It is awe inspiring to be with you in this sacred place (Swift Hall) at this sacred time (Wednesday noon) engaged in sacred ritual (eating and talking). I am pleased to count myself among those who, nearly four decades ago, liberated this room from exclusive use by faculty, enabling all members of the community to gather for a common meal and common reflection thereby creating, at least in intention, a sacred people. Some traditions are worthy of preservation.

I would speak with you this noon about the profession I have pursued since leaving this Hall almost three decades ago: the profession of education. My remarks are occasioned by a Supreme Court decision announced on June 24, 1988, Kadrmas et al. v. Dickinson Public Schools et al. (North Dakota). Under North Dakota law, certain school districts are permitted to charge a fee for transporting pupils to the public school from outlying areas. The Kadrmas family, whose annual income at the time of the trial was at or near the poverty line, protested the fee they were charged, basically on the grounds of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority of the Court rejected the Kadrmas family's claim. Although the argument, set forth by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, contained many complexities pertaining to a long line of arguments about the Equal Protection Clause, I would focus on one strong and near determinative pronunciation that she makes: that the Supreme Court has never “accepted the proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right,’ like equality of the franchise.” That is, there is no constitutional right to education.