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“Cashing In”: The Parties and the National Government, August 1931—September 1932

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2014

David J. Wrench
David J. Wrench*
Affiliation:
Bolton Institute of Higher Eduction
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Extract

The traditional approach to the political crisis of 1931 and the events that followed it is to seek to establish responsibility, or guilt, for the fall of the second Labour Government and the formation of its National successor. Few doubt the conventional wisdom that after August 1931 the Conservatives were “cashing in,” completing the imprisonment of MacDonald, securing a massive parliamentary majority, enacting protectionist legislation, and finally causing the resignation of the free traders in September 1932. This orthodoxy has been reinforced in a recent study by John Fair, in which a new “culprit” has been found in Neville Chamberlain. If the evidence of his “culpability” in bringing down the Labour Government is unconvincing, it is buttressed by the assumption that the Conservatives gained most from the crisis, by controlling the new government and enacting conservative measures.

The study of these events cannot advance beyond the discovery of culprits while it remains confined to the study of individual roles. What is needed, and what this article seeks to supply, is an analysis which takes into account the whole political context, the condition and prospects of all the parties concerned at the time when the crisis broke upon them. It is necessary to separate clearly the expectations of the parties in August from the quite unforseen rewards that they reaped in the October election. The partisan bitterness which has plagued the study of the crisis has largely resulted from a failure to achieve such a separation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of British Studies , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , Spring 1984 , pp. 135 - 153
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference of British Studies 1984

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References

1 The phrase is Mowat's, C. L., Britain Between the Wars 1918–1940 (London, 1955) p. 406Google Scholar. Responsibility is placed on MacDonald and the King. Marquand, David, in Butler, David (ed.), Coalitions in British Politics (London, 1978) p. 61Google Scholar, places more of the responsibility on the King. Two of the most recent accounts of the crisis concentrate mainly on MacDonald's role; Marquand, David, Ramsay Mac-Donald (London, 1977)Google Scholar and Berkeley, Humphrey, The Myth that will not die, the Formation of the National Government 1931 (London, 1978)Google Scholar. A full bibliography of the crisis would occupy several pages, but the recent proliferation of available sources has seriously dated most accounts. One of the most useful older works is Bassett, R., 1931: Political Crisis (London, 1958)Google Scholar.

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4 Marquand, , Ramsay MacDonald, p. 600Google Scholar. The result of a hypothetical general election before the days of opinion polls cannot, of course, be known, but what matters here is what contemporary politicians expected the result to be. They were practically unanimous, and municipal and bye-election results were showing a swing to the Conservatives of approximately ten per cent.

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33 C.P.247(31).

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40 Dairy 1 October 1931, Neville Chamberlain Papers 2/22; and Sir Austen to Hilda Chamberlain, 3 October 1931, Sir Austen Chamberlain Papers 29/3/30. The Conservatives were dismayed when Samuel indicated his readiness to accept the formula, and vastly relieved when it was ultimately rejected.

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51 The Conservatives emerged with 497 of the government's 556 seats. The other government supporters were 33 Liberals (Samuelites), 35 Liberal Nationals (Simonites), 13 National Labour and two independents. The opposition comprised 46 Labour, 5 Independent Labour Party, 4 Independent (Lloyd George) Liberals and one independent.

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57 Letter from Maclean probably wrongly dated as 13 November 1931. Runciman Papers 2/37.

58 83 H.L. 5s. col.77.

59 He had circulated a memorandum; C.P.287(31).

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