¹ Richardson, J. S., ‘The Tabula Contrebiensis: Roman Law in Spain in the Early First Century B.C.’, JRS LXXIII (1983), 33Google Scholar = Richardson (1983). For a bibliography reference is made to p. 33 n. 1 of that article, to which should now be added J. L. Murga, ‘La addictio del gobernador en los litigios provinciates’, RIDA 30 (1983), 151 and P. Birks, ‘A New Argument for a Narrow View of Litem Suam Facere’, T.v.R. 59 (1984), forthcoming. The following works will be cited in abbreviated form: D'Ors, A., ‘Las formulas procesales del “Bronce de Contrebia”’, Annuario de Historia de Derecho Español 50 (1980), 1Google Scholar = D'Ors (1980); Torrent, A., ‘Consideraciones juridicas sobre el Bronce de Contrebia’, Cuadernos de trabajos de la Escuela Española de Historia y Arqueologia en Roma 15 (1981) 95Google Scholar = Torrent (1981); Lenel, O., Das Edictum Perpetuum³ (1956) = Lenel, E.P.Google Scholar; Kaser, M., Das römische Zivilprozessrecht (1966) = Kaser, Z.P.Google Scholar

² The text presented here is based on the readings of Fatás and Richardson. For apparatus criticus see Richardson (1983), 33–4.

³ Richardson (1983), 35–6.

⁴ Way, R. and Simmons, M., A Geography of Spain and Portugal (1962), 24–7, 55–9, 289–95Google Scholar; Schulten, A., Iberische Landeskimde 1 (1955), 193–5Google Scholar. For brief account of recent irrigation, see Nir, D., The Semi-arid World (1974), 154–8Google Scholar.

⁵ Beltrán, A., ‘El tramo de la vía romana entre Ilerda y Celsa y otros datos para el conocimiento de los Monegros’, Actas del primer congreso internactional de estudiospirenaicos (Zaragoza, 1952), 4. 3. 189–208Google Scholar; cf. Fatás, G., ‘Notas sobre el dique romano de Muel’, Caesaraugusta 21/22 (1963), 174–7Google Scholar.

⁶ On the excavation at Botorrita, see Beltrán, A. and Tovar, A., Contrebia Belaisca I (1982), 9–33Google Scholar.

⁷ Gabba, E. and Pasquinucci, M., Strutture agrarie e allevamento transumante nell' Italia romana (III–II sec. a.C.) (1979), 17–29Google Scholar.

⁸ On the ager publicus/privatus distinction, see M. Kaser, ZSS 62 (1942), 1; on the interpretation of this clause, see below p. 55.

⁹ D. 18. 1. 6 pr. (Pomponius 9 ad Sabinum, citing Celsus).

¹⁰ Frontinus, de aquis 2. 128.

¹¹ Thus Tod, M. N., International arbitration among the Greeks (1913), 181–2Google Scholar. See the survey of the position by A. J. Marshall, ‘The survival and development of international jurisdiction in the Greek world’, ANRW 11. 13 (1980), 626–61.

¹² Thus in the epigraphic texts: Magnesia v. Priene (mid-second century: Syll. ³ 679); Narthacium v. Melitaea (c. 140 B.C.: Syll. ³ 674); Lacedaemonia v. Messene (c. 140 B.C.: Syll. ³ 683); Priene v. Samos (135 B.C.: Syll. ³ 688); Hierapytna V. Itanos (112 B.C.: Inscr. Cret. III. 4. 9 and 10).

¹³ Syll. ³ 679, 11. 47–51.

¹⁴ FIRA 3, no. 163, 11. 1–14.

¹⁵ Richardson (1983), 40.

¹⁶ Thus for instance Syll. ³ 747 and IG XII (suppl.), 11. The only instance known to us of a direct appeal by Greek cities to a provincial governor is that of Cierium and Metropolis to C. Poppaeus Sabinus in the reign of Tiberius (IG IX. 2. 261). Sabinus referred the matter to the Thessalian league.

¹⁷ A. J. Marshall, ANRW 11. 13. 640–50. Arangio-Ruiz, commenting on the dispute between Magnesia and Priene (FIRA 3, p. 502), observed that the document ‘ad Romanorum ius respicit ordinemque iudiciorum privatorum quam maxime imitatur’. In view of the terms of the tabula Contrebiensis ‘quam maxime’ perhaps appears somewhat excessive. For another instance of the formulae in an unexpected context, see the Babatha archive, from Petra in the second century A.D. (SB X. 10288).

¹⁸ Thus Syll. ³ 683, 11. 53–5; Syll. ³ 679, 11. 53–5; Inscr. Cret. III. 4. 10, 11. 56–8; Partsch, J., Die Schriftformel im römischen Provinzialprozesse (1905), 3–52Google Scholar; Passerini, A., ‘Nuove e vecchie tracce dell' interdetto uti possidetis negli arbitrati pubblici internazionali del II secolo A.C.,’ Athenaeum N.s. 15 (1937), 25–56Google Scholar; A. J. Marshall, ANRW 11. 13. 649 n. 79. On the procedure under the interdict uti possidetis, see Thomas, J. A. C., Textbook of Roman Law (1976), 115–17, 147–8Google Scholar; Kaser, Z.P. 220 n. 38 and 526.

¹⁹ Gaius 4. 160; Kaser, Z.P. 327–8.

²⁰ M. N. Tod, op. cit. (n. 11), esp. 70–106.

²¹ Lenel, E.P. 374. D'Ors (1980), 18 and Torrent (1981), 100 n. 10 wrongly rely on Lenel, E.P. 193, which deals with other servitudes.

²² Contra Torrent (1980), 99–100, who asserts that there was a consensual arbitration, the judgment in which was endorsed a posteriori by Flaccus. This view is quite untenable.

²³ Buckland, W. W., A Textbook of Roman Law³ (1963), 630–1Google Scholar; Kaser, Z.P. 162–7, 170–9.

²⁴ See further below p. 50.

²⁵ On Flaccus in Spain, Richardson (1983), 40.

²⁶ Richardson (1983), 40.

²⁷ D'Ors (1980), II, Torrent (1981), 98, 100.

²⁸ The part of the formula in which the plaintiff expresses what he claims, discussed below, pp. 63–4. And see esp., Lenel, E.P. 374.

²⁹ See above.

³⁰ Below, p. 52 and p. 59.

³¹ D'Ors (1980), 9 and thereafter throughout the article; Torrent (1981), 98 and again thereafter throughout the article.

³² cf. D. 43. 21. 1. 2 and 3 (Ulpian 70 ad ed.); Lenel, E.P. 480.

³³ cf. D. 39. 3. 11 pr. (Paul 49 ad ed.).

³⁴ Torrent (1981), 100 et seq.

³⁵ cf. FIRA 3, no. 106 0. See on it Colognesi, L. Capogrossi, La struttura della proprietà e la formazione dei ‘iura praediorum’ nell' età repubblicana vol. 2 (1976). 279 n. 19Google Scholar.

³⁶ Even in the inscription cited in the preceding note, specific reference is made to the conveyance: ‘comparatis et emancipatis’.

³⁷ Richardson (1983), 39.

³⁸ For iure suo cf. D. 8. 3. 29 (Paul 2 epit. Alfeni dig.); D. 7. 1. 44 (Neratius 3 memb.) and D. 43. 19. 7 (Celsus 25 dig.).

³⁹ For both cf. Gaius 4. 36. In Gaius 4. 34 the ‘tum si’ following the fiction that Aulus Agerius is heir appears to be partly conjectural; the other rests on the manuscript. The subjunctives are also to be found in Gaius 4. 37.

⁴⁰ Richardson (1983), 37 et seq.

⁴¹ Gaius 4. 37.

⁴² Leumann, M., Hofmann, J. B., Szantyr, A., Lateinische Grammatik vol. 2Google Scholar (1965, reprinted with corrections 1972), para. 234. Plural verbs are found with collective nouns. For the detail see op. cit., para. 233 IA.

⁴³ We are grateful for the assistance of Mr. L. D. Reynolds and Mr. D. L. Stockton in this matter.

⁴⁴ p. 72 below.

⁴⁵ Richardson (1983), 33–4. On the basis of an examination of the coloured photograph included in Fatás, G., Contrebia Belaisca II (1980)Google Scholar, M. H. Crawford would read AVT without qualification. We have rejected a reconstruction ast, which by itself would have eased our difficulties, but which is never followed by a separate ‘si’.

⁴⁶ cf. D. 43. 24. 11. 5 (Ulpian 71 ad ed.); C.J. 6. 38. 4. Ib (Justinian). For the meanings of ‘aut’, including ‘aut’ = ‘et’, cf. Leumann, Hofmann, Szantyr, op. cit. (n. 42), vol. 2, para. 269.

⁴⁷ For examples, cf. Kaser, Z.P. 245 n. 63.

⁴⁸ D'Ors (1980), 11.

⁴⁹ Torrent (1981), 98.

⁵⁰ Richardson (1983), 35.

⁵¹ See p. 59.

⁵² The suggestion of Torrent that Valerius Flaccus was not involved at this stage seems quite without foundation: Torrent (1981), 100.

⁵³ D'Ors (1980), 14.

⁵⁴ FIRA I, no. 21.

⁵⁵ de aquis 2. 128. The comments on this passage by P. Bonfante, Corso di diritto romano 11. 1 (1926 eprinted 1966), 286, cited by D'Ors (1980), 14 are not satisfactory.

⁵⁶ D'Ors (1980), 13.

⁵⁷ This is discussed in more detail below.

⁵⁸ D'Ors (1980), II makes the strange deduction that the tense ‘ducetur’ shows that the aqueduct has already been constructed by the time of the legal proceedings.

⁵⁹ See also n. 46 above.

⁶⁰ de Zulueta, F., The Institutes of Gaius, Part n (1953), 259Google Scholar.

⁶¹ He was urban praetor in or before 96 B.C.: Broughton, M.R.R. II. 9.

⁶² D'Ors (1980), 9, 19; Torrent (1981), 98, 100.

⁶³ Its nearest rivals are those of the Lex Rubria, n. 68 below.

⁶⁴ Buckland, op. cit. (n. 23 above), 167.

⁶⁵ Below, p. 65.

⁶⁶ Below, n. 72.

⁶⁷ II Verr. 2. 12. 31.

⁶⁸ Cap. 20, FIRA I, no. 19, col. 1, 22, 33. For the date, see Bruna, F. J., Lex Rubria (1972), 322–5Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Gaius 4. 34, 36, 37, 47. Cf. n. 117 below. The reason for the omission of names may be no more than the extreme anxiety, exemplified by the Lex Rubria, cap. 20, col. 1, 1. 45, lest names be taken to be part of the model pleading, something later obviated by the invention of Aulus Agerius and Numerius Negidius; semble, however, there never was a ‘Julius Judicius’ vel sim.

⁷⁰ cf. Lex Coloniae Genetivae, caps. 96, 99, FIRA 1, no. 21, col. 3, 11. 10–12, col. 4, 1. 4.

⁷¹ D. 42. 1. 37 (Marcellus 3 dig.); D. 42. 1. 39 (Celsus 3 dig.); D. 4. 8. 17. 7 (Ulpian 13 ad ed.); D. 4. 8. 18 (Pomponius 17 epist. et var. lect.). Cf. Kaser, Z.P. 284.

⁷² C. Giordano, Rend. Acc. Arch. Napoli 46 (1971), 181; L'Année Epigraphique (1973), 155, 156.

⁷³ J. G. Wolf, ‘Aus dem Neuen Pompejanischen Urkundenfund: die Kondiktionen des C. Sulpicius Cinnamus’, SDHI 45 (1979), 141; but see Selb, W., ‘Zu Anfängen des Formularverfahrens’, Festschrift W. Flume vol. 1 (1978), 99Google Scholar, esp. 100 f.

⁷⁴ Subsequent nomination was supported by Kaser, Z.P. 215 f.; also earlier by Lenel, ‘Zur Form der klassischen Litiskontestation’, ZSS 24 (1903), 329–40. Lenel's main argument was based on D. 5. 1. 28. 4, which contemplates a litis contestatio in Rome for a trial to be held in the provinces. He derides the suggestion that there might have been a delegated nomination in that case: ‘Iudex esto quern Titius propraetor dabit’ (p. 338). He attaches importance to the omission of names from standard nominations (as to which see n. 69 above). For the contrary view, see Wlassak, M., Römische Processgesetze vol. 2 (1891) 197Google Scholar, n. 18; Pugliese, G., Il processo civile romano vol. 2 (1) (1963), 238 fGoogle Scholar. And see esp. next note.

⁷⁵ Jahr, G., Litis Contestatio (1960), 24 f., 84 f.Google Scholar; Wolf, op. cit. (n. 73 above), 155–8.

⁷⁶ Above, n. 74.

⁷⁷ Broggini, G., Iudex Arbiterve (1957), 11 f., 15 fGoogle Scholar. His two textual references do not, however, warrant this backdating: (i) Varro, Ling. Lat. 6. 61; ‘Hinc ilia indicit ilium, indixit funus, prodixit diem, addixit iudicium’. (ii) Macrobius, Sat. 1. 16. 28: ‘Trebatius in libro primo religionum ait, nundinis magistratum posse manumittere iudiciaque addicere.’

⁷⁸ Below, p. 72.

⁷⁹ Gaius 4. 45–6.

⁸⁰ Gaius 4. 1–5; Kaser, Z.P. 250–6.

⁸¹ cf. also n. 99 below.

⁸² Above, p. 52.

⁸³ Gaius 4. 34, 35 (Serviana, not to be confused with the pledge-creditor's action: Lenel, E.P. 433, 493; Kaser, Z.P. 311).

⁸⁴ Above, n. 68.

⁸⁵ The emendation appears to derive from Mommsen, cf. Krüger, P., Studemund, W., Gai Institutiones⁷ (1923), ad loc.Google Scholar; cf. Theophilus 4. 6. 6.

⁸⁶ Above, n. 67.

⁸⁷ Gaius 4. 34, 35. Lenel, E.P. 427. Rutilius was probably P. Rutilius Rufus, consul in 105 B.C.: Jolowicz, H. F. and Nicholas, B., Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law³ (1972), 93Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ On condemnationes, see above.

⁸⁹ Gaius 3. 194.

⁹⁰ The development of Rutilian formulae is more easily accepted if all formulae originally directed declarations before proceeding to condemnatio pecuniaria: see below, p. 70.

⁹¹ Gaius 4. 43.

⁹² Gaius 4. 44; cf. Lenel, E.P. 211.

⁹³ For these questions see now Hackl, K., Praeiudicium im klassischen römischen Recht (1976), esp. 17 f., 189 f., 293 fGoogle Scholar. See also Triantaphyllopoulos, J., ‘Praeiudicium’, Labeo 8 (1962), 73, 220Google Scholar; ‘Praeiudicium legis Cicereiae’, Labeo 10 (1964), 24, 171Google Scholar; Pissard, H., Les questions préjudicielles en droit rornai (1907)Google Scholar; Bekker, E. I., Die Aktionen des römischen Privatrechts vol. 1 (1871), 283–95Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ Richardson (1983), 37 went further than we now feel able to.

⁹⁵ For text, see above, p. 63.

⁹⁶ Gaius 4. 44.

⁹⁷ (a) sed quaedam: sed 〈abesse potest una aliave; item solae〉 quaedam (Mommsen). (b) aliquis libertus: 〈an quis libertus〉 (Kübler). (c) vel adīudicatio sine demonstratione nullas vires habet (Kübler): vel adiudicatio sine demonstratione vel intentione nullas vires habet (Krüger).

⁹⁸ Maitland, F. W., The Forms of Action at Common Law(1936, repr. 1965), 2Google Scholar.

⁹⁹ This may mean no more than that the wording does not allege that the defendant ought to give or do anything (i.e. that the formula was not framed ‘against a person’. But this is the only place where praeiudicia are said to be framed in rem and its meaning has been much disputed. See Hackl, op. cit. (n. 93 above), 199 n. 22; Kaser, Z.P. 253, 267 n. 41.

¹⁰⁰ Theophilus, , Institutionum Graeca Paraphrasis, ed. Ferrini, E. C. (1897), 424 = J. 4. 6. 13Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ E.P. 312 f.

¹⁰² von Bethmann-Hollweg, M. A., Der Civilprozess des Gemeinen Rechts vol. 2 (1865), 328, 335, 339Google Scholar; Rudorff, A. F., Edicti perpetui quae reliqua sunt (1869), 128Google Scholar; Greenidge, A. H. J., The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (1901), 154Google Scholar.

¹⁰³ loc. cit., n. 101 above. The only place in which such a ‘si paret’ clause could conceivably be put would be before the nomination of the judge, in which case a praeiudicium would only operate as a pre-condition to the judge's own authority. To this remote possibility there are some decisive objections. Inter alia there would be no logical basis for the judge's own jurisdiction when, finding against the plaintiff, he destroyed his own commission. A conditional nominatio is therefore difficult to accept.

¹⁰⁴ ibid. Nobody has proposed a direct question— because of what Theophilus 4. 6. 6 says. But this possibility must be kept in play.

¹⁰⁵ K. Hackl, op. cit. (n. 93 above), 26, 193 f., 204 f.; Kaser, Z.P. 239, 266; J. Triantaphyllopoulos, op. cit. (1962; n. 93 above), 225, 238; Buckland, op. cit. (n. 23 above), 651.

¹⁰⁶ Siber, H., ‘Praeiudicia als Beweismittel’, Festschrift Wenger vol. 1 (1944), 46, 69Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁷ Hotman, François, Commentarius in quatuor libros Institutionum luris Civilis² (Basle, 1569), 377Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁸ For the combination of ‘apparere’ and ‘pronuntiare’, in place of ‘parere’ and ‘iudicare’, see D. 40. 12. 7. 5 (Ulpian 55 ad ed.).

¹⁰⁹ Schulz, F., Classical Roman Law (1951), 49Google Scholar.

¹¹⁰ loc. cit., n. 100 above.

¹¹¹ Lenel, E.P. 312 n. 4. Lenel's view was affected also by his opinion that there was no ‘praeiudicium an liber sit’ in classical law. Cf. E.P. 379 f. Cf. also the discussion of Servius, Aen. 11. 593 by Triantaphyllopoulos, op. cit. (1962; n. 93 above), 238, which shows that Servius also contemplated a ‘si paret’ formulation.

¹¹² Cit., above n. 100. The French translation of J. C. Frégier (1847) retains the indicative: ‘S'il appert que je suis libre.’

¹¹³ e.g. D. 40. 12. 7. s (Ulpian 54 ad ed.); D. 43. 30. 1. 4 (Ulpian 71 ad ed.); D. 2. 4. 8. 1 (Ulpian 5 ad ed.); D. 25. 3. 7 (Modestinus 5 resp.); D. 37. 10. 4 (Julian 34 dig.); D. 40. 14. 6 (Marcellus 7 dig.); D. 40. 14. 5 (Papinian, 10 Resp.).

¹¹⁴ Equally, the an-form found in the texts does not necessarily point, as Lenel really suggests, to the formulae being framed with an.

¹¹⁵ cf. Hackl, op. cit. (n. 93 above), 246–57. And note for a different species of valuation which can be accommodated to the form of a *iudicatio: Paul, Sent. 5. 9. 1; cf. Kaser, Z.P. 38 f.

¹¹⁶ If the judge is not convinced that the plaintiff has proved that X is the case, what should he say ? Should he say ‘X is not so’ or should he say ‘I am not able to say that X is so’ ? Siber was much troubled by this, op. cit. (n. 106 above), 70; cf. D. 44. 2. 15. The same logical difficulty underlay counsel's argument for the next-of-kin in Re Baden's Trusts (No. 2) (1972) Ch. 607, 616, 625, (1973) Ch. 9, 14, 19, 20.

¹¹⁷ For near-neurosis and hence for the degree of meticulousness to be expected, see Lex Rubria, loc. cit. (n. 69 above): legislation was thought necessary to take the specimen names out of the pleadings and then—even more revealing—to allow them in again, should it be that the real party or place happened to share the specimen name.

¹¹⁸ Contrary to the inference from 1. 13; see above, p. 59.

¹¹⁹ Above, p. 55.

¹²⁰ Wlassak laid more stress on the efficacy of the agreement of the parties as the source of the judge's authority, but even he did not exclude the need for reinforcement by a magistrate manifested in the iussum iudicandi. See Wlassak, M., ‘Die Litiskontestation in Formularprozess’, Festschrift Windscheid (1889), 53Google Scholar; ‘Der Judikationsbefehl der römischen Prozesse’, Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Phil.-hist. Klasse 197 (1921)Google Scholar, Abh. 4. However, Wlassak's consensual interpretation of litis contestatio has now been repudiated: G. Jahr, op. cit. (n. 75 above), passim; Wolff, op. cit. (n. 73 above), 154.

¹²¹ But we cannot follow Torrent (1981), 99 f. in the opinion that this is a consensual arbitration merely endorsed by Roman authority.

¹²² Below, p. 71.

¹²³ D. 25. 3. 3 pr. (Ulpian 34 ad ed.); D. 2. 4. 8. 1 (Ulpian 5 ad leg. Jul. et Pap.); cf. Hackl, op. cit. (n. 93 above), 298–318.

¹²⁴ D. 44. 1. 12 (Ulpian 38 ad ed.).

¹²⁵ D. 25. 3. 1. 16 (Ulpian 34 ad ed.); cf. Theophilus, loc. cit. (n. 100 above).

¹²⁶ See, however, n. 133 (vi).

¹²⁷ Richardson (1983), 38.

¹²⁸ A clausula arbitraria, if included, would empower the iudex to allow the defendant to surrender the res q.d.a. and thus escape condemnation: see Kaser, Z.P. 256–61. The possibility of a iudicare for the plaintiff followed by voluntary surrender of the res and subsequent absolutio brings out the contrast between the judge's findings on the intentio and the separate exercise of condemnatio, as to which see literature cited at n. 140 below.

¹²⁹ Lenel, E.P. 186; cf. Gaius 4. 48; Kaser, Z.P. 297.

¹³⁰ Gaius 4. 48; Broggini, op. cit. (n. 77 above), 65, 96; Kaser, Z.P. 76, 79, 90 ff. Earlier lit., Brini, G., Delia condanna nelle legis actiones (1878)Google Scholar.

¹³¹ Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 20. 1. 38, cf. 4. 4. 2, Broggini, op. cit. (n. 77 above), 143 ff. The legis actiones of the second generation, namely, per iudicis arbitrive postulationem and per condictionem seem always to have had an integrated aestimatio: Kaser, Z.P. 91; cf. Behrends, O., Der Zwölftafelprozess (1974), 132 f.Google Scholar; A. Magdelain, ‘Aspects arbitraux de la justice civile archaique à Rome’, RIDA 27 (1980), 205, 212 f.

¹³² See nn. 61 and 68 above.

¹³³ In particular, (i) the development of Rutilian formulae (cf. p. 63 above); (ii) the logical problems of the demonstratio (see V. Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Le formule con demonstratio e la loro origine’, Rariora (1946), 25, 28 f.); (iii) the different forms of praescriptio (see Gaius 4. 130–7); (iv) the discrete nominatio (p. 61 above); (v) the operation of the clausula arbitraria (cf. n. 140 below); and finally, (vi) the fact that the terminology of formulary analysis as applied to discrete sentences, and in particular to an intentio of that kind, could possibly provide a historical solution to the problems of Gaius 4. 44, p. 65 above. A paper will be published by Birks on this subject. This pattern of development would be in line with the spirit, though not the detail, of the work of Selb who has consistently argued for a less static picture of the form of the pleadings: Selb, W., Formeln mit unbestimmter intentio iuris (1974), esp. 47–56Google Scholar; cf. op. cit. (n. 73 above); also ‘Die Formel der Injurienklage’, Acta Juridica (1978), 29.

¹³⁴ D. Liebs, ‘Damnum, damnare und damnas’, ZSS 85 (1968), 173, 220 f.

¹³⁵ Richardson (1983), 35.

¹³⁶ ibid.

¹³⁷ Vocabularium Jurisprudentiae Romanae vol. 2, s.v. ‘dicere’, cf. vol. 5, s.v. ‘sententia’ (D. 2b: ‘sententia iudicis’). In tab. Cont. the terms ‘sententiam dicere’ and ‘iudicare’ seem to be substantially synonymous. For shades of difference supposedly detectable, see Biondi, B., ’Appunti intorno alia sentenza nel processo civile romano’, Studi Bonfante vol. 4 (1930), 29, 36 fGoogle Scholar.

¹³⁸ For ‘secundum (actorem, etc.)’ see esp. D. 40. 7. 29. I (Pomponius/Quintus Mucius); D. 6. 1. 57 (Alfenus); D. 5. 3. 57 (Neratius). And see also: G. 4. 166a; D. 2. 8. 15. 16; 5. 2. 8. 1 5. 2. 10 pr.; 5. 2. 17. 1; 12. 2. 11. 3; 12. 2. 31 12. 2. 42. 3; 12. 5. 2. 2; 12. 6. 2. 1; 20. 1. 3 pr. 20. 1. 16. 5; 22. 3. 14; 24. 3. 31. 2; 26. 9. 51 30. 50. 1; 34. 9. 16 pr.; 40. 7. 29. 1; 44. 2. 9. 1 44. 4. 4. 7; 48. 1. 14. 1; 48. 14. 24; 50. 16. 158; C.J. 7. 43–60, passim.

¹³⁹ Above, p. 67.

¹⁴⁰ Kaser, Z.P. 259, 285. Beseler tried to establish a strong contrast between ‘pronuntiare’ and ‘iudicare’ in classical law, such that ‘pronuntiare’ would always have been used to declare the rights, prior to a ‘iudicare’ in money: ‘Pronuntiation und Judikat’, Beiträge zur Kritik der römischen Rechtsquellen vol. 2 (1911)Google Scholar; but the truth seems to be that the line is to be drawn not between ‘pronuntiare’ and ‘iudicare’, but between both of them and ‘condemnare’: J. Vášný, ‘Osservazioni generali sulla sentenza e la res judicata’, BIDR 47 (1940), 108; Liebs, op. cit. (n. 134 above), 216 ff., esp. 227–32; A. Magdelain, op. cit. (n. 131 above); Kaser, Z.P. 285 n. 22.

¹⁴¹ de finibus 2. 12. 36. The passage is cited only for the requirement of jurisdiction by Roby, H. J., Roman Private Law vol. 2 (1902Google Scholar, repr. 1975), 392, n. 1; and by Costa, E., Cicerone giureconsulto vol. 2 (1927), 39Google Scholar; and for the cautiousness of the Roman character by Greenidge, A. H. J., The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (1901), 276Google Scholar. The image of giving judgment continues in the next paragraph in which, after consulting a consilium, reason delivers a balanced sententia. Cicero achieves a brilliant contrast between the babble of the senses and the calm judgment of reason, and he incorporates a number of legal allusions.

¹⁴² cf., less vividly, Cicero, , Pro Cluentio 164Google Scholar.

¹⁴³ ‘Secundum Salluienses iudicamus’ may possibly have given effect to a here unrecorded declaration using ‘videtur’, cf. Daube, D., Forms of Roman Legislation (1956), 73–7Google Scholar, and texts there cited, esp. Cicero, Acad. 2. 47. 146; Kaser, Z.P. 88.

¹⁴⁴ Minuciorum sententia, FIRA 3, no. 163 (cf. no. 164); J. Inst. 4. 17. 6; D. 10. 1. 21 (Ulp. 9 ad ed.); D. 10. 1. 3 (Gaius 7 ad ed. prov.).

¹⁴⁵ Gaius 1.2, but note Rhet. ad Her. 2. 13.

¹⁴⁶ A panel of judges, deciding by majority, would have still more reason to declare only their conclusion, since consensus as to conclusion might well conceal a diversity of reasons. On majority decision: D. 42. 1. 36, 38 (Paul 17 ad ed.); Lex repetundarum, FIRA 1, no. 7, 11. 46–56.