Using a special-purpose module implemented in the Health and Retirement Study, we evaluate financial sophistication in the American population over the age of 50. We combine several financial literacy questions into an overall index to highlight which questions best capture financial sophistication and examine the sensitivity of financial literacy responses to framing effects. Results show that many older respondents are not financially sophisticated: they fail to grasp essential aspects of risk diversification, asset valuation, portfolio choice, and investment fees. Subgroups with notable deficits include women, the least educated, non-Whites, and those age 75+. In view of the fact that retirees increasingly must take on responsibility for their own retirement security, such meager levels of knowledge have potentially serious and negative implications.

Sponsors of defined contribution plans often hire financial advisors to help them design and monitor their plans. I find that advisors have a significant impact on the menu of investment options of their clients’ plans. Clients of the same advisor tend to hold the same funds and fund families. They also tend to delete and add the same funds. Advisors’ plans are similar to their clients’ plans in that they tend to hold identical funds, use the same fund families, and fund categories. Thus, to a large extent, advisors take their own advice. However, funds that are in clients’ plans but not in their advisors’ plans have higher expense ratios than the funds held by advisors. Since advisors’ compensation is often tied to the expense ratio of their clients’ funds, this pattern is consistent with misaligned incentives on the part of advisors and their clients.

In this paper, I show that traditional earnings related pay-as-you-go pension systems as we see them in many OECD countries subsidize human capital formation. The reason is that these systems come along with an implicit tax structure that features high tax rates at the beginning of working life and low tax rates toward the end. When the costs of human capital investment are mainly time costs, such an implicit tax structure lowers the costs of human capital investments and simultaneously increases the payoff. The fact that higher skilled workers tend to have steeper wage profiles over the working phase than the unskilled enforces this mechanism. I first show this result in a simple analytical model and then quantify the macroeconomic and welfare effects of making the implicit tax structure age independent in a large-scale overlapping generation model, in which households can invest in human capital both by going to college and through on-the-job training. In terms of welfare, such a reform comes along with a lot of intergenerational redistribution. Although the welfare of current retirees may increase by about 4.5% of their remaining life-time resources, current older workers will lose due to an increase in their implicit tax rates. The welfare of future generations slightly declines by 0.1%.

In light of the declining pension coverage of low-income workers, policy makers have discussed requiring all employers to offer individual retirement accounts, similar to defined contribution plans. How likely to participate are workers who currently do not have access to a pension plan? We address this question by using plausibly exogenous variation in pension-plan availability to estimate the determinants of participation in a standard selection on unobservables model. We find that currently uncovered low-income workers are fairly likely to participate in a newly offered plan, yet they are much less likely to do so than currently covered workers.

This paper analyzes the effect of private supplementary pensions (and the tax reliefs that aim to stimulate such plans) on national saving in Spain. It tries to test the alleged positive effects of private pension plans on savings. Using a longitudinal dataset and fixed-effects methods, we find that tax-favored contributions to a pension fund are not associated with a lower consumption level, which implies that this policy does not increase national saving. The empirical results on the impact of contributions on private household wealth are less clear.

According to optimal portfolio theories, investors should reduce their exposure to stock market risk as they grow old. Indeed, older workers, with only a few years left before retirement, are particularly vulnerable to unexpected falls in stock prices. Despite the theoretical and – as shown by the recent financial crisis – policy relevance of the issue, empirical evidence on this topic has been scant and inconclusive. The aim of the present paper is to assess the effect of age on portfolio choices, using a new panel dataset from an Italian defined-contribution pension plan. We find that on average holdings of risky assets do indeed significantly decrease with age. However, the effect is non-linear, being much stronger in the last part of one's career. Moreover, we also document that inertial behaviour is quite widespread, and can be very costly. Results are confirmed when we control for individual fixed effects and cohort effects.

The aim of this paper is to make an assessment of the 2011 reform of the public pension system in Spain using the Swedish pension system as a benchmark, although some reference to the US pension system is also made. The paper focuses on the reform, explaining its aims, breaking down the main contents, critically examining the official view and describing the expected ageing of the Spanish population. This approach complements the quantitative analyses performed by other researchers and will enable us to assess the reformed system with the focus on four main areas: actuarial fairness, actuarial transparency, solvency and communication with the public. The main conclusion is that the reform was a wasted opportunity given that Spain did not take advantage of the lessons learned in Sweden, it did not include any elements for improving the management of pay-as-you-go systems, and there is no sound basis for claiming that the system's sustainability is assured in the medium term, the long term or even the short term. The new parametric reforms currently under consideration in Spain are targeted to correct some of the pension system's design faults that have been highlighted in this paper.

Collective pension schemes are the dominant form of saving for retirement in the Netherlands. We investigate the introduction of individual choices into a collective pension system without affecting the generally accepted advantages of a collective agreement. Increasing individual choices can be beneficial, as it prevents pension plans from making decisions for the average plan participant that may not be optimal for individual participants. We argue for a system in which individuals choose from a set of low-cost balanced index funds, together with a level of intergenerational guarantees that are exchange-traded. This system maintains the two primary advantages of collective agreements: risk sharing and low implementation costs, while facilitating different risk taking behavior at the individual level. To facilitate individual choices within collective pension schemes, it is important to enhance the transparency associated with intergenerational guarantees to all participants in the scheme, both in terms of their price and quantity. We argue that the current system, in which long-term guarantees are given by the young to the old within a specific fund but not across pension funds, is not transparent and we argue that it can be suboptimal. We propose a system of Pension Guarantee Exchanges (PGEs) that increase transparency and allow pension funds with different age distributions to trade with each other. Knowing the price of such guarantees facilitates the introduction of individual portfolio choices within collective pension schemes.

In many countries, governmental support for funded old-age programmes comes at the cost of at least partial mandatory annuitisation of accumulated assets in retirement. We survey regulatory frameworks for the payout phase of funded pension systems in seven European countries and the US and study the influence of mandatory annuitisation on the welfare of both rational and behaviourally influenced individuals using a dynamic life-cycle model. We show that mandatory immediate full annuitisation of retirement assets will reduce rational individuals’ certainty equivalent pension wealth by up to 54%. Softening the strict immediate annuitisation requirements along the line of regulatory realities in some of the surveyed countries reduces utility losses considerably. Behaviourally restricted individuals can benefit from full annuitisation at retirement, but generally they will also prefer more flexible regulation.

This work has three objectives: first, to provide a comprehensive review of administrative fees; second, to construct a comparative data set for 53 countries; and third, to perform an empirical analysis that highlights the main determinants of pension fees from a world-wide perspective. The paper provides an econometric analysis by using panel data techniques. It finds the greater statistical significance of market size, result that is reinforced by mandatory pension schemes. Other factors, such as structural country conditions, market's vertical integration and the presence of an occupational pension scheme, seem to be less relevant.

We analyse the impacts of changing employment patterns and pension reforms on the future level of public pensions across birth cohorts in Germany. The analysis is based on a microsimulation model and a rich data set that combines household survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and process-produced microdata from the German pension insurance. We account for cohort effects in individual employment and unemployment affecting earnings over the life cycle as well as the differential impact of recent pension reforms. For individuals born between 1937 and 1971, cohort effects vary greatly by region, gender and education, and strongly affect life cycle earnings profiles. The largest effects can be observed for younger cohorts in East Germany and for the low educated. Using simulated life cycle employment and income profiles, we project gross future pensions across cohorts taking into account changing demographics and recent pension reforms. Simulations show that pension levels for East German men and women will fall dramatically among younger birth cohorts, not only because of policy reforms but also due to higher cumulated unemployment. For West German men, the small reduction of average pension levels among younger birth cohorts is mainly driven by the impact of pension reforms, while future pension levels of West German women are increasing or stable due to rising labour market participation of younger birth cohorts.

We present the results of a survey experiment where the treatment group was provided with an information brochure regarding recently implemented changes in the Norwegian pension system, whereas a control group was not. We find that those who received the information are more likely to respond correctly to questions regarding the new pension system. The information effect is larger for those with high education, but only for the most complex aspect of the reform. Despite greater knowledge of the reform in the treatment group, we find no differences between the treatment and control group in their preferences regarding when to retire or whether to combine work and pension uptake.

Social Security benefits may be commenced at any time between ages 62 and 70. As individuals who claim later can, on average, expect to receive benefits for a shorter period, an actuarial adjustment is made to the monthly benefit to reflect the age at which benefits are claimed. We investigate the actuarial fairness of that adjustment in light of recent improvements in mortality and historically low interest rates. We show that delaying is actuarially advantageous for a large number of people, even for individuals with mortality rates that are twice the average. At real interest rates closer to their historical average, singles with mortality that is substantially greater than average do not benefit from delay, although primary earners with high mortality can still improve the present value of the household's benefits through delay. We also investigate the extent to which the actuarial advantage of delay has grown since the early 1960s, when the choice of when to claim first became available, and we decompose this growth into three effects: (1) the effect of changes in Social Security's rules, (2) the effect of changes in the real interest rate, and (3) the effect of changes in life expectancy. Finally, we quantify the extent to which the gains from delay can be expected to increase in the future as a result of mortality improvements.