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Consistency is the Hobgoblin: Manuel L. Quezon and Japan, 1899–1934
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 April 2011
Extract
During the period of American colonial rule in the Philippines prior to the Pacific War, the attitude of most thoughtful Filipinos toward Japan seemed to waver as though tantalized between fear and fascination. For while there was often a genuine concern, principally as a result of Japanese-American tensions, that a predatory Japan was literally counting the moments to an invasion and conquest of the Islands, there was also the tremendous admiration of one Asian people for another and an almost awe-struck eagerness to emulate the startling successes of Japan in achieving modern nationhood in its fullest sense. To this generalization Manuel Luis Quezon (1878–1944) was no exception.
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References
1 This is in error since the presence of the two men had no official sanction from the Japanese government. See Goodman, G.K., “Japan and the Philippine Revolution”, Journal of Oriental Studies VIII, 1 (Jan. 1970): 100–112Google Scholar.
2 “Conversation” seems to be a bit of an exaggeration since Quezon and his fellows spoke no English, and Hara spoke no Spanish.
3 Quezon, Manuel Luis, The Good Fight (New York and London; 1946), p. 55Google Scholar.
4 Ibid., p. 57.
5 Ibid., pp. 58–59.
6 Ibid., p. 64.
7 Quoted in ibid., p. 109.
8 National Archives, Washington, D.C., War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs 364/118 (hereafter cited as “BIA” plus file number).
9 See Goodman, G. K., “The Problem of Philippine Independence and Japan: The First Three Decades of American Colonial Rule”, Southeast Asia An International Quarterly I, 3 (Summer 1971): 165–90.Google Scholar
10 Quoted in R.R. Ingles, “50 Years with the Times”, Manila Times (30 Apr. 1961). This remark seems strangely prophetic in the light of the lightning-like victories of the Japanese in 1941 and 1942 and the request made to President Roosevelt in Feb. 1942 by then Commonwealth President Quezon to grant immediate independence to the Philippines and to declare them neutral — a request that was promptly rejected. Quezon was quoted by the Baltimore Sun of 17 Jan. 1942 as having said in an interview: “The Philippine Islands were attached because the American flag flew over them. … We had no quarrel with the Japanese.… We suffered because of you.…”
11 Quoted in Ingles, “50 Years”.
12 Ibid.
13 Report No. 441, American Consulate General, Yokohama, BIA 364/160.
14 BIA 4325/158.
15 Ibid.
16 BIA 364–A-222.
17 Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1.6.2, 1–6, 28 Sept. 1916 (hereafter cited as “JMFA” plus file number, date, and classification if given).
18 The following information and quotations are taken from a lengthy interview appearing in the Philadelphia Bulletin, 5 Apr. 1919 (found in BIA 6144/86). Quezon expressed identical views in another interview in the New York Times of the same date.
19 JMFA 1.6.2, Vol. 3, 5 June 1919.
20 JMFA 1.6.2, Vol. 3, 31 Aug. 1920. Very Secret.
21 JMFA 1.6.2,1–6, Vol. 4, 16 Aug. 1921.
22 Chicago Daily News, 22 Aug. 1925.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Manila Times, 9 June 1925.
27 JMFA L.3.3.0.8–7, 1 Oct. 1927.
28 JMFA L.3.3.0.8–6, 12 Sept. 1929.
29 Philippines Herald, 21 July 1928.
30 Mindanao Herald, 21 July 1928.
31 Speaking in Manila in Mar. 1931, one Dr. Herbert Adams Gibbs stated his opposition to Philippine independence in this way:
If the Filipinos think that our thirty odd years here are in vain and have been destructive rather than constructive, we certainly don't want to remain another thirty. Our work is finished and we should recognize that fact. We are not Asiatics. Have we failed for the reason that only an Asiatic power would know how to treat the Filipinos well?
Japan is the logical successor of the United States as mentor of the Filipinos. Japan could develop these islands better than we have done. Japan would be more enthusiastically received, I have no doubt, than we have been. If the Filipinos want to get rid of the Americans, the Japanese succession is the only alternative I see. It would be impossible for the Filipinos to maintain complete independence against Japan. Let us talk facts. We all know that to be true. (Quoted in the New York Times, 26 Mar. 1931.)
Reaction among Filipino leaders was immediate and violent. The nationalistic Philippines Herald, in a condemnatory editorial entitled “Dr. Gibbons' [sic] Outpourings”, said, “Japan, of course, is the traditional bogey, a set-up that grimaces and wiggles every time the strings are manipulated”. Philippines Herald, 26 Mar. 1931.
32 Quoted in the Osaka Mainichi in an article by X entitled “P. I. Would Appear Doomed to Take Only U.S.Handouts” and reprinted in the Philippines Herald, 29 Dec. 1932. X replied to Quezon as follows:
What did he [Quezon] have in mind…? The Japanese bugaboo has often cast its shadow of gloomy threat on the future of the Philippines. Even so gifted a statesman as Manuel Quezon is apparently suffering from this stock illusion. It is a matter of supreme regret to see this popular nonsense affecting the destiny of our neighbors in the South.
It may be briefly added here that it would not be the Philippines as an objective that Japan would attack in case she were at loggerheads with America. It would be to destroy any American base of naval operations since the presence of American war vessels with a base in the Philippines would be a serious menace to Japan's commerce in the South Seas. The Philippines minus the American foothold would have no attraction for Japan in such a case. Those who speak of the Japanese bugaboo always turn the subject upside down.
33 For an enlightening account of these negotiations, see Hayden, J.R., The Philippines (New York, 1955)Google Scholar, chap. XIV, “The Politics of Independence”, pp. 351–75.
34 Quoted in the Tribune, 31 Aug. 1932.
35 New York Times, 24 Apr. 1933.
36 Letters of Roy Howard to Manuel Quezon, 12 and 13 June 1933, and letters of Manuel Quezon to Roy Howard, 26 June and 11 July 1933. Papers of Manuel L. Quezon, National Library of the Philippines, Manila, Philippines.
37 The Tribune, 14 Nov. 1933.
38 Text found in BIA 364/971.
39 Philippine Magazine, Dec. 1933: 279–80.
40 Quezon recounts in his autobiography that President Roosevelt agreed with him [Quezon] about the inequity of the H-H-C clause, which would have permitted the retention of United States military reservations in the islands. “After all,” Roosevelt is quoted as saying, “the American military force in the Islands is too small to protect the Philippines against foreign invasion, and after we have been in the Islands all these many years, it will be impossible to induce Congress to appropriate the necessary funds for the military defense of the Islands and the maintenance of an army of sufficient size to keep any enemy at bay”. Quoted in Quezon, The Good Fight, pp. 151–52.
41 Quoted in the Washington Star, 28 Jan. 1934.
42 Quoted in The Sunday Tribune (Manila), 4 Mar. 1934.
43 It received formal approval by the Philippine Legislature on 1 May 1934, the day after the return to Manila in triumph of the Quezon-led independence mission.
44 Quoted in The Tribune, 27 Mar. 1934.