^{Page 204 note 1} Davies, Rob and O'Meara, Dan, ‘Total Strategy in Southern Africa’, Review of African Political Economy Conference on ‘The World Recession and the Crisis in Africa’, University of Keele, 29–3009 1984;Google Scholar and Saul, John S. and Gelb, Stephen, The Crisis in South Africa: class defence, class revolution (New York and London, 1981).Google Scholar For an assessment of recent internal reforms and an overview of the ongoing conflict within South Africa, see Bush, Ray and Cliffe, Lionel, ‘Southern Africa: the struggle ahead’, in Bush, , Johnstone, Gordon, and Coates, David (eds.), Socialist Perspectives on the World Order (London, 1986).Google Scholar

^{Page 205 note 1} Marini, R. M., ‘Brazilian Sub-Imperialism’, in Monthly Review (New York), 23, 9, 02 1972, pp. 14–24.Google Scholar

^{Page 205 note 2} Amin, Samir, ‘Towards a New Structural Crisis of the Capitalist System?’, in Carl, Widstrand (ed.), Multinational Firms in Africa (Uppsala, 1975), pp. 3–25.Google Scholar

^{Page 205 note 3} National Planning Commission, Peoples Republic of Mozambique, Economic Report (Maputo, 1984).Google Scholar

^{Page 206 note 1} South Africa Yearbook, 1985 (Pretoria, 1985), p. 556.Google Scholar

^{Page 206 note 2} For an overview of the periodisation of the proposed Constellation, see Shaw, Timothy M., ‘South Africa, Southern Africa, and the World System’, in Callaghy, Thomas M. (ed.), South Africa in Southern Africa: the intensifying vortex of violence (New York, 1983).Google Scholar

^{Page 207 note 1} Vale, P. J., in New Zealand International Review (Wellington), 4, 07/08 1982, pp. 15–18.Google Scholar

^{Page 207 note 2} Jaffe, Georgina, ‘The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)’, in Southern Africa Review I (Johannesburg, 1983).Google Scholar

^{Page 207 note 3} Leys, Roger and Tostensen, Arne, ‘Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa – the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)’, in Review of African Political Economy, 23, 01–04 1982, pp. 52–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{Page 208 note 1} International Hearings on Destabilisation in Southern Africa, Oslo, 1983.Google Scholar

^{Page 209 note 1} Marini, op. cit. p. 15.

^{Page 212 note 1} Leys and Tostensen, loc.cit. p. 61.

^{Page 212 note 2} Ibid.

^{Page 212 note 3} Ibid.

^{Page 213 note 1} This is accentuated by the threat to deport ‘legal’ as well as ‘illegal’ foreign workers if sanctions are applied – a move unpopular with the Chamber of Mines, and one that the new trade-union federation C.O.S.A.T.U. has pledged itself to resist. The Guardian (London), 16 11 1985,Google Scholar and The Times (London), 4 12, 1985.Google Scholar

^{Page 213 note 2} See Bush, Ray, Cliffe, Lionel, and Jansen, Val, ‘The Crisis of Social Reproduction in Southern Africa’, Review of African Political Economy Conference, University of Keele, 29–3009 1984.Google Scholar

^{Page 216 note 1} Davies and O'Meara, loc.cit.

^{Page 218 note 1} Minerals and metals accounted for $2,204 million of total export earnings of $12,775,000 in 1984, and gold is the single biggest earner of foreign exchange at between 40 and 50 per cent.

^{Page 218 note 2} South Africa Yearbook, 1985, p. 512.Google Scholar See also Seidman, Ann and Makgetla, Neva Seidman, Outposts of Monopoly Capitalism: Southern Africa in the changing globe economy (London and Westport, 1980).Google Scholar

^{Page 218 note 3} Whilst South Africa currently produces 70 per cent of gold in the non-communist world, output is estimated to drop from 664 tons in 1982 to 575 according to stockbrokers Phillips and Drew in their 1984 Gold Book (London, 1984),Google Scholar quoted by The Star (Johannesburg), 30 01 1984, whilst production elsewhere will double to nearly 700 tons. There is, though, considerable disagreement about future short- and medium-term trends in both prices and supplies.Google Scholar

^{Page 218 note 4} South Africa has 48 per cent of the non-communist world's chrome, 42 per cent of its ferro-chrome, 85 per cent of all the known world resources. The U.S.A. gets 55 per cent of its chromium from the Republic, 49 per cent of its platinum, 44 per cent of its vanadium, and 39 per cent of its manganese. But South Africa has, of course, to sell them and needs all the foreign exchange it can get.

^{Page 218 note 5} South Africa Yearbook, 1983 (Pretoria, 1983), p. 951.Google Scholar

^{Page 220 note 1} A 5 per cent increase in annual growth would be needed just to absorb new entrants to the work-force without making any reductions in the existing figure of 25 per cent for black unemployed, and only with foreign capital inflows could this rate be achieved. Despite an actual balance-of-payments surplus – needed to pay off the agreed debt schedule – businessmen are in fact keener on getting out than in.

^{Page 221 note 1} Davies and O'Meara, loc.cit. p. 68.

^{Page 222 note 1} The Guardian, 1 November 1985.Google Scholar

^{Page 222 note 2} E.g. Harry Oppenheimer's 1976 lecture to the London Stock Exchange, quoted in The Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 7 12 1976.Google Scholar

^{Page 223 note 1} Ibid.

^{Page 223 note 2} The Financial Mail (Johannesburg), 10 01 1986.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 225 note 1} The Guardian, 18 March 1986. See also South Africa Yearbook, 1985, p. 915.Google Scholar

^{Page 225 note 2} The latter gesture in February 1986 appears aimed as much at the international bankers, who are close to the party of big business (the P.F.P.), as at convincing the white electorate of the truth of its assertion of increasing totalitarianisation – a handy cover, if need be, for withdrawal from the longer-term alliance with militarism.

^{Page 226 note 1} The Financial Times (London), 24 10 1985.Google ScholarPubMed

^{Page 226 note 2} The Guardian, 30 November 1985.Google Scholar

^{Page 226 note 3} Ibid. 7 October 1985.

^{Page 227 note 1} Ibid. 13 November 1985.