Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-c654p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-26T19:51:07.475Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Knowledge and the theory of institutional change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2009

THRÁINN EGGERTSSON
THRÁINN EGGERTSSON*
Affiliation:
University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland and New York University, New York, USA
*
*Email: thrainn@hi.is
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Modern theory identifies several sources of economic growth, such as capital accumulation, new techniques, secure property rights and contracts, and absence of rent seeking. This paper introduces new social technologies as yet another source of growth and emphasizes our incomplete knowledge of social systems. I introduce a framework for analyzing institutional policy and use the case of modern biotechnology to explain how uncertainty about social technologies, persuasion, and competing beliefs influence the evolution of property rights.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , August 2009 , pp. 137 - 150
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Banerjee, A. (2002), The Uses of Economic Theory: Against a Purely Positive Interpretation of Theoretical Results, Working Paper 02-24, Department of Economics, MIT, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., and Richard, J.-F. (2003), ‘Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect’, European Economic Review, 47: 165–195.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chandler, A. D. (1977), The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Cheung, S. N. (1975), ‘Roofs or Stars: The Stated Intents and Actual Effects of Rent Ordinance’, Economic Inquiry, 13: 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coase, Ronald H. (1937), ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, 4: 386–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
David, P. A. and D. Foray (2003), ‘The Economic Fundamentals of the Knowledge Society’, Policy Futures in Education, 1: 20–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Figueiredo, R. J., Rakove, J., and Weingast, B. R. (2006), ‘Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-confirming Equilibrium’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 18: 384–415.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Demsetz, H. (1967), ‘Towards a Theory of Property Rights’, The American Economic Review, 57: 347–359.Google Scholar
Easterly, W. (2006), The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Eggertsson, T. (2005), Imperfect Institutions: Possibilites and Limits of Reform, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eggertsson, T. (2008), ‘Genetic Technology and the Evolution of Property Rights: The Case of Decode Genetics’, Working Paper, W08:03, Institute of Economic Studies, University of Iceland.Google Scholar
Ellickson, R. (1991), Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epstein, R. (2003), ‘Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material’, in Kief, F. Scott (ed.), Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome Project, Amsterdam: Academic Press, Elsevier, pp. 153–194.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. (1960), The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Heller, M. A. and Eisenberg, R. S. (1998), ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research’, Science, 280: 698–701.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979), ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk’, Econometrica, 47: 263–292.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lucas, R. E. (1976), ‘Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique’, Journal of Monetary Economics, supp. series, 1: 19–46.Google Scholar
Mankiw, N. G. (2006), The Macroeconomists as a Scientist and Engineer, Working Paper 12349, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Merges, R. P. (2004), ‘A New Dynamism in the Public Domain’, University of Chicago Law Review, 71: 183–203.Google Scholar
Merton, R. K. (1973), The Sociology of Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Mokyr, J. (2002), The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Nelson, R. R. (2008). ‘What Enables Rapid Economic Progress: What Are the Needed Institutions?’, Research Policy, 37: 1–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phelps, E. S. (1990), Seven Schools of Macroeconomic Thought, Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Posner, R. A. (1980), ‘A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law’, Journal of Law and Economics, 23: 1–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, W. H. and Sened, I. (1991), ‘A Political Theory of the Origin of Property Rights: Airport Slots’, American Journal of Political Science, 35: 951–969.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosenberg, N. (1982), Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Sargent, T. J. (2008), ‘Evolution and Intelligent Design’, American Economic Review, 98: 1–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Solow, R. M. (1956), ‘A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70: 65–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Solow, R. M. (1957), ‘Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 39: 312–320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weingast, B. R. (1995), ‘Economic Role of Political Institutions − Market Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 11: 1–31.Google Scholar