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Germany and Pearl Harbor

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

H. L. Trefousse
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Extract

Germany's role in the events leading up to Pearl Harbor needs to be re-examined in the light of documents published since the end of the war. These sources help correct certain misconceptions about German policy which were held during the conflict. The Allied powers believed at that time that Hitler had long-range plans for conquest and that as a part of these plans had, in one way or another, pushed Japan into war with the United States.

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Articles
Information
The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , November 1951 , pp. 35 - 50
Copyright
Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1951

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References

1 For the text, providing for collaboration against the Comintern, cf. Germany, Inneren, Reichsministerium des, Reichsgesetzblatt 1937 (Berlin, 1937), II, 28–29Google Scholar; for the secret protocol, providing for mutual neutrality in case of war with Russia, cf. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, “Record of Proceedings…” (Hereafter referred to as “IMTFE”), Document 1561-E, pp. 5936–5937.

2 “The United States of America against Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al., Defendants,” Erich Kordt's testimony, p. 7418. (Hereafter referred to as “Weizsäcker Case.”) This was true despite the fact that Ribbentrop knew so little about the Far East that he thought “Shimonoseki” was a person.

3 Ibid.

4 Liu, James T., “German Mediation in the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1938,” in Far Eastern Quarterly, VIII (February, 1949), 157–171;CrossRefGoogle Scholar United States, Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945 (Washington, 1949), Series D, I, 826–864.Google Scholar For the recognition of Manchukuo and the Pact, cf. Dokumente der deutschen Politik (Berlin, 1935–1944), VI, 85, 102Google Scholar.

5 Interrogation of General Oshima and Stahmer's affidavit, “IMTFE,” pp. 6050 ff., 24398.

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7 General Oshima's interrogation, loc. cit.

8 “IMTFE,” p. 6115.

9 Document 4034, “IMTFE,” pp. 6127 ff.; Document 1714, p. 2404; Document 2862, p. 34016; Kordt's testimony, “Weizsäcker Case,” p. 7419.

10 Zeitschriften-Dienst, September 23, 1939;Google ScholarVölkischer Beobacbter, July-November, 1939Google Scholar.

11 Assmann, Kurt, “Why U-Boat Warfare Failed,” in Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (July, 1950), p. 659;CrossRefGoogle ScholarFuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy (Washington, 1947), 1939, pp. 3–5.Google Scholar (Hereafter referred to as Fuehrer Conferences.)

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17 “IMTFE,” Document 1308, pp. 6191–6212.

18 “Weizsäcker Case,” Kordt's testimony, pp. 7417 ff.

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22 Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940, II, 280–281.Google Scholar According to Erich Kordt of the German Foreign Office, Special Emissary Stahmer entered into a secret oral understanding which gave Japan the right to decide whether the casus foederis existed in any given situation or not. “Weizsäcker Case,” pp. 7426–7427.

23 “Japan, Germany, and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present between each of the three Contracting Parties and the Soviet Union.”

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29 “IMTFE,” p. 48994.

30 It may be argued that the secret clause of the treaty left the decision of entry up to Japan and prevented the Nazis from invoking the alliance, but they never even approached the Japanese to inquire about the implementation of the pact as far as the writer has been able to discover.

31 Fuehrer Conferences. 1940, II, 68–72.Google Scholar Cf. Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific (Boston, 1948), p. 48,Google Scholar for earlier references to the plan.

32 Fuehrer Conferences. 1941Google Scholar, 1, 1–4.

33 Document 134-C, IMT, XXXIV, 469.

34 Document 075-C, IMT. XXXIV, 302–305. This “Basic Order No. 24 Regarding Collaboration with Japan,” issued to Hitler's armed forces, stated in part: “It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East.…The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of war.”

35 Document 1834-PS, IMT. XXVIII, 554–564; United States, Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941, 2181–316; Schmidt, Paul, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne. 1932–1945 (Bonn, 1949), 531.Google Scholar

36 Document NG-4422-C, “Weizsäcker Case.”

37 Document NG-3437, “Weizsäcker Case.” He thought Great Britain would shortly be completely isolated as he considered Russia's collapse imminent; cf. Document 2896-PS, IMT, XXXI, 258–262.

38 Document NG-3437, “Weizsäcker Case;” Document 2897-PS, IMT, XXXI, 258–262. Japan was to benefit by getting Eastern Siberia.

39 Feis, Herbert, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, 1950), 192ff.Google Scholar

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41 Feis, op. cit., 193 ff.

42 Kato, op. cit., 45.

43 Documents NG-4422-D and 4454, “Weizsäcker Case.”

44 Ibid. For later efforts by the Germans to utilize the discussions to induce the United States to stop further participation in anti-German policies' in the Atlantic, cf. Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), 1034;Google Scholar United States, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, 1943), II, 686;Google ScholarGrew, Joseph C., Ten Years in Japan (New York, 1944), 464;Google ScholarPearl Harbor Attack, XII, 71–72.

45 Document NG-3459, “Weizsäcker Case.”

46 Document 3733-PS, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI, 545–546.

47 Ibid.

48 According to Konoye, Tojo was chosen as he was not as uncompromising as some of his army colleagues. Konoye Diary, Pearl Harbor Attack, XX, 4011.

49 Documents NG-4418, 4452, 4453, “Weizsäcker Case.”

50 On July 2, 1941, an Imperial Conference had arrived at the decision to prepare for war with Great Britain and America should negotiations break down. Pearl Harbor Attack, XX, 4018–4019. Cf. Feis, op. cit., pp. 209 ff., 282.

51 This incredible reaction may be accounted for by von Ribbentrop's illogical approach to problems of foreign policy.

52 Document 4421-NG, “Weizsäcker Case.”

53 Pearl Harbor Attack, XII, 112, 143, 146, 147.

54 Document NG-4423, “Weizsäcker Case.”

55 This blindness may have been conditioned by the Nazis' conviction of long standing that America ought not to be provoked prematurely.

56 Hull, op. cit., p. 1055.

57 Should the Japanese newscaster insert the words, “East wind rain,” in his daily broadcasts, war would break out with the United States. Pearl Harbor Attack, XII, 154–155.

58 Document 4070-B, “IMTFE,” pp. 6637–6638.

59 Document 4070, “IMTFE,” pp. 6640–5641.

60 Völkischer Beobachter, November 27, 1941Google Scholar.

61 Hull, op. cit., 1074–1084; Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948), 421; Feis, op. cit., 307 ff.Google Scholar; Millis, Walter P., This Is Pearl (New York, 1947), 220ff.Google Scholar

62 Frankfurter Zeitung, November 26 and 27, 1941Google Scholar.

63 Pearl Harbor Attack. XII, 200–202.

64 Ibid., 204.

65 Document 2889-PS, IMT, XXXI, 265–268.

66 “IMTFE,” 34030.

67 IMT, X, 379–381.

68 Infra, 15–16.

69 Document 2157-D, “IMTFE,” 6651; also 34033.

70 Document 1532-A, “IMTFE,” 6654; ibid., 34034.

71 Pearl Harbor Attack, IX, 4200.

72 Ibid., XII, 228–229; Ciano, L'Europa verso la catastrofe, 684–687.

73 Document NG-4395, “Weizsäcker Case.”

74 Ciano Diaries, 414 ff.

75 Simoni, Leonardo, Berlino Ambasciata d'Italia, 1939–1941 (Rome, 1946), 263.Google Scholar

76 Pearl Harbor Attack, XXXV, 684–685.

77 Ciano Diaries, 414–416.

78 Pearl Harbor Attack, XII, 245–246.

79 Document 872-D, IMT, XXXV, 619–623.

80 Document NG-4367, “Weizsäcker Case;” Kordt, Erich, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart, 1948), 331.Google Scholar

81 Document NG-2705, “Weizsäcker Case.”

82 IMT, X, 201; Schmidt, op. cit., 541.

83 “Weizsäcker Case,” 7807.

84 Ciano Diaries, 416.

85 Pearl Harbor Attack, XIII, 401.

86 Hull, op. cit., 1093; Sherwood, op. cit., 430.

87 Weizsäcker Case,” 7907.

88 MIT, X, 296–297; XIII, 477; XIV, 120, 323.

89 Documents 2477, 2744-A, 29021, 2411; “IMTFE,” 24643.

90 Document 3000, “IMTFE,” 36396.

91 Pearl Harbor Attack, XII, 253.

92 Document NG-4424, “Weizsäcker Case.”

93 Pearl Harbor Attack, XII, 253.

94 According to Louis P. Lochner, most Berliners believed their Führer was too smart to declare war, and Hitler himself was not too sure. He had called the Reichstag to meet on December 9 at first, but did not convoke it until December 11. Lochner, Louis P., What About Germany (New York, 1943), 199–200Google Scholar.

95 Document 2932-PS, 1MT. XXXI, 316–321.

96 Sherwood, op. cit., 427.

97 Kordt, op. cit., 332.

98 “Weizsäcker Case,” 7904 ff.

99 Document 2911-PS and 2929-PS, IMT, XXXI, 273–280; 305–315.

100 IMT, XIV, 548–549.

101 Les Lettres Secrètes échangées par Hitler et Mussolini (Paris, 1946), 121–131Google Scholar.

102 Nazi-Soviet Relations, 314. On this occasion, he also promised assistance to Japan should she become involved in war with the United States, although his main theme remained the attack on Singapore and American non-belligerency. Ibid., 311–316.

103 Ibid., 303; Document NG-4371, “Weizsäcker Case.”

104 Weizsäcker, Ernst von, Erinnerungen (Munich, Leipzig, Freiburg, 1950), 328.Google Scholar

105 Fuehrer Conferences. 1940Google Scholar, I, 12–19, II, 37–58; 1941, I, 12–19, 50–60, 62–76, 77–78, II, 1–2, 3–12, 13–22, 49; Richard, Dorothy E., “Hitler at Sea,” (Unpublished Paper, Georgetown University, 1949).Google Scholar

106 “Weizsäcker Case,” pp. 1904–1920.