 1950, but its revolt was quelled. Aceh, which rebelled in 1953, had no better fortune.

^{page 117 note 44} U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, 9th Session (1954), First Committee, p. 406.

^{page 117 note 45} As an indication of its serious financial problem it may be noted that Indonesia's foreign debt as of June 1966, totalled US$2,358,000,000 of which US$1,404,000,000 was owed to Communist countries, US$587,000,000 to Western, US$261,000,000 to Asian and US$4,000,000 to African countries.

^{page 117 note 46} The Liberian representative on the Trusteeship Council accused Australia of having no intention of implementing the 1960 resolution and of resorting to a new method of colonialism — that of “intimidating peoples under its rule by telling them that their lack of social, economic and educational advancement prevented them from assuming their rightful position in the world.” U.N. Trusteeship Council, Official Records, 33rd Session (27 May-26 July 1966), p. 98.

^{page 118 note 47} White, Osmar, Parliament of a Thousand Tribes: A Study of New Guinea (London, 1965), p. 187.Google Scholar

On 19 June 1960, in an interview with The New York Times representative, Hasluck declared that Papua and New Guinea would not be ready for self-government for thirty years, but about the same time Prime Minister Menzies in London observed that “at one time it was thought better to move slowly towards independence. The school of thought now is that it is better to go sooner than later.” He stated that if you are in doubt you should leave sooner than later. Times (London), 21 June 1960.Google Scholar