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Volume 49 - December 1989

Contents

Page 3 of 15

Reviews of Books

Notes and Discussion

Articles

  • Land, Labor, and Economies of Scale in Early Maryland: Some Limits to Growth in the Chesapeake System of Husbandry

  • Lois Green Carr, Russell R. Menard
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    03 March 2009, pp. 407-418

  • Seventeenth-century planters developed a new system of husbandry, a long fallow, hoe-based agriculture that raised tobacco for export and Indian corn for subsistence. Plentiful land and shortages of labor characterized the system, which had few economies of scale. It provided rapid increases in wealth during the farm building stages, but its land and labor constraints set limits on growth. Eighteenth-century adaptations created economies of scale that permitted planters to grow grains for export without reducing tobacco crops. Planters who did not adopt these changes did not share in the resulting prosperity, and many left.

Notes and Discussion

Articles

  • Managing Competition in German Coal, 1893–1913

  • Lon L. Peters
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    03 March 2009, pp. 419-433

  • The history of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate before World War I demonstrates that a cartel can be established and maintained in the face of significant disintegrative forces, including many members, heterogeneous production and cost conditions, dynamic markets, competition from outside producers, and cheating. Opportunities for individualistic behavior, including contractual loopholes and horizontal combinations, combined with a collusive objective function that emphasized overall control and stability, allowed the cartel to survive for over two decades without government interference or support.

Review Article

Reviews of Books

Review Article

Editors' Notes

  • North American Labor History Conference

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    03 March 2009, pp. 725-726
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Articles

  • Cooperation and Rivalry in the International Steel Cartel, 1926–1933

  • Daniel Barbezat
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    03 March 2009, pp. 435-447

  • The International Steel Cartel of 1926 was a necessary step toward a coordinated system of cartels to govern steel exports. Like the present industrial policies of the European Community, however, differences in the aims of the domestic industries caused rivalry among the members of the 1926 agreement. Although thecartel was not able to fix its members' production shares, it was able to limit tradebetween them, which allowed for the formation and operation of their domesticcartels.

Editors' Notes

  • Fiftieth Anniversary Meeting

  • Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    03 March 2009, pp. 1000-1003
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Reviews of Books

Summaries of Doctoral Dissertations

Reviews of Books

Summaries of Doctoral Dissertations

Reviews of Books

Page 3 of 15