Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-7nlkj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-30T23:48:34.008Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Utility and Limitation of the Red Guard Publications as Source Publications: A Bibliographical Survey

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Hong Yung Lee
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
Get access

Extract

During the Cultural Revolution (CR) the numerous “Red Guard” and “Revolutionary Rebel” organizations published an enormous amount of printed materials in various forms, all of them now referred to as “Red Guard publications.” Some of them have become available to the academic community outside China, thus providing China specialists with their best opportunity for the foreseeable future—until we are able to interview Chinese people freely—to study Chinese politics. This paper contains a general bibliographical survey of the available Red Guard publications and an appraisal of their potential value as source materials.

Type
Research Notes and Abstracts
Copyright
Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1975

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 This estimate is made on the basis of the following compilations: (1) Source Materials on Red Guards and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, ed. by Raymond N., Tang and Wei-yi, Mao (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1966);Google Scholar (2) Catalogue of Red Guard Publications (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1970);Google Scholar and (3) “Red Guard Publications: A Check List” (RG-9), (Washington DC: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1970).Google Scholar

2 Ke-ming ti ch'ang-i shu, 21 August 1966.

3 Kuang-chou kang ta-hui, 21 February 1970.

4 For the title of monographs, see Catalogue of Red Guard Publications.

5 We have 55 issues of Hsin Peita of the Peking University, 45 issues of the Chingkangshan of the Tsinghua University, 35 issues of Tung-fang-hung pao of the Peking Geology Institute, 34 issues of Hung-ch'i of the Peking Aviation College, and 24 issues of Chingkangshan of the Peking Normal University.

6 The distribution seems to indicate that two factors influenced and availability of the Red Guard publications: the total numbers published and accessibility of the outside world to the provinces. Peking and Shanghai, the two cities that played the leading role in the CR, most likely produced the largest amount of the Red Guard newspapers. The newspapers from Kwangtung came to the West through Hong Kong and those from Sinkiang through the Sino-Soviet border. For the collections of the CR materials according to area, see Ting, Wang ed., Chung-kung wen-hua-ta-ke-ming tzu-liao hui-pien, (Volume 5) Pei-ching shih wen-hua-ta-ke-ming yün-tung; (Volume 6) Chung-nan ti-ch'ü wen-hua-ta-ke-ming yün tung (Hong Kong:Ming-pao yüeh-kan she, 1970 and 1972).Google Scholar

7 The rusticated youths published Ke-ming ch'ing-nien (n October 1967); Chih-nung hung-ch'i (7 October 1967, 1 November 1967, 11 November 1967, January 1968); 32III chan-pao (30 October 1967).

8 Seven issues of Jen-ta san-hung (moderate) and seven issues of Hsin jen-ta (radical) of the People's University are available. Ten issues of Chung-ta hung-ch'i (radical) and eight issues of Chung-ta chan-pao (conservative) in the Kwangtung Chung-shan University are available.

9 There are 13 issues of Hung-wei-ping (published by the First Headquarters), 15 issues of Tung-fang-hung (published by the Second Headquarters), and 35 issues of Shou-tu hung-wei-ping (published by the Third Headquarters).

10 Erh-chi chan-pao in Honan, Hsi-chiang nu-t'ao in Kwangsi, and Tung-feng chan-pao in Harbin were published under the factional names.

11 For PLA radicals' newspapers, see Hsing-huo liao-yüan (27 January 1967, 2, 9, 28 February 1967); Hung-se tsao-fan pao (4 February 1967). For PLA conservatives' newspapers, see Chu keming, chua shcng-ch'an (13 issues arc available) and San-chün lien-wei chan-pao (5 issues).

12 Thirteen issues of its newspaper arc available. Also, Chin-chün pao (15 issues) of the Department of Social Science and Philosophy and Tung-fang-hung pao of the Geology Institute were particularly close to the CRSG.

13 Mao-chu-hsi wen-hsüan; Mao-chu-hsi lun wen-i; Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui. Trans, in Current Background, No. 891, October 1969; No. 892, 21 October 1969; JPRS, No. 49826, I2 February 1967; No. 50792, 23 June 1970; No. 52029, 21 December 1970.

14 Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan sui. Trans in JPRS, No. 61269–1 and 61269–2, 20 February 1974.

15 For the latest two books that effectively utilized Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui, see Stuart, Schram, “The Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective” in Authority Participation and Cultural Change in China, ed. by Stuart Schram (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973);Google ScholarRoderick, MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, (N.Y.: Columbia U nivcrsity Press, 1974).Google Scholar

16 Mao-chu-shi tui p'eng Huang Chang Chou fan-tang chi-t'uan p'i-pan. Trans, in SCMMS, No. 21, 2 April 1968.

17 For the effective utilization of the materials on this period,see Ahn, Byung-joon, “Adjustments in the Great Leap Forward and their Ideological Legacy, 1959–62” in Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China, ed. by Chalmers, Johnson (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), pp. 257300.Google Scholar

18 For the policy formulation process, see Michel C., Oksenberg, “Policy Making under Mao: An overview,” in John M., Lindback, ed., China: Management of a Revolutionary Society, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 79115;Google ScholarParris H., Chang, “Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the Chinese Communist Party,” China Quarterly, No. 49.October/December, 1970, pp. 169194.Google Scholar

19 For instance, see Chui ch'iung k'ou, 7 June 196.

20 Most of the official documents of the Central Committee are translated and have been utilized by scholars. See Documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1971). But still one can find some interesting documents issued by the lower levels. For instance, see 60 articles on the higher education (Tung-fang hung, 9 June 1967); 8 articles on movie making (Kung nung ping t'ien-ying, 23 May 1967); the decision to close down the special school for the children of cadres (Ch'un lai, 23 March 1967); the detailed regulations on how to treat the bourgeois in the economy (Liu Shao-ch'i tsai Jen-min Shang-ch'ang t'ui-hsing tui tzu kai-tsao t'o-hsiang lu-hsien ti tsui-hsing by Tientsin shih Jen-min Shang-ch'ang wu-chan-chieh-chi ke-ming tsao-fan tsung-pu, June 1967).Google Scholar

21 Wu-ch'an-chieh-chi wen-hua-ta-ke-ming wen-chien hui-pie(by Pci-ching Hua-kung hsueh-yuan Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang hsüan-chuan-yuan), May 1967. For a comprehensive collection of the official documents, see CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966–1967 (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968); “Directives and Notes on the Cultural Revolution,” SCMMS, No. 17, 15 January 1968; “Collections of Documents Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” CB, No. 851, 6 May 1968.Google Scholar

22 For a skillfull comparison of the Red Guard newspapers and the official news media, see Lowell, Dittmer, “The Mass Line and ‘Mass Criticism’ in China; An Analysis of the Fall of Liu Shao-ch'i,” Asian Survey, August 1973, XIII, No. 8, pp. 772792. In many cases, the Red Guards who had real grievances against a particular leader would first initiate an attack on him, then the Center would respond positively or negatively according to its ownpolitical considerations, thus maximizing its influence over the selection of targets. This pattern is readily discernable in the case of Liu Shao-ch'i and T'ao Chu.Google Scholar

23 The PLA was publicly attacked for the brief period after the WuhanIncident, unfortunately a period almost totally lacking in Red Guard newspapers. The only available Peking Red Guard newspaper that criticized the PLA openly is Tung-fang-hung pao (the Geology Institute), I August 1967.

24 Honan erh-ch'i pao, 5 June 1967.

25 Kuang-ming chan-pao, 10 December 1967; Ch'ang-ch'eng, 3 December 1967.

26 Chu ying tung-fang-hung, April 1968; Kuang ya 8.31, May 1968.

27 Among others, see Chang chung-nan, 7 April, 21 July, 3 August, 14 September 1968.

28 For instance, Hung-wei-ping (the First Headquarters) carried an article entitled “Repudiate ‘Look out What Line the CRSG is Implementing in the CR,’” 15 December 1966.

29 For a comparative study of the Kwangtung radicals and conservatives, see Hong Yung, Lee, “The Political Mobilization of the Red Guards and Revolutionary Rebels in the CR” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1973), pp. 595649.Google Scholar

30 According to our preliminary investigation, Lin Piao's speech appears to precede the actual unfolding of the CR. He made his two most radical speeches at the early stage of the CR: one on 16 May 1966 at the Politburo meeting and the other on October 1, 1966 at a mass rally. The rest of his speeches, mostly delivered after the Wuhan Incident, were clearly geared to bringing an end to the CR. In contrast, Chou En-lai's speeches reveal his political skill and adaptability: he radicalized his position gradually in accordance with the changing situations of the CR, while at the same time keeping his position moderate as compared to that of the CRSC all through the CR.

31 Chung-yang shou-chang chiang-hua hui-pien, Vol. I, 2 and 3, November 1966. Trans, in CB, No. 819, 10 March 1967; SCMMS, No. 15, 8 May 1967. Also for the collection of the leaders' speeches from the Red Guard newspapers, see Chung-kung wen-hua-ta-ke-ming chung-yao wen-chien hui-pien (Taipei: Institute for the Studies on Chinese Communist Problem, 1973).Google Scholar

33 For this point, see Hong Yung Lee, “The Political Mobilization of the Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebels in the CR,” pp. 389–407.

34 Daily Report, 28 February 1967.

35 On one occasion, Chiang Ch'ing implicitly criticized Lin Piao to his face for his formalistic emphasis on “politics in command.” (Wen-ichan-pao, 9 March 1968) By the summer of 1968 when the PLA began to consolidate its power at the local level, Chiang Ch'ing bitterly protested that “not proletarian politics but bourgeois politics takes command.” (Hung-se t'ung -hsin, 20 July 1968). On another occasion she directly attacked Cheng Wei-shan, the newly appointed Peking Military Commander, for his request that the PLA be authorized to shoot at the Red Guards. (San-erh-ch'i t'ung hsin, July 1968)

36 Hung Ch'i warned the PLA for its propensity to use the slogan in order to moderate the CR. Living Studies and Application of Chairman Mao's Writing in the CR,” Hung Ch'i, No. 2, 16 January 1967, pp. 4243.Google Scholar

37 T'ung-fang-hung pao (the Geology Institute), 3 March, 9 March, 15 March, 1967.Google Scholar

39 Chin-chün pao, 20 February 1967.

40 According to our preliminary investigation, the “Red Flag” faction in Kwangtung extensively publicized the “rehabilitation” of those who had been stigmatized as “rightist” by the Party Committees during the initial stage of the CR and responded enthusiastically to the campaign in April against the “four rightist trends”; the newspapers of the “East Wind” faction completely disregarded these two issues, but reacted positively to the “great alliance,” the “three-in-one combination,” and the educational reform. The responses of the “Red Flag” to these three issues were lukewarm.

41 For the actual operation of the part-work and part-study program, see Kang-ta chan-pao; for the meaning of the “bourgeois reactionary line” in the CR, see Chung-hsueh wen-ke pao (21 February 1967) and Hung-chün pa(8 March 1967); for the tactics of “hitting at many in order to protect a few,” see T'i-yü chan-pao (6 May 1967), Tung-fang-hung pao (the Geology Institute, 12 April 1967), Pei-ching kung-she (12 April 1967), Chung-hsueh hung-wei-ping (20 May 1967).

42 For the representative view of the “East Wind,” see Hsiao-ping, 9 December 1967; for that of the “Red Flag,” see Hung se pao-tung, 22 August 1967.

43 It was the controversy over whether the personal record of “17 years” or the personal record of “50 days” should be stressed in evaluating performance of cadre.

44 Hung-ch'i t'ung-hsin, II January 1968.

45 Ling, Ken, The Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Young Chinese, Trans. Miriam London and Ta-ling Lee (N.Y.: Putman, 1972), pp. 198199.Google Scholar

46 The newspapers with the label of “for internal use only” were published in the last stage of the CR mainly by the Kwangtung radicals probably in order to facilitate the horizontal communication among themselves and to prepare the strategydealing with the changing situations at the top level. Main contents of these newspapers werethe speeches of the central leaders.

47 Source Materials on Red Guard and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from the University of Michigan contains the index of articles. But it does not include the latest group of Red Guard newspapers released by the Center for Chinese Research Materials (RG–9). Also since the titles of articles in Red Guard newspapers very often do not reveal the types of information contained, an index of articles needs some symbols indicating the actual content of information in each article. Despite these two weak points, Source Materials, the most comprehensive list of the titles and index of articles available at this moment, is very useful for reference.

48 For economic issues, see Pei-ching kang-she. Ts'ai-mao chan-pao, Ts'ai-mao hung-ch'i, Ts'ai-mao chien-ping, Pei-ching hsin ts'ai-mao, Ching-ch'i p'i-pan, Hung-se kung-chiao.

49 Tung-fang-hung pao (the Geology Institute),Google Scholar 5 December, 9 December 1967; Tung-fang-hung (the Peking Mining Institute),Google Scholar 18 December 1967, 1 January 1968; Chingkangshan (the Peking Normal University), 31 December 1967;Google ScholarHsin Peita, December 31, 1967.