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Self-deceit and self-serving bias: Adam Smith on ‘General Rules’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2009

ELIAS L. KHALIL
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Extract

Adam Smith (1982) undertook a momentous project in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS): He wanted to debunk the Cartesian dichotomy between the emotions (body) and rationality (mind). The debunking of the body/mind dichotomy is a major aim of many modern neuroscientists and neuroeconomists (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Glimcher, 2004; Rustichini, 2005). Smith also wanted to demonstrate that morality is grounded on the emotions – as the title of his book indicates. So for Smith, the twin pillars of what thinkers consider to be distinguishably human, namely, rationality and morality, are actually rooted in the emotions (body). More specifically, while rationality and morality are based on the emotions, Smith showed that the emotions are rather refined and sophisticated sentiments adopted by agents in light of how they judge the actions of others and, in turn, how they should judge their own actions. Such judgments are nothing but the determination of what is the rational (optimal) solution. So, sentiments are not hurdles in the pathway of rational decisions. They are rather the building blocks of such decisions.

Type
Fragment
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , August 2009 , pp. 251 - 258
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2009

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