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Civil War and Rebellion in Burma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2009

Josef Silverstein
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Extract

1988 was unlike any other year in Burma's short history as an independent nation. It began quietly, but erupted into a revolution for democracy and change which failed when the army violently restored its dictatorship; it ended quietly, but with the people living in fear under a military determined not to be challenged openly again. During this same period, while the world focused on Rangoon, the minorities continued to pursue a civil war which some have been fighting for the past forty years, hopeful that the changing situation in Burma's heartland would effect their struggles because both they, and the Burmans who rose in revolt, have the same enemy and seek the same ends — a peaceful and democratic Burma. Both looked to and sought help from the free nations of the world who spoke out vigorously when the rebellion began but whose voices either have been lowered or even stilled since the military made clear that it would decide the time and degree of change; only the U.S. continued to hold the high moral ground in support of the rebellion but its actions hardly matched its rhetoric.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 114 - 134
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1990

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References

This is a revised version of a paper originally presented at a U.S. Defense Intelligence College-U.S. Pacific Command Conference, February-March 1989, Honolulu, Hawaii. The author acknowledges with thanks permission from the conference sponsors to publish this version and to thank the Lee Foundation, Singapore for having provided travel grants in the past which made it possible to gather information and material used in the preparation of this and other papers. The information, conclusions and interpretations in this paper are those of the author and in no way reflect the interest or activity of the Conference, the Foundation or any individual connected with either.

1 For discussions of the preindependence period to the late 1970s see, Silverstein, Josef, Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977)Google Scholar. For a different point of view see, Taylor, Robert, The State in Burma (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

2 For a Burmese nationalist point of view see, AFPFL, From Fascist Bondage to New Democracy: The New Burma in the New World (Rangoon: Nay Win Kyi Press, no date)Google Scholar. For documents of this period, see Tinker, H. (ed.), Burma: The Struggle for Independence, 1944–48, 2 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1983, 1984)Google Scholar.

3 “Aung San-Attlee Agreement”, Government of Burma, Burma's Fight for Freedom: Independence Commemoration (1948), pp. 44–48Google Scholar.

4 For further information about Aung San, see Silverstein, Josef (ed. and contributor), The Political Legacy of Aung San (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper no. 72, 1972)Google Scholar. For the view of the Shans, on the Panglong meeting, see Mangrai, Sao Saimong, The Shan State and the British Annexation (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper no. 57, 1965), pp. 307–311Google Scholar.

5 “The Panglong Agreement”, Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry, 1947. Part I: Report (Rangoon: Supdt. Government Printing and Stationery, Burma, 1947), pp. 16–17Google Scholar.

6 Constituent Assembly of Burma, The Constitution of the Union of Burma (Rangoon: Government Printing and Stationery, 1948)Google Scholar.

7 For a very useful collection of documents and commentary, including the Goshal Thesis — the document which is the intellectual basis for the BCP's change from a peaceful to a militant line in 1947–48, see Tin, Thakin Ba, “On the Present Political Situation in Burma and Our Tasks”, in Fleishmann, Klaus (ed.), Documents on Communism in Burma 1945–47 (Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Instituts fur Asienkunde, 1989)Google Scholar.

8 For good brief discussions of the early days of the uprising, see Tinker, H., The Union of Burma (London: Oxford University Press, 1961 [3rd ed.]), Chap. IIGoogle Scholar. Also, Trager, Frank N., Burma: From Kingdom to Republic (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 95–139Google Scholar. For the government's view at the time, see Burma and the Insurrections (Rangoon: Government of the Union of Burma Publication, 1949)Google Scholar.

9 For a good account of the origins of the Caretaker Government from a military point of view, see Win, Sein, The Split Story (Rangoon: The Guardian Ltd., 1959)Google Scholar. For U Nu's version, see Nu, U, U Nu — Saturday's Son (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 323–29Google Scholar.

10 For the military's assessment of their rule under the Caretaker Government, see Ministry of Information, Is Trust Vindicated? (Rangoon: Director of Information, Government of the Union of Burma, 1960)Google Scholar.

11 For a fuller discussion, see Silverstein, Josef, “From Democracy to Dictatorship”, Current History 46 (1964): 83–88Google Scholar.

12 A fuller treatment of this can be found in Silverstein, Josef, “National Unity In Burma: Is It Possible?” in Durable Stability in Southeast Asia, ed. Snitwongse, Kusuma and Paribatra, Sukhumbhand (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 75–95Google Scholar.

13 Most of the material used in this and later portions of the paper was gathered by the author during several research trips made to the minority areas between 1984 and 1988.

14 The Working People's Daily, 7 06 1987Google Scholar.

15 For a discussion of the 1974 constitution see Silverstein, op. cit., pp. 121–34, for one interpretation and Robert H. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 300–372.

16 Amnesty International, Burma: Extrajudicial Execution and Torture of Members of Ethnic Minorities (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1988)Google Scholar.

17 National Democratic Front (NDF) (Burma) Statement of the Second Congress, Karen National Union (KNU) Bulletin, no. 12, August 1987, pp. 1–2.

18 The BCP position on the minorities has been articulated in several documents. Beginning in the Report to the Central Committee by Chairman Ba Thein Tin on 1 November 1978 and in speeches and published documents, the line of the party has been to recognize minority autonomy as a way of winning wider backing from the peoples amongst whom it resided.

19 Kachin Independence Organization Opium Statement, 1988 (mimeo 5 pages).

20 General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Senate: Drug Control — Enforcement Efforts in Burma Are Not Effective (Washington, D.C.: GAO/NSIAD-89–197), pp. 17–22Google Scholar.

21 Silverstein, Josef and Wohl, Julian, “University Students and Politics in Burma”, Pacific Affairs 38, no. 1 (1964): 50–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Lintner, Bertil, Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Co. Ltd., 1989)Google Scholar is the first book on the 1988 revolution by a reporter who documented it originally on the pages of the Far Eastern Economic Review.

23 Working People's Daily (Rangoon), 24 07 1988Google Scholar.

24 Amnesty International, Myanmar (Burma) Prisoners of Conscience: A Chronicle of Developments Since September 1988. AI Index: ASA 16/23/89. 11 1989 (hereafter cited as AI Myanmar)Google Scholar. Baw U Tun, in this document, is the same person as Paw U Tun in Bertil Lintner, op. cit.

25 Central Committee Democratic Alliance of Burma, Declaration of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (mimeo), 20 11 1988Google Scholar.

26 Bangkok Post, 25 and 26 May 1989.

27 Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 March and 1 June 1989.

28 Ibid., October 1988, pp. 16–17. “State Law and Order Restoration Council Chairman General Saw Maung's Statement”, Working People's Daily (Rangoon), 6 07 1989Google Scholar.

29 “The State LORC Law No. 15/89 of June 18, 1989”, The Working People's Daily (Rangoon), 19 06 1989Google Scholar. The restrictions on foreign journalists travelling to Burma was announced on 20 July.

30 Law 2/88 issued 18 September 1988 prohibited public gatherings of more than 5 persons and said “no one is permitted to block roads or demonstrate en mass”. Law 4/88, issued on 27 September allowed parties to form and register; Law 8/88 issued 10 October 1988 declared “political parties … must not damage particular persons or organizations and that they were not allowed to issue any literature or make speeches aimed at dividing the Defence Forces” and warned that “effective action would be taken against any who violated the law”.

31 “Election Commission Notification No. 245 of March 22, 1989”, announced that as of that date, 231 parties had been officially registered while 3 had been deregistered. In November 1989, the military rulers announced that 27 May 1990 had to be fixed as the date of election.

32 The extra-judicial powers of the army were established in Rule Number 1/89 and 2/89; for discussion of this and the arrests, see AI Myanmar, pp. 8–9Google Scholar.

33 Asiaweek, 21 July 1989.

34 See Maung, Saw's news conference, 5 07 1989, Working People's Daily, 6 07 1989Google Scholar.

35 Figures given to the author by student leaders in July 1989, during his visit to the border camps.