^l For example, Storry, Richard, The Double Patriots (London, 1957)Google Scholar; Maxon, Yale, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy (Berkeley, 1957)Google Scholar; and Butow, Robert, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton, 1961)Google Scholar; and, in Japanese, Masanori, Itō, Gunbatsu kōbō-shi [Rise and Fall of Military Cliques] 3 vols. (Tokyo, 1957–58)Google Scholar; Kikuo, Nakamura, Shōwa seijishi [Political Histoy of the Showa Period] (Tokyo, 1958)Google Scholar; Ken, Kurihara, Tennō: shōwa-shi oboegaki [The Emperor: A Note on Showa History] (Tokyo, 1955)Google Scholar; Masao, Maruyama, Gendai seiji no shisō to kōdō [Thought and Movement of Modern Japanese Politics] 2 vols., (Tokyo, 1957)—especiallyGoogle Scholar, “Nihon fuashizumu no shisō to undō” [“Ideology and Movement of Japanese Fascism”] I, pp. 25–82; and Mamoru, Shigemitsu, Shōwa no dōran [Upheavals of Showa Japan] 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1952)Google Scholar. An abridged English translation of Shigemitsu's volumes has appeared as Japan and Her Destiny (New York, 1958).Google Scholar

² International Military Tribunal, Far East (IMTFE), Tokyo, 1946–1948, Record of Proceedings, Exhibits, Judgment, Dissenting Judgments, Preliminary Interrogations, Miscellaneous Documents (in mimeograph form).

³ For example, the Chief Prosecutor declared: “Militaristic cliques, and ultra-nationalist secret societies resorted to rule by assassination, and thereby exerted great influence in favour of military aggression.” IMTFE, Proceedings, p. 442.

⁴ IMTFE, Proceedings, 1945–2177; 14288–14422; 15853–15951; 22713–22755; 22943–22968; 29030–29064; and 29406–29418. Also, General Tanaka Ryūkichi, Hai-in o tsuku [Probing the Cause of Defeat] (Tokyo, 1946).

⁵ IMTFE, Defense Document 3107, p. 234.

⁶ The pamphlet is included in the Tribunal material as Document 3167.

⁷ IMTFE, Document 1534.

⁸ IMTFE, Document 517.

⁹ IMTFE, Document 517, p. 4.

¹⁰ Because Japanese historians rarely indicate the exact source of their information, it is difficult to estimate how many have relied upon this volume. In English, Maxon, has carefully utilized Majima's volume in his Control of Japanese Foreign Policy.

¹¹ Majima, Gunbatsu antō hishi, p. 11.

¹² The information on the educational system, customs and traditions of the Imperial Army is a synthesis of data provided in oral interviews with Generals Katakura Chū, Wachi Takagi and Imamura Hitoshi; Colonel Nishiura Susumu, Head of the Historical Section of Japan's Self Defense Agency; Mitarai Tatsuo, the official biographer of General Minami Jirō; and Mr. Hata Ikuhito, a diligent student of army factionalism. The emphasis and organization is entirely the responsibility of the author.

¹³ Storry, Double Patriots, pp. 9–25 is a lucid summary of the prewar nationalistic movement; in Japanese, the most comprehensive study is Hanji, Kinoshita, Nihon kokka-sugi undō-shi [A History of the Movement of Japanese Nationalism] (Tokyo, 1952)Google Scholar. The best documentary source on the Kokutai genri-ha is Gun kankei jōhō [Intelligence Reports on Army Matters] compiled by the General Staff of the Imperial Navy. The author is deeply indebted to Mr. Hata Ikuhito for calling his attention to the records of the Imperial Navy available at the Zaidan Hojin Shiryō Chōsakai [Documentary Research Organization]; and to Vice Admiral Tomioka Sadatoshi for granting free access to the source material at this organization. Hereafter, Gun kankei jōhō will be cited, GKJ.

¹⁴ For example, GKJ, “Kokka kakushin undō ni okeru nidai chōryō” [“Two Main Streams in the National Renovation Movement”], p. 15 specifically identifies a leading member of this group as the chief theorist behind the May 15 Incident of 1932. This document was a booklet privately printed for circulation among the Kokutai genri-ha.

¹⁵ Yoshio, Matsushita, Meiji gunsei shiron [Historical Essay on the Meiji Military Organization] II, 468–510. (Tokyo, 1956).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Nakamura Kikuo, Shōwa seijishi, pp. 35–38.

¹⁷ Statements of this type are difficult to document but all of the former generals interviewed by the author during the fall and spring of 1957–58 seemed to agree upon this point. [Also Ito Masanori, Gunbatsu kōbō-shi, 231–234.]

¹⁸ Yoshio, Matsushita, Nihon gunji hattatsu-shi [History of the Development of the Japanese Army] (Tokyo, 1937), p. 200.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Tatsuo, Mitarai, Minami Jirō denki [Biography of General Minami Jirō] (Tokyo, 1957), p. 183.Google Scholar

²⁰ Information of this departmental reorganization was originally supplied by Mr. Hata and later verified by several of the generals interviewed by the author.

²¹ See general information on these mobilization plans in Itō Masanori, Gunbatsu kōbō-shi II, 229–231.

²² Mitarai Tatsuo, Minami Jirō denki, p. 182.

²³ Tahei, Takamiya, Gunkpku taiheiki [Taiheiki of the Military] (Tokyo, 1951) pp. 140–144; 157–158.Google Scholar

²⁴ GKJ, “Rikugun fuashiyo undö-shi gaikan [”A General View of the Fascist Movement in the Army”], Top Secret, February 21, 1934.

²⁵ Storry, Double Patriots, pp. 167–168.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 137; and Saionji-Harada Memoirs, August, 3, 1933.

²⁷ Itō Masanori, Gunbatsu kōbō-shi, II, pp. 226–227.

²⁸ That the majority of officers in Central Headquarters agreed with Umezu, Tōjō, and Nagata that the Soviet Union constituted the major threat is clearly substantiated in the proposals submitted by the War Ministry at the Five Ministers Conference of October 20, 1933. Records of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Teikoku no taigai seisaku kankei no ken [Concerning the Foreign Policy of the Imperial Government] I, “Jugatsu nijōnichi goshō kaigi ni okeru rikugun-gawa teiji” [“Army's Presentation at the October 20th Five Ministers Conference”] undated, Top Secret. This is not to suggest the army favored a weak China policy. Indeed, the War Ministry insisted, “Of course, the Chinese Central Government must be prevented, by appropriate means, from advancing into North China.” Teikoku no taigai …, I, “Rikugunshō shūsei-an” [“Amendments of the War Ministry to the October 20th Decision of the Five Ministers Conference”], November 30, 1933, Top Secret.

²⁹ The description of Nagata is taken from GKJ, “Seigun undō no jissai,” Part II.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Shuji, Aritake, Okada Keisuke denki [Biography of Admiral Okada Keisuke] (Tokyo, 1956), p. 210Google Scholar. In English, Fukuda Ippei, “Araki—the Man of the Crises,” Contemporary Japan (December, 1932), p. 388.

³² GKJ, “Seigun undō no jissai,” [“Truth of the Purification Movement”] Part II.

³³ Ibid., (Parts IV and VI).

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Takamiya Tahei, Gunkoku taihciki, p. 182.

³⁶ Personal interview with General Katakura Chū.

³⁷ Takamiya Tahei, Gunkoku taiheiki, pp. 142–143.

³⁸ IMTFE, Document 3089.

³⁹ Ikeda Sumihisa, “Seinen shōkō to kakushin shisō” [“The Young Officers and Revolutionary Thought”], Himerareta shōwa-shi [Secret History of the Shōwa Period] (Tokyo, 1956), p. 110. This is a special edition of Chisei [Intelligence] magazine.

⁴⁰ GKJ, “‘Rei no panfuretto ni tsuki Hayashi shō hikōshiki no sonno jitsugen o gemmei’ to dai suru bunsho” [“A Document on an ‘Informal Explanation by War Minister Hayashi of the Way to Realize the Pamphlet (Kokubō no hongi)’”], Secret, November 4, 1934.

⁴¹ Ikki, Kita, Nihon kaizō hōan taikō [Outline for the Reconstruction of Japan] (Tokyo, 1924)Google Scholar. A detailed synopsis of Kita's thought is Sōgoro, Tanaka, Nihon juashizumu no genryū: Kita Ikki no shisō to shōkai [Origin of Japanse Fascism: The Life and Thought of Kita lkki] (Tokyo, 1949)Google Scholar. In English, Scalapino, Robert A., Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan (Berkeley, 1953), p. 354et seq.Google Scholar

⁴² As indicated previously, a popular source of information on this incident is IMTFE, Document 1417, a magazine article written after the defeat of Japan by Iwabuchi Tatsuo, a friend of General Mazaki.

⁴³ In a postwar interview, Mazaki declared, “.… their (tōsei-ha) aim was to make it seem as though there was a seditious plan at the Military Academy, question the responsibility of the Inspector General of Education, … and so have me removed from my position.” Richard Storry, Double Patriots, p. 160. However, as Mr. Storry notes, this is a clearly ingenuous interpretation. General Katakura, in a talk with the author stipulated that General Nagata had been instrumental in having Tsuji and himself reprimanded because they had not promptly reported their knowledge of the plot to the Military Police.

⁴⁴ Saionji-Harada Memoirs, February 15, 1935.

⁴⁵ The most concise analysis of this controversy is Aritake Shuji, Okada Keisuke denki, pp. 274–283; in English, Storry, Double patriots, pp. 163–166.

⁴⁶ As cited by Maruyama Masao, Gendai seiji no shisō to kōdō, I, p. 62.

⁴⁷ GKJ, “Kikan setsu mondai ni kan sum gunbu oyobi seifu no naibu jijō” [“The State of Affairs in the government and the Army concerning the Emperor Organ Problem”], April 9, 1935, Top Secret.

⁴⁸ Aritake Shuji, okada Keisuke denki, p. 280. In October, 1935, the government compelled Minobe to resign his public positions. It is interesting to note that this action was dictated in large measure by pressure from the new War Minister, Kuwajima, who replaced Hayashi in August. Considering the image of Hayashi and Nagata as the architects of the fascist movement in the military, it is ironic that both men had exerted a moderating influence during the Minobe crisis.

⁴⁹ Storry, Double Patriots, pp. 281–282.

⁵⁰ Saionji-Harada Memoirs, July 22, 1935.

⁵¹ GKJ, “Hayashi Rikushō no jinji shidanko ni niyo no kansoku” [“Two Observations on the Decisive Action of War Minister Hayashi”], Top Secret, July 17, 1935. Also, Takamiya Tahei, Gunkoku taiheiki, pp. 216–222.

⁵² This distinction is important because the oral testimony and secondary documents produced at the Tribunal included Nagata, and others of the so-called Tōsei group, as leaders in the March Incident. As suggested, the Tōsei movement and the Seigun faction were not identical and were not even in existence in 1931. Secondly, the documents compiled by naval intelligence and available at the Documentary Research Organization do not mention Nagata as an instigator of the March Incident. Thirdly, the most careful study of this Incident and of the members of the Sakurakai who planned it, pointedly describes Nagata as playing a decisive role in aborting the conspiracy. Hata Ikuhito, “Sakurakai shui-sho” [“Documents on the Purpose of the Sakurakai”], Rekishi kyōiku, VI (1958), 2, pp. 81–89.

⁵³ Storry, Double Patriots, pp. 172–174, is a recapitulation of this stormy session based upon a memorandum of General Matsuura, a friend of General Mazaki.

⁵⁴ Takamiya Tahei, Gunkoku taiheiki, pp. 223–226.

⁵⁵ IMTFE, Document 3166.

⁵⁶ Nakamura Kikuo, Shōwa seijishi, pp 51–53 is an unusually accurate digest of this pamphlet.

⁵⁷ Byas, Hugh, Government by Assassination (New York, 1940), pp. 95–118Google Scholar is a masterful description of the Aizawa affair.

⁵⁸ Mazaki, of course, denied most adamantly that he had prompted Aizawa to attack Nagata. Richard Storry, Double Patriots, p. 176. Still, it would be expecting too much to believe that an Aizawa-Mazaki talk in July 1935 would not have included caustic remarks about Nagata. In addition, “A Strange Document Slandering Generals Mazaki and Araki,” states that Aizawa had lived in the Mazaki household during his youth; that Mazaki had been Aizawa's sponsor (hoshōnin) at the Military Academy; and that Aizawa referred to Mazaki as oyaji, a term of familiar respect. GKJ, “Araki Mazaki ryō taishō o hiki seru kaibunsho,” November 11, 1935. The other details of this slanderous document are consistently accurate and these assertions deserve some consideration. For example, they furnish a reasonable explanation of why Mazaki, a member of the Supreme War Council, would chat with an obscure Lt. Colonel stationed in Fukuyama on the Inland Sea.

⁵⁹ If Aizawa, in fact, had been a personal friend of Mazaki, this would also help to explain why the Chief of the Bureau of Military Equipment and Supply would have time for a protracted conversation with Aizawa. Hugh Byas, Government by Assassination, p. 96, attributes the Aizawa-Yamaoka talk to the fact that Yamaoka had been commandant of the Military Academy during Aizawa's student days. In a letter to the biographer of Yamashita, General Yamaoka recently has stated that Aizawa, in fact, told him during the conversation that “he came to kill Nagata and that he would also like to murder the War Minister [Hayashi].” Osamuji, Oki, Ninmen Yamashita Hobun: higeki no shōgun [The Life of Yamashita Hobun; the Tragedy of a General] (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 112–113.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Hugh Byas' description Government by Assassination (pp. 119–128) remains the classic account of the trial.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 114.

⁶² Isobe's last statement, along with those of most of the officers involved in the February 26 Incident, is reprinted in Tsukasa, Kōno, Ni-ni-roku [February 26 Incident] (Tokyo, 1958), pp. 24–92.Google Scholar

⁶³ Ibid., p. 31. Murakami became Gunjika-chō in October 1935. Ordinarily transfers of this importance take place in August. There is some evidence that his appointment was part of a strenuous effort of the Araki-Mazaki faction to acquire another foothold in Central Headquarters. GKJ, “Kuwashima Rikushō haigeki no shinsō” [ldquo;Truth of the Case Denouncing War Minister Kuwashima”] Top Secret, December 18, 1935.

⁶⁴ Kōno Tsukasa, Ni-ni-roku, pp. 31–32.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 38. General Yamashita also conferred with the leaders of the rebellion on February 15th about the possibility of assassinating Premier Okada. Oki Osamuji, Ninmen Yamashita Hobun, pp. 121–122.

⁶⁶ Saionji-Harada Memoirs, July 8, 1936.

⁶⁷ Storry, Double Patriots, p. 191.

⁶⁸ “Somehow,” noted Prince Saionji, “Konoe seems to defend Mazaki and Araki. … It is indeed regrettable for a man of such noble birth and character.” Saionji-Harada Memoirs, August 13, 1936.

⁶⁹ Ibid., July 5, 1937.

⁷⁰ Ibid., October 13, 1937.

⁷¹ Takamiya Tahei, Gunkoku taiheiki, pp. 293–296.

⁷² This is not to say that these officers were consigned to oblivion. Prince Konoe, for example, secured important cabinet and administrative positions for Yanagawa, Yamaoka, Suzuki and, of course, Araki. Yamashita later became famous as the Tiger of Malaya. Hayashi Senjūrō, Abe Nobuyuki, and Koiso Kuniaki subsequently served as premiers of the Imperial Government.

⁷³ A most succinct analysis of the implications of technological change within the military is Morris Janowitz's, “Military Elites and the Study of War,” Conflict Resolution, I (March, 1957), 9–18.

⁷⁴ GKJ, “Seigun undō no jissai” [“Real Conditions of the Purification Movement”], Top Secret, February 8, 1934, Part I is the only primary source known to the writer indicating the existence of factions in accordance with these classifications.

⁷⁵ The advantages of this approach are set forth by Janowitz, Morris, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New York, 1959)Google Scholar; and his The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, 1960).Google Scholar