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The genesis, evolution and crisis of an institution: the Protected Designation of Origin in wine markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2007

CHRISTIAN BARRÈRE
CHRISTIAN BARRÈRE*
Affiliation:
University of Reims, France. Email: christianbarrere@wanadoo.fr
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Abstract:

This paper addresses a specific institution, the Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) in wine markets. To understand the present strategic choices in the context of the globalization of wine markets, the paper seeks to explain the economic logic of this specific institution, its genesis and its evolution. Using an evolutionary games approach, we build an evolutionary model of the strategic determination of quality. Four configurations emerge. The PDO can be related to signals and policies of quality in strategic situations. This study also yields general results for use in the evolutionary analysis of other institutions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , August 2007 , pp. 165 - 181
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2007

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