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Soviet Foreign Policy: The Church, the Christian Democrats, and Chile

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Roger P. Hamburg*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin, Parkside, Wisconsin

Extract

Diplomatic relations between Chile and the Soviet Union were reestablished in 1964, increasing to five the number of Latin American countries with which the U.S.S.R. carried on diplomatic intercourse at that time. Two of these, Uruguay and Mexico, have a long record of “nonintervention” in diplomatic negotiations, e.g., recognition and diplomatic relations are almost pro forma, with little, if any, implied judgment of the nature and character of the opposite number's government. Brazil, a rather special case, reestablished diplomatic relations in 1961, at the beginning of the Quadros-Goulart flirtation with the Soviet Union. The Cuban case hardly deserves further consideration, having been discussed exhaustively in literally a score of publications. But the Chilean situation illustrates the juncture of evolving Soviet assessments of the Latin American political scene and the accompanying Soviet trade, aid, and diplomatic and cultural programs. The advent to power of the Christian Democratic regime of Eduardo Frei Montalva calls attention to significant maneuvering and probing in Soviet foreign policy.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 1969

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References

* Since then both Colombia and Peru have reestablished diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.

1 See chapter VIII, “Brazil: The Juncture of Soviet Program Appeals and Policy” in Roger P. Hamburg, “The Soviet Union and Latin America: 1953-1963,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, 1965.

2 See Wohl, Paul, “Kremlin-Vatican twist: Exit dogma?The Christian Science Monitor, February 6, 1967.Google Scholar

3 Ibid.

4 See Hopkins, Mark W., “The New Kremlin-Vatican Dialog,” The Milwaukee Journal, January 22, 1967.Google Scholar

5 Wohl, “Kremlin-Vatican twist.“

6 Gil, Federico G., “Cuatro tendencias en la política latinoamericana,” Journal of Inter-American Studies 1, no. 4 (October 1959): 464.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

7 Ibid., p. 468.

8 See Williams, Edward J., Latin American Christian Democratic Parties (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1967).Google Scholar

9 I. R. Lavretsky, “Katolitsizm v. Stranakh Latinskoi Ameriki Posle Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny (Catholicism in Latin American Countries after the Second World War), in Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii. Akademia Nauk SSSR. Problemy Sovremennoi Latinskoi Ameriki (Problems of Contemporary Latin America), Moscow, Izd'vo Instituía Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii, 1959, pp. 232-236.

10 N.A. Koval'sky, “Politika Katolicheskoi Tserkva V. Rabochem Dvizhenii Latinskoi Ameriki” (The Policy of the Catholic Church in Latin America) in Akademia Nauk SSSR Instituí Latinskoi Ameriki, Osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie V Latinskoi Ameriki (The Liberation Movement in Latin America), Izd'vo “Nauka,” Moscow, 1964, p. 198.

11 Ibid., pp. 200-201. Koval'sky notes with some anxiety the work of the clerics. “Special attention is devoted by reactionary clerics to attempts to weaken the democratic unity of the working class, which is the most consistent fighter for the interests of the popular masses” (p. 201).

12 Ibid., p. 205. is For a general survey and critique of Christian Democratic programs see Williams, chapter VI, from which the following description is taken.

14 S.I. Semenov, “Revoliutsionnye Protsessy Rol'Khristianskoi Demokratii v Latinoamerikanskikh Stranakh,” (The Revolutionary Process and the Role of Christian Democracy in Latin American Countries) in Osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike (The Liberation Movement in Latin America), p. 208.

15 Ibid., p. 209. This is contrary to the earlier distinction made between leaders and masses, for Semenov seems to suggest a coalition with the Christian Democratic parties as a whole. As previously noted, Soviet writers are not always consistent on this point.

16 Ibid., p. 213. A recent statement in a Soviet handbook on Latin American political parties argues in a similar fashion, making a distinction between those who would “renovate” capitalism by liquidating its vices and those who would destroy the capitalist structure and transfer the means of production into the hands of the workers. While the latter position is far from “scientific socialism,” nevertheless it creates preconditions for strengthening collaboration with the most progressive revolutionary forces. See Akademia Nauk SSSR. Institut Latinskoi Ameriki. Politicheskie Partii Stran Latinskoi Ameriki. lzd'\o “n&uka.” (Moscow, 1965), p. 19.

17 Ibid., p. 229.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 230. He adds that the first steps in this direction may already have been taken. See also a similar argument in a Soviet journal widely circulated in Latin America and elsewhere: A. Shulgovsky, “Political Trends in Latin America,” International Affairs (March 1965), p. 45.

20 Williams, , Latin American Christian Democratic Parties, p. 244.Google Scholar Williams gives a brief survey of this relationship, full of opportunism and mutual suspicion on both sides, but still a recurrent, if intermittent phenomenon of Chilean political life. For a recent, extended discussion of the election see Halperin, Ernst, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965)Google Scholar. Soviet and other Soviet-inclined writers are quite potent in citing the Chilean case as the example of the Communist-Christian Democratic collaboration that they have in mind in some of the more general statements previously cited.

21 Semenov, “Revoliutsionnye Protsessy,” p. 217.

22 Ibid, p. 230.

23 of course calls for unity and collaboration carry an implied caveat. For example, Luis Corvalán, first secretary of the Chilean Communist Party, is quoted in a widely circulated journal to the effect that the Communists seek Christian Democratic participation in the Front, but he adds, “The question, therefore, consists in who will be the main force in the probable agreement, which class will play the leading role, what will be the scope and depth of the change.” (Luis Corvalán, “Bor'ba Za Sozdanie Narodnovo Pravitel'stva v Chili” (The Struggle for the Creation of a Popular Government in Chile), Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, 1962, no. 12, p. 19, cited in Semenov, Revoliutsionnye Protessy,” p. 233.

24 Millas, Orlando, “New Trends in Catholicism and the Policy of the Chilean Communists,” World Marxist Review 7, no. 3 (March 1964): p. 26.Google Scholar

25 Ibid., pp. 26-27. Millas also presents the usual Communist critique of the progressive though inconsistent nature of Social-Christian reforms and concludes that the Church's old image is changing, “proclaiming its own rights to such values as justice and compassion, respect for human beings, for equality and progress” (p. 30).

26 M.F. Gornov, “Bor'ba Chiliskovo Naroda Za Korennye Demokraticheskie Preobrazovania” (The Struggle of the Chilean People for Fundamental Democratic Reforms) in Chili Politika, Ekonomika, Kul'tura (Chile: Politics, Economics, Culture). Izd'vo “Nauka”, Moscow, 1965, pp. 61-65.

27 I.R. Grigulevich, “Kristiansko Demokraticheskaia Partiia v Chili”, (The Christian Democratic Party in Chile), Chili, Politika, Ekonomika, Kul'tura, pp. 176-177.

28 Ibid., pp. 177-178.

29 See Collier, Barnard, “Chile's Frei Reaps a Political Whirlwind,” The New York Times, January 29, 1967 Google Scholar. Collier documents the real “contradictions” in the Frei program, proceeding too fast for the right and middle of the roaders who despise his measures and of course not fast enough for the left, especially the FRAP, who in addition blocked a proposed Frei trip to the United States because of U.S. policies in Vietnam, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic.

30 See Sizonenko, A.I., “Chili i Sotsialisticheskie Strany” (Chile and the Socialist Countries) in Chile: Ekonomika, Politika Kul'tura, pp. 274-277.Google Scholar

31 See de Onís, Juan, “Latin Diplomacy Touchy to Soviet. Envoys Try to be Moderate and ‘Revolutionary’ Too,” The New York Times, May 30, 1966.Google Scholar

32 See Communist Propaganda Activities in Latin America, 1965.

33 See Fleming, Louis B., “Russia Intensifies Bid to Woo Latins,” Chicago Sun Times, February 8, 1967 Google Scholar, and Chilean embassy, Washington, D.C., “News From Chile, A Summary of Recent Events in Chile,” no. 49, February 6, 1967.

34 Particular attention is directed to the author's study, previously cited, which examines this difflculty in connection with the Brazilian situation of 1961-1964. As indicated, the Soviets claim that no such dilemma exists. It is, of course, a major point of contention between Chinese and Soviet wings of the Communist movement.