There are Several Reasons why the drug phenomenon has proved to be a difficult analytical puzzle for social scientists. One is that the field of study itself shifts depending upon the interest of the analyst, ranging from topics as diverse as drug abuse, the political and judicial impact of violence and corruption engendered by the illegality of drug trafficking, and the nature of the groups that generate revenue from drug trafficking—and the purposes to which they put that money. Another reason, of course, is the fact that hard data are often absent; measurement problems are severe. A third reason, compounding the second, is that generalizations decay quickly in this area, as zones of production, patterns of consumption, trans-shipment points, and methods and relationships among trafficking groups, state agents and local producers can all change quickly.

Peru is a Priority Theater in The US War against drugs in that it produces more coca for export to the United States than any other Latin American country. The Huallaga Valley, a remote area about 200 miles northeast of Lima on the eastern Andean slopes, is one of the world's most fertile coca-growing regions. This article focuses on what is known about Peru's coca industry, and the anti-drug efforts that have been undertaken by the US and Peruvian governments. Under President Alan Garcia, elected in 1985, the Peruvian government has been usually cooperative with US anti-drug programs; some explanations for this collaboration will be suggested.

Despite the Garcia government's cooperative stance, the results of Peru's war against drugs have been similar to results elsewhere: governments have won some battles, but they are losing the war. Perhaps the most important question raised by the ' Peruvian case is whether the United States should give a higher priority to anti-drug efforts or to counterinsurgency; US policy regarding Peru has appeared to do the latter.

The Colombian Naval Corvette Caldas sailed under orders into a disputed zone of the Gulf of Venezuela on 9 August 1987 and began ordering Venezuelan fishing boats and naval craft to leave areas which the Colombian vessel declared were the territorial waters of Colombia. The Venezuelan navy responded by deploying frigates to the scene to reassert Venezuela's claim of territorial jurisdiction over the waters. A protracted naval encounter followed; Venezuelan warships crossed the prow of the Caldas and dispatched Mirage fighter aircraft to overfly it. As the confrontation proceeded, both governments appealed for calm but took steps which to many observers suggested preparations for war.

Honduras Has Emerged as a cocaine transshipment point between Colombia and the United States. One informed source suggests that as much as fifty tons of cocaine have moved through the country during the last fifteen months. This paper examines the politics of drug trafficking in Honduras. Special attention is given to the relations between drug trafficking and the Honduran political environment, the emergence of a new “powder elite, ” and the manner in which US and Honduran authorities are addressing these problems.

One of the hemisphere's poorest countries by almost all standards of development, Honduras has a population of about 4.5 million people and an area the size of Tennessee. Unlike neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador where a national oligarchy has enhanced its wealth through an extensive coffee industry, Honduras first emerged in the international economy through its foreign-owned banana enterprises which still are a leading source of foreign exchange.

The Headlines Had a Tone of sensationalism in Trinidad's Sunday Guardian: “ Drug Barons Taking Over Big Business: 'Dirty’ Money is being laundered into the system” (Guardian, 1988).

Trinidadians, however, were hardly in a mood to accuse the normally staid Trinidad Guardian of sensationalism; the doings of drug barons is the subject of almost every dinner, cocktail party and informal conversation. Visitors are taken on tours of the new multimillion-dollar mansions springing up in formerly placid and genteel neighborhoods. Their massive walls and remote control cameras stand in stark contrast to the gingerbread quaintness of the adjoining structures (Interviews, 1988). But architectural divergency is the least of the contrasts so annoying to Trinidad citizens. What the Guardian calls the “satanic plot,” carried out by men of “prominence and respectability, ” is especially grating as the depressed economy has everyone else tightening belts or, worse, going into receivership. The court system is overwhelmed with drug and drug-related cases, and the main thrust of communityoriented philanthropy is the establishment of drug rehabilitation centers.

US Chief Executive Ronald Reagan Declared WAR on drugs in February 1982, and pledged his administration to the task of curtailing the burgeoning drug epidemic in the United States. To accomplish this urgent “national security” objective, the federal government rapidly increased expenditures for narcotics control programs during the ensuing seven years of his two-term presidency, reaching $4.3 billion annually in 1988. Enthusiastically backing the president's initiative, the US Congress approved tougher national drug legislation, widened the US military's involvement in the war, supported the administration's drive to intensify interdiction efforts along US borders, and expanded USdesigned eradication, crop substitution, and law enforcement programs in foreign source and transit countries. First Lady Nancy Reagan launched her “Just Say No” campaign, flooding the American educational system and the public media with anti-drug messages. Ostensibly, all sectors of American society enlisted in the war on drugs and the country began mobilizing for battle.