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To what extent do institutional arrangements shape the excludability of resource systems? Lessons from French farms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2023

Grâce Kassis Open the ORCID record for Grâce Kassis [Opens in a new window]
Grâce Kassis*
Affiliation:
Univ. Grenoble Alpes, INRAE, LESSEM, 38000 Grenoble, France
*
Corresponding author. E-mail: grace.kassis@inrae.fr
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Abstract

The question of the impact of institutional arrangements on the nature of goods is insufficiently addressed in the literature. By the nature of goods, we refer to the economic taxonomy of goods, meaning their privateness is defined according to their degrees of excludability and subtractability. This paper aims to fill this research gap by examining whether institutional arrangements developed for the management of private goods can reduce the degrees of excludability of these goods. To this end, we analyse four collective farmland management projects in the Isère department in France. We adapt the tool of property as a bundle of rights in order to characterize the impact of these projects on the nature of farmland. Our results show that the distribution of land rights, as well as the rules designed to define land rights, influence the degree of excludability of farmland. We discuss the impact of these findings on public policy-making.

Keywords

bundle of rightsexcludability degreesfarmlandinstitutional arrangementsinstitutional mismatch
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 19 , Issue 6 , December 2023 , pp. 747 - 763
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Millennium Economics Ltd.

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