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2. Garvin, J. L., The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1932–1951), III, 406Google Scholar. Paradoxically, they exchanged roles two decades later when Ritchie, now Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Balfour cabinet, acted as the militant defender of fiscal orthodoxy and Chamberlain, who served as Colonial Secretary in the same cabinet, embraced the cause of protection.

3. Amery, Julian, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1951), IV, 468–69Google Scholar. Amery's volume is a continuation of the official biography begun by Garvin.

4. 3 Hansard 264: 1782-1805 (Aug. 12, 1881). The full text is also found in Boyd, Charles W. (ed.), Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches (London, 1914), I, 84–105Google Scholar.

5. A History of the Cobden Club, by Members of the Club (London, 1939), p. 17Google Scholar.

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7. Cf. Gulley, Elsie E., Joseph Chamberlain and English Social Politics (New York, 1926), pp. 32–68Google Scholar.

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9. Ibid., III, 448-50.

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11. Cf. Goodman, Gordon L., “Liberal Unionism: The Revolt of the Whigs,” Victorian Studies, III (1959), 173–89Google Scholar.

12. Speech at Rawtenstall, July 8, 1886, in Boyd, , Chamberlain's Speeches, I, 278.Google Scholar

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24. The full text of the platform was published in the Times, Aug. 3, 1881, and is reproduced in Zebel, , “Fair Trade,” J.M.H., XII, 169Google Scholar.

25. Cmd. 4893, Report of Royal Commission on depression of trade and industry, Parliamentary Papers (1886), XXIII, v-xxvi, xliii–lxxiii.Google Scholar

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27. Cecil, Lady Gwendolyn, Life of Robert Marquess of Salisbury (London, 1921–1931), IV, 177–81Google Scholar.

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32. Cmd. 5091, Proceedings of Colonial Conference, Parliamentary Papers (1887), LVI, 463–68Google Scholar. Cf. Gordon, Donald, The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914 (Baltimore, 1965), pp. 91–92Google Scholar.

33. “The majority of those who desire a closer commercial union, and believe it to be within the range of practical politics, have a very indistinct knowledge of the materials with which they have to deal, and of the obstacles they would encounter in coming to any adjustment which would be acceptable to many members of the Empire.” SirRawson, Rawson W., Synopsis of the Tariffs and Trade of the British Empire (London, 1888), p. 6Google Scholar.

34. Beadon, Robert, “Why the Imperial Federation League Was Dissolved,” National Review, XXII (1893–1894), 814–22Google Scholar; cf. Hutchinson, Horace G. (ed.), Private Diaries of Sir Algernon West (London, 1922), p. 151Google Scholar.

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36. Denison, , Struggle for Imperial Unity, pp. 145-47, 282, 298, 308-09, 332Google Scholar.

37. Especially at the Ottawa Conference of 1894. The colonial premiers approved the following resolution: “That this Conference records its belief in the advisability of a Customs arrangement between Great Britain and her Colonies by which trade within the Empire may be placed on a more favourable footing than that which is carried on with foreign countries.” Cmd. 7824, Despatches from Secretary of State for Colonies on trade and commercial treaties, Parliamentary Papers (1895), LXX, 3.Google Scholar

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40. Boyd, , Chamberlain's Speeches, I, 371 ffGoogle Scholar. His changed attitude becomes apparent when we compare a statement he made in 1890, that “I have never seen my way to any practical scheme of Imperial Federation,” with another he made in 1895, that “Dreams of that kind which have so powerful an influence upon the imagination of men have somehow or other an unaccountable way of being realised in their own time.” Garvin, , Chamberlain, II, 468;Google Scholar III, 26.

41. Cf. Hewins, W. A. S., Apologia of an Imperialist (London, 1929), I, 67-68, 72Google Scholar.

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43. Gordon, , Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, pp. 132–36Google Scholar.

44. The Canadian preference was initially 12½ per cent, but in June 1898 it was raised to 25 per cent and two years later to 33½ per cent. After the Boer War the other colonies also introduced preferences in favor of the mother country. For details see Cmd. 2326, Papers of colonial legislatures since 1890 favouring preferential trade relations with U. K., Parliamentary Papers (1905), LIII, 2-4, 10–26.Google Scholar

45. Denison, , Struggle for Imperial Unity, p. 142Google Scholar.

46. Garvin, , Chamberlain, III, 543–44Google Scholar.

47. Hobson, J. A., Imperialism: A Study (London, 1938), pp. 105–06Google Scholar.

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49. Holland, Bernard, The Life of Spencer Compton Eighth Duke of Devonshire (London, 1911), II, 291, 296–97Google Scholar. The estimated gain to the revenue was approximately £2,500,000, an amount equivalent to the added revenue produced by the simultaneous increase in the income tax.

50. Quoted in ibid., II, 291.

51. The critics were right. Contrary to Hicks Beach's prediction that the Corn Duty would not be paid by the consumer, the price of a loaf of bread rose immediately by a half penny. Spender, J. A., Empire and Commonwealth 1886-1935 (London and Toronto, 1936), p. 202Google Scholar.

52. Quoted in Holland, , Devonshire, II, 292.Google Scholar

53. Annual Register, 1902, pp. 149–50Google Scholar; cf. Spender, J. A., The Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London, 1923), II, 65–66Google Scholar.

54. The full text of these resolutions is reproduced in Holland, , Devonshire, II, 294;Google Scholar cf. Jebb, R., The Imperial Conference (London, 1911), I, 340 ffGoogle Scholar.

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58. Ibid., IV, 444-45.

59. BM, I. S. Sandars to Arthur Balfour, July 9, 1902, Balfour Papers, Add. MSS, 49,761, fols. 26-27.

60. Cf. Halévy, Élie, A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century, V, Imperialism and the Rise of Labour (2nd ed.; London, 1951). 324Google Scholar.

61. “I have my own work to do and … I am quite content to stay where I am,” he informed Balfour's private secretary on Feb. 25, 1902. “It is true that I once said that I meant to be the next Prime Minister in succession to Mr. Gladstone, but circumstances have entirely changed and I frankly recognise that such is the case. I say again what I have said before, I shall be quite willing to serve under Balfour.” Dugdale, Blanche E. C., Arthur James Balfour (New York, 1937), I, 250Google Scholar.

62. Amery, , Chamberlain, IV, 514;Google ScholarSirFitzroy, Almeric, Memoirs (London, [1925]), I, 136Google Scholar; Spender, J. A., Life, Journalism and Politics (New York, 1927), I, 109Google Scholar; Churchill, Winston S., The World Crisis (New York, 1931), pp. 16 ffGoogle Scholar.

63. Clapham, , Economic History of Modern Britain, III, 41.Google Scholar

64. Amery, , Chamberlain, IV, 516–17Google Scholar. Chamberlain later explained that the Canadians had offered to raise their existing tariffs against “the foreigner” and to institute tariffs where articles were still on the free list. “But they were willing to go further, and, in cases where they have at present no important manufactures, to see if they could not reduce or place on the free list British manufactures.” BM, Chamberlain to Balfour, Feb. 24, 1905, Balfour Papers, Add. MSS, 49,774, fols. 69-70.

65. Amery, , Chamberlain, IV, 518–23Google Scholar.

66. Dugdale, , Balfour, I, 252Google Scholar; cf. Holland, , Devonshire, II, 297–98Google Scholar. Apparently some of the ministers, including the Duke of Devonshire who was hard of hearing, were confused by the voting procedures. No cabinet secretary or official minutes existed until more than a dozen years later to prevent such misunderstandings.

67. Amery, , Chamberlain, IV, 527–29Google Scholar; cf. Headlam, Cecil (ed.), The Milner Papers (London, Toronto, Melbourne, and Sydney, 1931–1933), II, 442 ffGoogle Scholar.

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70. Amery, L., My Political Life, I, 233–34Google Scholar. Cf. BM, Sandars to Balfour, Apr. 14, 1903, Balfour Papers, Add. MSS, 49,761, fols. 81-82: “Mr. Chamberlain, I understand, is overworked and suffering from the consequences of overwork! His paper is a mere exposition of the Canadian grievance: he neither asks for nor suggests that anything can be done now in the matter.”

71. Chamberlain obviously failed to realize the extent of the opposition to his proposal. “Why should I have resigned?” he asked later, in response to a query by Bernard Holland. “The majority of my colleagues agreed with me. The difficulty … arose only from the fact that the Chancellor of the Exchequer was opposed to it, and that there was no time to fight the question out then and there before the Budget had to be introduced.” Holland, , Devonshire, II, 300.Google Scholar

72. Dugdale, , Balfour, I, 256–57Google Scholar.

73. Ibid., I, 257.

74. Ibid.

75. Gretton, R. H., A Modern History of the English People (2nd ed.; London, 1913), II, 184Google Scholar; Annual Register, 1903, p. 133Google Scholar.

76. Birmingham Daily Post, May 16, 1903. The speech is also included in Boyd, , Chamberlain's Speeches, II, 133 ffGoogle Scholar.

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78. Amery, L., My Political Life, I, 234Google Scholar; cf. Dugdale, , Balfour, I, 258–59Google Scholar.

79. Gardiner, A. G., The Life of Sir William Harcourt (New York, [1923]), II, 554Google Scholar.

80. Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, 135: 280-85 (May 18, 1904).

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82. Parl. Deb., 4th series, 122: 1549-53.

83. Ibid., 4th series, 123: 141-95.

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85. Webb, , Our Partnership, p. 267Google Scholar.

86. Blumenfeld, Ralph D., R. D. B.'s Diary 1887-1914 (London, 1930), pp. 195–96Google Scholar; cf. Dark, Sidney, The Life of Sir Arthur Pearson (London, [1922?]), pp. 95 ffGoogle Scholar.

87. Fitzroy, , Memoirs, I, 139–40Google Scholar.

88. The full text of this letter is quoted in Holland, , Devonshire, II, 308–09Google Scholar. Actually, Balfour had quite positive views on the tariff question, which he revealed at this time to the Duke and to at least one other person (see n. 101). He declared that he deplored the way the controversy had been raised, but “inasmuch as the question, for good or for evil, has been raised in a form which makes it necessary for every man in practical politics to make some declaration of opinion, I cannot, as an honest man, do otherwise than range myself among those who are of opinion that our present fiscal system is not wholly suited to our present needs.” BM, Balfour Papers, Add. MSS, 49,855, fols. 154-60.

89. Fitzroy, , Memoirs, I, 136.Google Scholar Balfour has been criticized for entrusting the inquiry to the Board of Trade, rather than to a royal commission. He rejected the latter because he believed that the free traders would refuse to serve or, if they did, that there was no possibility of achieving a unanimous report. SirLee, Sidney, King Edward VII (New York, 1927), II, 178Google Scholar.

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91. Spender, , Life of Campbell-Bannerman, II, 102–04Google Scholar. It was Sir William Harcourt, according to his biographer, who persuaded Campbell-Bannerman to avoid a frontal attack and to allow Chamberlain's enemies within the Unionist party “to make the running and complete the breach in the Government ranks.” Gardiner, , Harcourt, II, 556.Google Scholar

92. In Mar. 1902 the Salisbury Government, concerned for the cane-sugar growers in the West Indian colonies, signed the Brussels Convention with the major European beet-sugar-producing countries to bar the future payment of bounties on sugar exports. For the economic issues involved, see Halévy, , Imperialism and the Rise of Labour, pp. 310–12Google Scholar.

93. Parl. Deb., 4th series, 123: 837-921, 1241-74; 125: 272-301, 379-84, 558-60; 126: 17-36, 206-10, 782-804, 991.

94. The full text of this correspondence is found in Holland, , Devonshire, II, 305–06Google Scholar.

95. Amery, L., My Political Life, I, 238–39Google Scholar; cf. Blumenfeld, , R.D.B.'s Diary, pp. 195–96Google Scholar. At the same time that he was getting the Tariff Reform League started, Chamberlain also organized the Imperial Tariff Committee in Birmingham and chose his former election agent, C. A. Vince, to head it. To Vince was assigned the responsibility of founding tariff reform clubs throughout the Midlands and North Wales. Chamberlain apparently thought that these industrial regions were more likely to respond favorably to an agitation directed from Birmingham than from London. Tariff Reform League, 1913 Conference (London, 1914), p. 105Google Scholar.

96. Hewins, , Apologia of an Imperialist, I, 61 ffGoogle Scholar.

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99. BM, Hicks Beach to Sandars, Nov. 19, 1903, Balfour Papers, Add. MSS, 49,695, fol. 654. However, while assuring the Prime Minister of the Free Fooders’ continued loyalty to the Government, he was privately concerting tactics with Sir William Harcourt and other Liberal leaders. Gardiner, , Harcourt, II, 556, 558Google Scholar; cf. BM, Herbert Gladstone Papers, Add. MSS, 46,060, fols. 222-24, 234.

100. Balfour protested privately against the charge that he had failed to make clear his views. “You seem to think that I am animated by some sinister motive, and that, with no convictions on the one side or the other, I make speeches which, in their effect, are all in Joe's favour. Those speeches, however, as precisely represented my attitude of mind when they were made as is possible to most of us in working, on the spur of the moment, with such a difficult instrument as language.” BM, Balfour to Lord Hugh Cecil, July 16, 1903, Balfour Papers, Add. MSS, 49,759, fol. 37.

101. Foxwell expressed his “absolute agreement” with the views Balfour had outlined in his June memorandum. Colonial preference, he thought, would have been a suitable policy “in 1840, when a strong tide of first class emigration was leaving Europe,” but now, “when that stream has nearly run dry, it is doubtful whether the game would be worth the candle. … The other principle of reserving the right to defend our trade interests by whatever policy promises at the time to be most effective, seems to me true of all times and places & as nearly universal in its validity as any Economic principle can be.” BM, Foxwell to Balfour, Aug. 1 (?), 1903, ibid., 49,855, fols. 164-66.

Ashley prepared a series of lengthy studies for the Prime Minister, and these are included in a special volume of the Balfour Papers which is devoted entirely to technical aspects of the tariff controversy. In a letter accompanying one of these reports, Ashley concluded: “As a strong Imperialist I should welcome anything which might make, or tend to make, Imperial Union closer and more real. I should welcome any economic legislation which would promote that; my only fear is that the price which this country might have to pay would be a great deal too heavy.” BM, Ashley to Balfour, July 4, 1903, ibid., 49,780, fols. 44-45.

102. Arthur Balfour, Arthur James, Economic Notes on Insular Free Trade (London, 1903), pp. 8 ff.Google Scholar; cf. Dugdale, , Balfour, I, 263–64Google Scholar. Balfour also presented a second paper for consideration at this cabinet meeting, apparently in an effort to reconcile the dissentient ministers. In addition to the retaliatory duties which he personally favored, he indicated his willingness to establish mutual preferential trading relations with the Empire through the imposition of food taxes, but he so hedged this proposal with restrictive provisos as to make it practically meaningless. The “compromise” was acceptable to neither Chamberlain nor the free traders. Holland, , Devonshire, II, 322–25Google Scholar.

103. The first use of this term is found in a letter written by Balfour to Devonshire on Aug. 27, 1903. “I never meant to suggest to any one that, because he was prepared to advise the use of our fiscal system … for purposes other than mere revenue, he was therefore bound to go the ‘whole Protectionist hog.'” Ibid., II, 329. I have been unable to learn why Balfour's followers, who were opposed to food taxes, were later called “Little Piggers.”

104. Dugdale, , Balfour, I, 261–62.Google Scholar

105. Annual Register, 1903, pp. 197–200Google Scholar. Subsequently Chamberlain amplified his explanation and described his new role. “I have been well aware that the country has to be educated, as I myself have had to be educated before I saw, or could see, all the bearings of this great measure; and therefore I take up the position of a pioneer. I go in front of the [Unionist] army and if the army is attacked, I go back to it.” Boyd, , Chamberlain's Speeches, II, 142.Google Scholar

106. Devonshire, according to a confidential report received by Balfour, was not a doctrinaire free trader and was favorably disposed toward the Prime Minister's “modest and moderate” retaliation policy. The Duke feared, however, that if the threat of retaliatory duties failed to secure satisfactory results, pressure would develop within the country for “down right protection.” Balfour was also informed that the Duke had expressed annoyance with the Free Fooders when pressed recently by Ritchie for a meeting. “What a d …. d nuisance they are,” he was quoted as saying. BM, Sandars to Balfour, Aug. 18, 1903, Balfour Papers, Add. MSS, 49,761, fols. 81-82.

107. Gollin, Alfred, Balfour's Burden: Arthur Balfour and Imperial Preference (London, 1965), pp. 122–26Google Scholar, revives the charge that Balfour and Chamberlain plotted the entire affair. A convincing statement to the contrary is found in a private message from Sandars to Balfour, dated Sep. 1904, which Gollin quotes in another context. Ibid., p. 232.

108. Dugdale, , Balfour, I, 264–69Google Scholar; Fitzroy, , Memoirs, I, 149–56Google Scholar.