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FDA and the Marketplace of Ideas for Medical Products
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2021
Abstract
The market can produce skewed information about investigational products awaiting FDA approval. But the FDA rarely steps in to correct such misleading information, despite statutory authority to do so. This article evaluates a recommendation by the FDA Transparency Working Group that FDA more clearly signal when and how it will correct misleading information about investigational products, and why such a recommendation is particularly important after the 21st Century Cures Act.
- Type
- Symposium Articles
- Information
- Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 45 , Issue S2: Symposium - Blueprint for Transparency at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration , Winter 2017 , pp. 39 - 41
- Copyright
- Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2017
References
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