¹ This paper focuses on the manufacturing sector of Burma, but the terms “manufacturing” and “industrial” sector will be used interchangeably unless otherwise indicated. Strictly speaking “industry” refers not only to manufacturing but also to construction, mining, and utilities.

² The most comprehensive recent publication is Steinberg, David I., Burma's Road Towards Development: Growth and Ideology Under Military Rule (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981)Google Scholar.

³ The figure for Thailand in column (1) appears anomalous. In any case, this column only refers to the whole of the industrial sector, and Burma's non-manufacturing industrial sector would almost certainly be relatively larger than that of the other less industrialized countries.

⁴ The effect of the occupation on manufacturing is illustrated partly in the 1953-54 Manufacturing Census data, which provided information on the establishment date of firms employing 10 or more workers. According to the Census, only about four per cent of firms were aged 9-11 years, that is, roughly corresponding to the occupation period. The Census results are given in Myint, Kyaw, “Industrialization in Burma” (Master of Economics Thesis, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1978), p. 57Google Scholar.

⁵ Spate, O.H., “Beginnings of Industrialization in Burma”, Economic Geography 17, 1 (1941): 75–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ For a detailed description of the rice milling industry prior to 1940 see Siok-hwa, Cheng, The Rice Industry of Burma 1852-1940 (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968), Chapter 4, pp. 77–111Google Scholar.

⁷ , Spate, “Beginnings of Industrialization”, p. 84Google Scholar. See also , Cheng, The Rice Industry of Burma, p. 85Google Scholar. Spate also believes that effective Burmese control was even less, for several reasons.

⁸ This very approximate estimate is derived by comparing the 1930 estimate of Spate, “Beginnings of Industrialization”, Table 1, with that of Andrus, J. Russel, Burmese Economic Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1947), Table 21Google Scholar.

⁹ Walinsky, Louis J., Economic Development in Burma 1951-1960 (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), p. 143Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Furnivall, J.S., An Introduction to the Political Economy of Burma, third edition (Rangoon, 1957), p. aaGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ , Myint, “Industrialization in Burma”, p. 89 ff provides a useful account of developments over this periodGoogle Scholar.

¹² Walinsky, Economic Development in Burma, Chapter 17, records the performance of the state manufacturing enterprises in the 1950s in detail.

¹⁴ Although essentially a political document, much useful information on the situation in industry in the late 1950s is contained in , Burma, Director of Information, Is Trust Vindicated? (Rangoon, 1960)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Stifel, Lawrence D., “Economics of the Burmese Way to Socialism”, Asian Survey 11, 8 (1971), p. 804CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ A similar phenomenon appears to have occurred in Indonesian manufacturing in the late 1960s before the onset of rapid growth in the 1970s. See Peter McCawley and Maree Tait, “New Data on Employment in Manufacturing, 1970-1977”, and “Reply”, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 15, 1 (1979), pp. 125–36 and 15, 3 (1979), pp. 132-44Google Scholar.

¹⁶ On the latter point, see Fenichel, Allen and Khan, Azfar, “The Burmese Way to ‘Socialism’”, World Development 9, 9/10 (1981), p. 817CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ , Steinberg, Burma's Road Towards Development, pp. 137–61Google Scholar, discusses the reforms that are examined in the next few paragraphs.

¹⁸ For example, the “Guidelines for the Fourth Four Year Plan” (1982-83 - 1985-86) adopted at the Fourth Party Congress in 1981 are very general, but they do not rule out the possibility of foreign investment. They state in part that “[where] investment projects may require either the capital intensity beyond the means of the state or advanced technical knowhow … mutually beneficial economic cooperation with the foreign public or private enterprises will be considered for specified periods, provided that they are not contrary to the Socialist system”. Similar general statements were made at the Third Party Congress in 1977, on which see , Fenichel and , Khan, “The Burmese Way to ‘Socialism’”, p. 817Google Scholar.

¹⁹ For details, see , Myint, “Industrialization in Burma”, p. 202ffGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ For a survey of state enterprises in developing countries, see Lai, Deepak, “Public Enterprises”, in Policiesfor Industrial Progress in Developing Countries, ed. Cody, John, Hughes, Helen, and Wall, David (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1980), pp. 211–34Google Scholar. For a review of several case studies of state enterprises, see Choksi, Armeane M., State Intervention in the Industrialization of Developing Countries: Selected Issues (Washington: World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 341, 1979), Section IIGoogle Scholar.

²¹ McCawley, Peter, “Some Consequences of the Pertamina Crisis in Indonesia”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9, I (03 1978), p. 24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² State enterprises are organized into corporations, which in manufacturing number nine: six in light industry under Ministry of Industry I (foodstuff, textile, ceramic, pharmaceutic and household, metal, and general), and three under Ministry of Industry II (paper and chemical, petro-chemical, and heavy). The Ministry's jurisdiction includes price changes, foreign exchange allocations, investments, labour force ceilings, and recruitment and promotion of senior personnel. The corporation decides on product mix, marketing and distribution, and matters concerning middle-level employees. Theoretically, each enterprise acts only as a virtual production unit. However, in practice some plant managers do have a considerable amount of discretionary authority, especially in those located out of Rangoon.

²³ This explains the ubiquitous phenomenon, in Rangoon and other cities, of long queues outside railway stations, cinemas and such like, and empty shelves in some of the official stores. For a recent report on the unofficial market, see Sricharatchanya, Paisal, “Burma - The Prize of Isolation”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 10 1982Google Scholar.

²⁴ For example, the largest “manufactured” export is jute, which in 1981-82 was estimated to account for more than 40 per cent of the total value. Other items valued at over Kl million that could also be classified as non-manufactures include raw cotton, coffee beans, and raw duck feathers.

²⁵ A recent comparative study of tin processing in the USA and Malaysia is likely to be of relevance to Burma. The study found that production costs were higher in Malaysia because of greater wastage and less intensive capacity utilization. Tin is one of Burma's main mineral products and there is no reason to presume that its costs would be lower than in Malaysia. For details of the study, see Lim, David, “Industrial Processing and Location: A Study of Tin”, World Development 8. 2 (1980), pp. 205–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ For example, according to the Report to the Pyithu Hluttaw in 1980-81, a little over 2, 000 motor vehicles were produced, including jeeps amd mini-cars. This may be compared with generally accepted estimates of minimum scale economies of 100.000 to 500, 000 units for passenger cars and 20.000 to 40, 000 for medium-sized trucks; see Baranson, Jack, Automotive Industries in Developing Countries (Washington: World Bank Staff Occasional Papers No. 8, 1969), p. 24Google Scholar. Of course, these estimates assume 100 per cent local content, and much depends on the nature of the motor vehicle. But they do suggest that local production of some products is likely to be highly uneconomic.