Figures I through III on the following pages were omitted from the article, “New Perspectives on Informational Asymmetry and Agency Relationships,” by Robert A. Haugen and Lemma W. Senbet which appeared in the November 1979 issue of this journal.

In the Arrow-Debreu approach to uncertainty it has been recognized that an inadequate number of markets in contingent claims would be a source of inefficiency. Several researchers have studied the allocative inefficiencies resulting from incomplete markets, i.e., when the number of independent securities is less than the number of states and therefore the state-space cannot be “spanned” by those securities. In a situation where the number of primitive assets is inadequate to span the state-space, the new spanning opportunities opened up by derived assets written on the primitives is an interesting question.

In this paper we present a method for valuing American and European put and call options on debt securities. Although no exhange-traded options of this type currently exist in the United States, the Chicago Board Options Exchange plans to introduce option contracts on several government bonds, and the Chicago Board of Trade petitioned the Commodities Futures Trading Commission to allow the trading of options on the Ginny Mae futures contract. In addition to pricing put and call options, the model developed here can be applied to the valuation of other securities such as callable bonds and bank loan commitments.

In the theoretical literature of finance, it has been assumed for some time that capital markets are efficient, with security prices reflecting all available information [10]. One purpose of this paper is to consider market efficiency in the context of rights offerings. It has recently been suggested, for example, that rights offerings afford positive abnormal returns [17,18]. This view was immediately countered by the comment that the number of rights issued, and inversely the issue price, cannot affect the market value of the total exrights equity market [21, p. 44]. No empirical evidence was offered on either side, however.

In the late 1930s, Macaulay [7] and Hicks [6] independently introduced the concept of duration as a measure of the length of a stream of cash flows and a measure of the elasticity of the present value of the stream with respect to a change in the rate of discount, respectively. Approximately 15 years later, Reddington [8] and Heynes and Kirton [5] used the concept to develop interest rate immunization rules for the portfolio management of insurance companies. More recently, Fisher and Weil [1] have developed duration based rules to help investors find investments that will insure them of having some fixed amount of money available at a specific future point in time. In [2], Grove uses duration to link the investor's decision to speculate or immunize with his subjective forecast of future interest rate movements. Finally, Haugen and Wichern [3, 4] show the relationship between duration and the characteristics of bonds and stocks. Also, in analyzing the effect of financial leverage on interest rate risk, they demonstrate how the financial manager can manipulate the capital structure of his firm, so as to render the present value of the common stock insensitive to changes in the rate of interest.

There are two well-known distinct aspects to the behavior of a risk-averse individual towards a risky proposition: the position he takes, long or short, with regard to the gamble, and the scale of the position taken–the amount by which he goes long or short. On one hand, the first aspect depends only on the individual's assessment of the expected return from the gamble relative to a safe return. The second aspect, on the other hand, will be influenced by the individual's degree of risk aversion and the level of risk of the gamble.

The market for underwriting services provides a valuable opportunity to test two competing hypotheses in monopsony theory. When applied to the area of investment banking, the theory implies that spread behavior ought to be influenced not only by the average costs of providing underwriting services, but also by the extent of vigorous competition. In competitive markets the prices of products and services tend to reflect minimum average costs in the long run. When competition declines, spreads can be expected to widen. A number of empirical studies have established that spread behavior is in fact dependent on the extent of bidding competition [5, 8, 9, 2]. “The intensity of competition in underwriting new issues of tax exempts has the expected effect on underwriters' spreads, that is, the difference between buying and selling prices; spreads decrease as the degree of competition increases” [2, p. 707].

The mean-variance portfolio model of Markowitz and Tobin has been the most substantive contribution to the theory of individual asset demand under uncertainty, in terms of comparative static results and testable implications. Although subject to a number of criticisms at the axiomatic level, it still stands as the classic portfolio model. The general equilibrium extension of the Tobin-Markowitz model due to Sharpe [14], Lintner [9], and Mossin [11] has led to important propositions about the nature of risk in general equilibrium and its effect on the pricing of assets, and the model has subsequently been subjected to extensive empirical testing. It has been used for a variety of purposes in areas ranging from corporate-finance theory to the debate on the social discount rate.

Beta coefficients were initially defined by Sharpe [11] as the slope term in the simple linear regression function where the rate of return on a market index was the independent variable and a security's rate of return was the dependent variable. As indicated by Brenner and Smidt [4], accurate estimation of beta coefficients is important for at least two reasons. First, they are important for understanding risk-return relationships in capital market theory. Second, they are important for use in making investment decisions. Some confusion has appeared, however, in recent research regarding both the optimal estimation interval and the intertemporal stability of beta coefficients. The purpose of this paper is to examine this confusion and present new evidence on the estimation and stability of beta.

Statistical estimates of securities' systematic risk and the Market Model R2 are not invariant to the length of the differencing interval over which securities' returns are measured. This phenomenon, referred to as “The Intervaling Effect,” has been widely observed and discussed in the literature. Assuming that returns are multiplicative and independently distributed, Levhari and Levy [7] have developed a model that explains the intervaling effect on systematic risk for differencing intervals of one to 30 months. However, with intervals as, short as a day, their independence assumption does not usually hold.

The problems associated with the investment horizon and systematic risk estimation have been investigated in some detail. Jensen [7] has shown that investment horizon has some impact on the estimated systematic risk; Cheng and Deets [1] have raised some questions about Jensen's instantaneous systematic risk estimation method; Lee [9] has derived the relationship between the estimated instantaneous systematic risk and the estimated finite systematic risk; Levhari and Levy [11] have shown that there exist some relationships between the magnitude of estimated systematic risk and the length of investment horizon; based upon Zellner and Montimarquette's [19] time aggregation technique, Lee and Morimune [10] have shown that the investment horizon problem can be treated either as a time aggregation problem or as a specification problem. However, systematic risk estimates in terms of additive and multiplicative rates of return have not been investigated in detail. The purpose of this paper is to employ the time aggregation technique proposed by Zellner and Montimarquette [19] to investigate the impact of time aggregation on systematic risk associated with the market model. It is shown that autocorrelation and variation in market rates of return are two important factors in determining the magnitude of the estimated systematic risk associated with additive as well as multiplicative models.

More than ten years have passed since Bierman and West [1] and Elton and Gruber [5] first used valuation models to study corporate stock repurchasing. Young [29] followed their work with an empirical investigation of the motivations for stock repurchasing and its impact on prices. Following Young, there seems to have been a five-year pause in the study of repurchasing. However, by 1973 repurchasing activity had increased in intensity, and this seems to have rekindled an interest in studying the phenomenon.

The existence of default risk is an important characteristic of most lending operations, and many of the studies dealing with lending behavior incorporate default risk considerations. Two basic approaches to the modeling of such behavior can be identified according to their treatment of default probabilities: the first approach assumes that the likelihood of default is independent of the actions of the lender under consideration, namely, the volume of the loan granted by the current lender has no impact on the default probability (e.g., the works by Yawitz [9], Feder and Just [3], and Bierman and Hass [2]). Such an assumption may be quite appropriate in situations where the volume of operations of a single lender is rather small relative to the size of borrower's assets (or previous debt), as is the case with most bond buyers or with banks who lend to sovereign borrowers.

In recent issues of the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, several papers ([7], [1], [4], and [6]) have presented simple sufficient conditions for detecting whether a given pattern of cash flows over time has a unique, simple, nonnegative internal rate of return. One such condition, developed independently by Bernhard [4] and deFaro [6], is easily shown to be the most general of the lot, i.e., to contain the others as special cases. See, e.g., deFaro[6].

A number of articles have recently appeared in the literature dealing with the application of multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to classification problems in the area of finance [2, 3, 7, 8, 13, 15]. The problem of assessing the importance of individual variables was an issue in these papers. The objective of this paper is to develop a ranking procedure for assessing the relative importance of the individual variables when it cannot be assumed that the group covariance matrices are equal. It is assumed that the analysis is for two groups. The ranking procedure we suggest relies upon the conditional deletion procedure based on a statistic used for solving the multivariate Behrens–Fisher problem.

Bank regulators tend to disagree with the idea that markets can play a role in bank regulation. The markets for bank securities are viewed by regulators as inefficient and lacking the necessary information to demand sufficient risk premiums on bank obligations to affect bank management decisions. On the other hand, bankers who have an active market for their securities tend to place faith in market assessments to determine the cost of management policies; therefore, they tend to think that the market plays an important role in “regulating” bank management decisions. The regulators are perhaps correct about the markets for small and medium–sized banks, but for those banks which have an active market for their securities, do investors adjust rates of return for the presence of increased potential of bankruptcy? If so, when does the adjustment take place?