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Nigeria's Federal Financial Experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Extract

Whatever the origin of a federation, whether aggregation or devolution, its establishment at once raises three problems: how to allocate functions rationally; how to allocate taxing powers; and how to share revenue between the governments of that federation. It is for the constitution-makers to settle the first problem, leaving the remaining two to federal financial experts.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1971

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References

Page 389 note 1 The phrases ‘federal government’ and ‘regional government’ are here used in a general sense without any particular reference to the Federation of Nigeria.

Page 391 note 1 For a résumé of the principles of fiscal adjustment, see Adedeji, A., Nigerian Federal Finance (London, 1969), pp. 1221.Google Scholar

Page 392 note 1 See Adedeji, A., ‘The Finances of Nigeria's State Governments’, in Administration (Ife), 07 1969, p. 276.Google Scholar

Page 393 note 1 It should be emphasised that Table 1 sets out only the system for allocating federally raised revenues to the Regions/States. The Federal Government's share is not explicitly included, although its position can be deduced. Thus, any federally raised tax or any portion of any such tax not accounted for by the table belongs to the Federal Government.

Page 393 note 2 Phillipson, S., Administrative and Financial Procedure under the New Constitution (Lagos, 1946).Google Scholar

Page 397 note 1 Report of the Commission on Revenue Allocation (Lagos, 1951).Google Scholar

Page 398 note 1 Report of the Fiscal Commission on the Financial Effects of the Proposed Constitutional Arrangements (Lagos, 1953).Google Scholar

Page 400 note 1 Report of the Fiscal Commission (London, 1958).Google Scholar

Page 400 note 2 The Pool Account was originally distributed thus: North 40%, East 31%, West 24%, and Southern Cameroons 5%. When the Southern Cameroons left the Federation of Nigeria in 1961 and the remaining three Regions could not agree on what should be done with the extra 5%, it was decided to share the Account according to the 95th fractions shown above.

Page 401 note 1 Report of the Fiscal Review Commission (Lagos, 1964).Google Scholar

Page 404 note 1 The May 1971 increases in the posted price of Nigeria's crude oil and in the rate of petroleum profits tax (from 50% to 55%) are bound to enhance still further the revenue importance of this tax.

Page 405 note 1 Source: Accountant-General's Reports and approved Estimates.

Page 406 note 1 Figures may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

Page 407 note 1 The coefficient is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the distribution. The index has been computed from the information shown in the rest of Tables 2 and 3, weighting each Region's percentage share for each year by its percentage share of Nigeria's total population. Up to 1967/8 the West and the Mid-West have been treated as one.

Page 408 note 1 Republic, Federal of Nigeria, , Second National Development Plan,1970–74 (Lagos, 1970), p. 302.Google Scholar