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Genetic Privacy and Confidentiality: Why They are So Hard to Protect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Mark A. Rothstein
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Extract

Genetic privacy and confidentiality have both intrinsic and consequential value. Although general agreement exists about the need to protect privacy and confidentiality in the abstract, most of the concern has focused on preventing the harmful uses of this sensitive information. I hope to demonstrate in this article that the reason why genetic privacy and confidentiality are so difficult to protect is that any effort to protect them inevitably implicates broader and extremely contentious issues, such as the right of access to health care. Moreover, the tentative legislative and policy steps undertaken and proposed thus far have been, for the most part, misguided, simplistic, and ineffective.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 26 , Issue 3 , Fall 1998 , pp. 198 - 204
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1998

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References

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