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Charops and Roman Policy in Epirus

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 September 2012

H. H. Scullard
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Extract

In the settlement of Greece after the Third Macedonian War Roman policy was at times moderate, at times harsh. On occasion the difference might represent only an individual point of view: thus the terms imposed upon Macedonia might seem generous to a Roman who contemplated the grant of ‘freedom’ to the Macedonians, the reduction of taxation and the absence of territorial aggression on Rome's part, while they might equally seem harsh to a Macedonian who felt that his sense of nationhood had been violated by Rome's creation of the four independent Republics. But towards Epirus Roman policy seems to have been marked by two successive stages, the first moderate, the second brutal. It is the purpose of this note to attempt to consider the causes which determined this change and to examine what influence the Epirote Charops exercised upon the measures which turned his country into a playground for Roman brutality and ultimately into an abomination of desolation.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Roman Studies , Volume 35 , Issue 1-2 , November 1945 , pp. 58 - 64
Copyright
Copyright ©H. H. Scullard 1945. Exclusive Licence to Publish: The Society for the Promotion of Roman Studies

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References

1 On Epirus at this period see in general Niese, B., Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten, iii, 134, 143 ff.Google Scholar, 167 ff., 183, 186 ff.; G. Colin, Rome et la Gréce, 397 ff., 424, 450 ff.; De Sanctis, G., Storia dei Romani iv, i, 294 ff.Google Scholar, 316 ff., 341, 350 ff.; P. V. M. Benecke, CAH viii, ch. viii, esp. 272 ff.; on constitutional matters, Busolt, G.-Swoboda, H., Griechische Staatskunde ii, 1470 ffGoogle Scholar.

2 Pol. xxvii, 15. On Phanota see Livy xliii, 21, 4: ‘Ap. Claudius … Phanotam adortus … auxitia Chaonum Thesprotorumque … secum adduxit’ (despite MS. difficulties these names are fairly certain); Livy xlv, 26, 3.

3 Pol. xxvii, 16; Livy xliii, 21–2.

4 The abortive attack by Ap. Claudius upon Phanota (Liv. xliii, 21–3) was far from being a serious attempt to reduce the whole of Epirus.

5 Pol. xxx, 7; Livy xlv, 26.

6 Livy xlv, 26, 11.

7 Livy xlv, 33, 8. The extent of this devastation is unknown, but it was probably not great compared with what Epirus suffered. The statement of Appian (Illyr. 9) that seventy towns were ravaged has been wrongly transferred from the more brutal treatment that was reserved for Epirus.

8 Pol. xxx, 16; Liv. xlv, 34; Plut. Aemil. 29; App. Illyr. 9; Strabo vii, 322; Pliny, , NH iv, 39Google Scholar.

9 Strabo vii, 327.

10 Livy xlv, 34, 1; Plut. Aemil. 29, 1: ἔχων δόγμα συγκλήτου.

11 Aemil. 30, 1: παρὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἐπιεικῆ καὶ χρηστὴν οὖσαν.

12 Cf., e.g., the shady diplomacy of Q. Marcius Philippus in 172, the conduct of P. Licinius Crassus and C. Lucretius Gallus in 171, and the attack of the praetor L. Hortensius on Abdera in 170. This deterioration was partially checked in 169. Livy xlii, 38–43; 47 (Marcius); xliii, Perioch., and 4, 5 (Licinius); xliii, 4, 5–7; 6, 2–3; 7–8 (Lucretius); xliii, 4, 8–13; 7, 9–11; 8 (Hortensius).

13 Livy xlv, 35–9.

14 Pol. xxx, 13.

15 That Rome was actuated by a desire to avenge the attack made more than a hundred years before upon Italy by Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, is unlikely. There is no evidence that such a desire had burned deeply into the national consciousness. If it had, opportunities to express it had not been lacking in the past, when Rome suppressed the Illyrian pirates and established a Protectorate which bordered on Epirus, or after the First Macedonian War, when Epirus had sided with Macedon.

16 Benecke, P. V. M., CAH viii, 272Google Scholar.

17 Benecke, , ib., 273Google Scholar.

18 Pol. xxvii, 15. Diodorus (xxx, 5; xxxi, 31) is derivative and adds little.

19 Pol. xxx, 13; xxxi, 8.

20 Pol. xxxii, 20–21. The visit of Charops to Rome must have been before or during 160 B.C., the year of the death of Paullus.

21 Pol. xxx, 12.

22 See below, p. 63. Polybius may have been fully aware of the extent of Charops' evil activities (his extreme condemnation suggests that he knew more than he recorded—at least, in the extant books) but have refrained from detailed reference to Charops' attempt to influence senatorial policy, because he might hesitate to suggest that the Senate, of which his patron, Scipio Aemilianus, was one of the brightest adornments, would have given ear to the suggestions of such a villain. True, Polybius gives more detail about the evil influence which Callicrates exercised upon the Senate, but then Achaea was more germane to his theme and interests than was Epirus.

23 Pol. xxvii, 15.

24 Thuc. ii, 80–81. This implies that the Chaonians were the chief tribe in 429 B.C. For the earlier Molossian predominance see Cross, G. N., Epirus (Cambridge, 1932), 6Google Scholar.

25 Cf. especially Münzer, F., Römische Adelsparteien und Adelsfamilien (Stuttgart, 1920), 202–223Google Scholar.

26 Pol. xxvii, 16.

27 Senatorial policy was no doubt generally determined by the senior members, and in the Senate of 167 the plebeians predominated. The three senior members were the patrician Princeps Senatus, M. Aemilius Lepidus, and the censorii plebeii, M. Porcius Cato and Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (the two surviving censorii patricii, A. Postumius Albinus and C. Claudius Pulcher, were absent in Greece): their past careers suggest that these three men would counsel moderation, Among the men who had held the consulship in the last twenty years and who certainly or probably survived in 167 the newer plebeian families pre-dominated. Of the patricians there were Cn. Servilius Caepio (cos. 169), Sp. Postumius Albinus (174), C. Valerius Laevinus (176), A. Manlius Vulso (178), L. Manlius Acidinus (179), P. Cornelius Cethegus (181), possibly P. Claudius Pulcher (184, last mentioned in 181), Ap. Claudius Pulcher (185)— Cn. Servilius Caepio (169), L. Aemilius Paullus (182 and 168) and Q. Fabius Labeo (183) were absent in Greece—i.e. some eight patrician consulars. The plebeians were A. Hostilius Mancinus (170), A. Atilius Serranus (170), C. Cassius Longinus (171), P. Licinius Crassus (171), C. and M. Popillius Laenas (172 and 173), Q. and P. Mucius Scaevola (174 and 175). M. Iunius Brutus (178), and possibly Q. Fulviusi Flaccus (cos. suff. 180), M. and Cn. Baebius Tamphilus (181 and 182), and C. Flaminius (187)—C. Licinius Crassus (168), P. Aelius Ligus (172), and Q. Marcius Philippus (186) were in Greece. It is scarcely profitable to go back beyond 187, as apart from the plebeian M. Servilius Pulex Geminus, none of the earlier consuls,was certainly alive in 167. Thus in the Senate of 167 there were perhaps thirteen plebeian consulars over against the eight patricians, who would probably be supported on this issue by the three senior members. If in the light of the recent severe tension between patricians and plebeians it is legitimate to suppose that the majority of the plebeians would support the more extreme plebeian consuls of 172–168 and that the patricians would tend towards greater moderation, it will be seen that opinion in the Senate would be fairly evenly balanced. This would help to explain the more moderate policy of 168, when the plebeians had to give some ground under patrician pressure, and the more extreme policy of 167, when the plebeians at home were perhaps slightly more influential again, as they had gained both consulships for 167. The balance will have been tilted, by the more aggressive plebeian leaders, who in turn may have listened to the evil counsels of Charops.