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Promoting Competition in Drug Pricing: A Review of Recent Congressional Legislation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 January 2022
Abstract
Brand-name prescription drug manufacturers use various strategies to extend their market exclusivity periods by delaying generic or biosimilar competition. Recent Congressional legislation has targeted four such tactics. We analyze these proposals and assess their likely effect on competition in the U.S. drug market.
- Type
- Columns: Health Policy Portal
- Information
- Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 49 , Issue 4: First Amendment Values in Health Care , Winter 2021 , pp. 683 - 687
- Copyright
- © 2021 The Author(s)
Footnotes
About This Column
Aaron Kesselheim serves as the editor for Health Policy Portal. Dr. Kesselheim is the JLME editor-in-chief and director of the Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law at Brigham and Women’s Hospital/Harvard Medical School. This column features timely analyses and perspectives on issues at the intersection of medicine, law, and health policy that are directly relevant to patient care. If you would like to submit to this section of JLME, please contact Dr. Kesselheim at akesselheim@bwh.harvard.edu.
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