¹ There are 250 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Elections were postponed for security reasons in 5 constituencies, uncontested in 36 AFPFL and allied strongholds. At this writing (May 25) information affecting a total of 233 seats is available. The AFPFL and its allies won 169 seats, and together with the probable accession of 7 of the 11 elected independents control 176. The National Unity Front captured 46; three right wing groups (the Arakanese, Burma National Bloc, and Pa'o) won 7. Thus the opposition groups command 57 seats as compared with a maximum of 37 in the previous parliament elected in 1951. If however the votes are totaled and if all the 1956 votes for the independents were to be assigned to the opposition then the latter garnered 44.8 per cent of the vote cast as compared with 46.6 per cent in 1951. See the Nation (Rangoon, 05 15, 1956)Google Scholar for a useful summary.

² From a speech at the AFPFL Mass Conference, Rangoon, March 4, reported in the Burma Weekly Bulletin, IV (03 8, 1956).Google Scholar

³ This is the policy U Nu formulated both in the United States and earlier at Bandung. See his speech of July 1, 1955, “An Asian Speaks About Neutrality.” (Washington, D. C., National Press Club), reprinted in An Asian Speaks (Washington, D. C., n.d.), pp. 13–18Google Scholar; and Resurgence, A Collection of Three Speeches, published by the Directorate of Information (Rangoon, 1955).Google Scholar

⁴ The AFPFL or The Communist Party, Who Is Right? (Rangoon, 1952)Google Scholar, a collection of documents published by the AFPFL as a mimeographed pamphlet in Burmese. For a fuller discussion see the author's chapter “Insurrectionary Movements” in Burma (New Haven, 1956).Google Scholar

⁵ Speech on June 13, 1948, “The Nature of Leftist Unity,” Towards Peace and Democracy (Rangoon, 1949), p. 117Google Scholar. Negotiations with the British had proceeded rapidly. On Dec. 20, 1946 Prime Minister Attlee invited a Burmese delegation headed by General Aung San to London. Their talks ended in an Agreement (Cmd. 7029) for the election of a self-determining Constituent Assembly in April 1947. Following the assassination of the Socialist leaders Aung San, Thakin Mya, and others, Thakin Nu completed the negotiations with Attlee. In October, the Nu-Attlee treaty was signed to provide for the transfer of sovereignty to Burma on Jan. 4, 1948 (Cmd. 7240, London, Oct. 17, 1947).

⁶ Nu, Thakin, From Peace to Stability (Rangoon, 1951), p. 154Google Scholar, from speech at the Union Youth Rally, Jan. 8,1951.

⁷ The Burmese Government issued an official release on March 2, 1956 about the first Sino-Burmese Conference on border questions, held Feb. 7–8, 1956 at the town of Lweje. The festivities of the occasion, the repeated reference to the Sino-Burmese endorsement of “the Five Principles of Peace,” and the exchange of large cultural delegations between Peking and Rangoon did not seem to add up to more than a decision for the two governments to explore the possibilities of opening discussions. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 5, 1956. During the summer of 1956 the Burmese Government admitted, after the English-language daily, The Nation, broke the story, that Chinese Communist troops were quartered to the south of the disputed boundary area. The Nation would hardly have handled the story without Government aid. Prime Minister U Ba Swe has already sought the diplomatic intercession of India, has been promised aid from Thailand, and has apparently resolved to take the issue to the UN General Assembly.

⁸ From Peace to Stability, pp. 153–154.Google Scholar

⁹ From Peace to Stability, pp. 197–198Google Scholar. “Internal and External Problems,” speech in Parliament, 03 8, 1951.Google Scholar

¹⁰ From an interview on March 30, 1951, quoted in U.S. Foreign Service Dispatch, Review of First Four Years of Burma's Independence, 06 20, 1952.Google Scholar

¹¹ An account, with full texts of resolutions, names of delegates, etc., appears in Burma, III (04 1953), 7–22Google Scholar. All quotations and references are from these texts.

¹² For a prime example of this failure to understand, see Saposs, D. J., “The Split between Asian and Western Socialism,” Foreign Affairs, XXXII (07 1954), 588–594CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Saposs exaggerates the role of the Japanese Socialists in this group; without evidence he cites the Burmese as friendly toward Russia; he is completely in error on several other Burma matters and concludes that Asian Socialism is an “obstacle to the strengthening of democratic forces.” What he means is that Burma among others has not been willing to join the Manila Pact.

¹³ A publication of the Brookings Institute (New York, 1929), p. 682. Also see pp. 319, 321, 434, 440–441.

¹⁴ Socialist Asia, III, Nos. 9–10 (1955)Google Scholar discusses editorially the differences between the Socialist International and (the nine parties of the) Asian Socialist Conference. The differences arise primarily from “their approach to the problem of colonialism and freedom of the dependent peoples.” This in turn affects their views on world peace and world reconstruction. However they had resolved to co-operate and had set up in July 1953 liaison machinery for this purpose.

¹⁵ Socialist Asia (08 1954), pp. 1–2Google Scholar, editorially welcomed “the cease-fire in Indo” China. It regarded the “liberation of Laos and Cambodia from the threat of communist occupation and from the shackles of French imperialism as the most impressive consequence of the [July] Geneva agreements…Vietnam, however, continues to remain a tragedy. Dr. Ho Chi Minh for instance has promised the Communists a complete liberation of the country south of the 17th parallel from the ‘continued’ strangle hold of the ‘imperialist warmongers.’ What that exactly means is not difficult to predict…the fate of the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians depends more on the countries of Asia pursuing an independent foreign policy than on the sincerity and desire for peace and co-existence of the Sino-Russian and Anglo-American blocs.” Buddhist Burma immediately recognized Buddhist Laos and Cambodia; arranged an exchange of visits with the Cambodians; used her good offices to get India to recognize these countries; and otherwise acted as if she were saying to Ho Chi Minh, “Don't move westward!”.

¹⁶ Subsequent meetings of one kind or another have been held roughly on a semi-annual basis, e.g., Hyderabad, India, in Dec. 1953; Kalaw, Burma, May 1954; Tokyo, Japan, Nov. 1954, etc. At the India meeting it was agreed to set up an Anti-Colonial Bureau as part of the Secretariat. Socialist Asia, originally a monthly, now a quarterly, has been published as the organ of the Conference; in Nov. 1955 Jana, the Ceylon monthly news journal, carried the announcement that a “publishing house of the Asian Socialist movement (approved at the Tokyo Meeting)… with Branches in India, Indonesia, Japan and Israel” will soon be started. All these organizational arrangements are so far conducted from the Secretariat located in Rangoon. The second Asian Socialist Conference has been scheduled for Bombay, Nov. 1956.

¹⁷ All quotes from Socialist Asia, III (06 1954), 9–11.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The remarks were not casual. They immediately occasioned a vigorous debate between Kyaw Nyein and Rammanohar Lohia, a leading Indian Socialist delegate. The latter wished to condemn equally all imperialisms. He rejected explicitly what he called the application of socialist “lesser evil” analysis to the problem. The debate continued. See for example Mehta, Asoke, “To Distinguish [between imperialisms] Is Not to Choose,” Socialist Asia, III (08 1954), 6–8Google Scholar. Kyaw Nyein's position was overtly supported by Prime Minister U Nu at the first meeting of the Five Colombo Powers in May 1954. At this meeting U Nu joined his counterparts from Pakistan and Ceylon who rejected the “line” advanced at that time by Prime Minister Nehru. The majority group insisted on formulating a policy which named Communism, along with imperialism, as a danger to peace.

¹⁹ An Asian Speaks, p. 13.Google Scholar

²⁰ See for example two speeches by U Nu both published by the Ministry of Information, “For World Peace and Progress” (07 19, 1954)Google Scholar and “War and Its Consequences” (09 13, 1954)Google Scholar; and Nyein, U Kyaw, “To Prefer Is Not to Choose,” Socialist Asia, III (06 1954)Google Scholar. The first speech by U Nu and the article by Kyaw Nyein were reprinted in the American Socialist Call, XXII (10 1954).Google Scholar

²¹ See Burma Weekly Bulletin, III, Nos. 41–42 (01 5, 12, 1955)Google Scholar. However, the Burmese Socialists have not followed Tito in the latter's renewal of Soviet ties.

²² The Burma Research Project, New York University, has just completed a modest Chinese language bibliography on Burma (1930–50). It was found that approximately half the number of all entries were devoted to the border question.

²³ U Kyaw Nyein negotiated the Treaty with Japan. Burma Weekly Bulletin, III, No. 33 (11 1954)Google Scholar, for the text. Also see Burma Weekly Bulletin, III, No. 26 (09 1954).Google Scholar

²⁴ See the author's Towards a Welfare Slate in Burma, Reconstruction and Development 1948–1955 (New York, 1955)Google Scholar for a full discussion of this. Burma has recently negotiated a stabilization loan of $15 million with the International Monetary Fund and two loans totaling $19.35 million with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. These loans, plus that of India, reparations from Japan, and aid grants from the U.S., the Colombo Plan, and the UN have contributed to the foreign currency requirements of Pyidawtha. But the total of such money, amounting to less than $400 million, falls far short of the need. The Burmese Government and press have welcomed recent United States aid action: the sale of approximately $20 million of surplus agricultural commodities for local currency and a currently negotiated long term loan for approximately $25 million.

²⁵ New York Times, 05 2, 1956Google Scholar, dispatch by Robert Alden from Rangoon.

²⁶ The decline was registered partly by falling rice prices but also by payments for increased imports for the Pyidawtha plans, repayment of debts to the United Kingdom and India, and purchase of government shares in the Burma Oil Corporation Joint Venture. For a fuller discussion see Nelson, Saul, “Domestic and Foreign Trade,” in Burma by Frank N. Trager and Associates (New Haven, 1956).Google Scholar

²⁷ Burma Weekly Bulletin, V, No. 1 (04 5, 1956).Google Scholar

²⁸ Burma, The Eighth Anniversary, VI, No. 2 (01 1956), 24–25.Google Scholar

²⁹ Since this is not an article about U.S. or Free World policy it may be irrelevant to cite such intriguing data; one additional item is nonetheless offered. On the same day (and same page) the Burma Weekly Bulletin, IV, No. 46 (02 16, 1956)Google Scholar, announced the Burma sale of 20,000 tons of rice to Romania, it also carried the story of purchase was made under the enterprise of Americans carrying out the Congressional intent of Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development Assistance Act. During the summer of 1956 emerging possibilities of rice sales for cash pointed toward a diminishing dependence on barter deals with the Soviet-Sino bloc.

³⁰ Raschid, U, “Address to the Burmese Chamber of Commerce,” Burma Weekly Bulletin, IV, No. 47 (02 23, 1956).Google Scholar