¹ Adewale, Ombolaji. “Oil spill compensation claims in Nigeria: Principles, guidelines and criteria”, (1989) 33(1) J.A.L. 91 at 93.Google Scholar

² Personal interview with Odeleye, J. A., Legal Manager and Company Secretary of Shell Nigeria (Lagos, 02 1998).Google Scholar

³ Personal interview with Ned, ‘Temi Mojuetan, Attorney at the Law & Contracts Department of Chevron Nigeria (Lagos, 03 1998).Google Scholar

⁴ (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 382) 148.Google Scholar

⁵ The official exchange rates in this article were derived from the IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook, various years. The unofficial real exchange rates are considerably higher than the official exchange rate but the IMF figures, which go back to the early years of Nigeria's independence, allow for greater consistency in the comparison of damages awarded in Nigerian courts over time.

⁶ See, for instance, Adewale, Ombolaji, “Rylands v. Fletcher and the Nigerian petroleum industry”, (1987/1988) 8 & 9 Journal of Private and Property Law 37;Google Scholar Adewale, “Oil spill compensation claims Nigeria: Principles, guidelines and criteria”, op. cit.; and Adewale, , “Some legal aspects of community relations m the petroleum industry”, in Soremekun, Kayode (ed.), Perspectives on the Nigerian Oil Industry, Lagos, 1995.Google Scholar

⁷ Okonmah, Patrick D., “Right to a clean environment: The case for the people of oil-producing communities in the Nigerian Delta”. (1997) 41 J.A.L. 43 at 43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 382) 148.Google Scholar

¹⁰ (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 350) 258.Google Scholar

¹¹ Unreported Suit No. W/89/71 in the Warri High Court.

¹² (1974) 2 RSLR 1.Google Scholar

¹³ Personal interview with Odeleye, J. A., SPDC's Legal Manager and Company Secretary (Lagos, 02 1998).Google Scholar

¹⁴ While the imposition of injunctions against oil companies is not a realistic option in Nigeria, the substantial quantity of litigation continues to constitute a problem for the oil industry and entails financial costs for the companies. As a way of avoiding litigation, oil companies could introduce less harmful practices. This would ultimately reduce the quantity of litigation because potential plaintiffs would have fewer legal grounds on which to sue. But oil companies have largely failed to change their harmful practices despite environmental legislation. See Frynas, Jedrzej George, Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities. Forthcoming book, Münster/ Hamburg, 1999, chs. 3 and 5.Google Scholar

¹⁵ (1993) 7 NWLR 203.Google Scholar

¹⁶ On negligence and duty of care, see e.g. Percy, R. A., Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (7th ed) London, 1983, 10–15.Google Scholar

¹⁷ (1993) 7 NWLR 203.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Cap. 350, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.

¹⁹ In a number of oil-related cases in Nigeria, the plaintiff won by inferring negligence without proving it. Adhemove v. Shell-BP Unreported Suit No. UHC 12/70 in the Ughelli High Court is an example of such an instance. In that case, waste from an oil waste pit escaped and spread over the plaintiff's property destroying a fish pond and killing a substantial number of fish. It is not clear if the principle res ipsa loquitur was applied in this case (see the subsequent discussion of the rule). Unless res ipsa loquitur is evoked in a negligence case, the plaintiff must prove negligence. In those eases, in which a plaintiff won by inferring negligence without proving it and res ipsa loquitur could not be invoked, the judge did not appear to follow the correct legal procedure under the Common Law and, technically, the cases should have been dismissed. According to Percy (op. eit., 15) “any failure to prove any one of these component elements [duty of care, breach of duty and resulting damage] must result in the plaintiff's action for damages being dismissed” (my emphasis).

²⁰ (1970–1972) 1 RSLR 71.Google Scholar

²¹ (1970–1972) 1 RSLR 71.Google Scholar

²² In order to rely on the principle, three conditions must be fulfilled. First, the plaintiff must prove that the accident occurred. Second, he/she must prove that the occurrence would not have happened “in the ordinary course of things without negligence on the part of somebody other than the plaintiff’. Third, the facts suggest that the defendant rather than the plaintiff was negligent. In line with the last condition, the plaintiff must usually show that the thing causing the damage was “in the management and control of the defendant” (Percy, op. cit., 350). An oil spill fulfils all three conditions of the principle res ipsa loquitur, as long as the plaintiff can show that the spill actually happened. An oil spill does not happen in the ordinary course of things and the oil installation is in the management of the oil company.

²³ (1993) 7 NWLR 203.Google Scholar

²⁴ It is also difficult to prove negligence as a result of gas flaring, see Chinda v. Shell-BP (1974) 2 RSLR 1.Google Scholar

²⁵ (1970–1972) 1 RSLR 71.Google Scholar

²⁶ Res ipsa loquitur was successfully applied in a number of more recent cases involving oil spills, for instance, in Shell v. Enoch (1992) 8 NWLR 335.Google Scholar

²⁷ The defendant can cause an interference through vibrations, flooding, fire, noise or other forms of invasion. Nuisance is slightly different from negligence, although it can also result from negligence. The plaintiff'does not generally have to prove a duty of care, but he must show that the defendant's interference was unreasonable and that the interference was serious. On the most basic level, the court may ask the question “Is it reasonable that the plaintiff should have to put up with this interference?”. This is different from negligence where the question is asked about the duty of care. On nuisance, see e.g. Baker, G. D., Tort (5th ed), London, 1991, ch. 15.Google Scholar

²⁸ (1974) All NLR 95.

²⁹ 4 ECSLR 486.

³⁰ (1974) All NLR 95.

³¹ 4 ECSLR 486.

³² Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, s. 6(6)(b).

³³ 4 ECSLR 486.

³⁴ The legal rule was expressed by the House of Lords in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) I.R. 3 H.L. 330Google Scholar as follows:

“We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.”

The judgment in Rylands v. Fletcher laid down the rule for strict liability. Four conditions must be fulfilled for the rule to apply. First, the defendant must have brought the thing on his land for his/ her own use. Second, the thing must be likely to cause harm if it escapes. Third, the defendant's use of the land must be non-natural, for instance, sewage or gas come under the rule, while weeds or flood water are natural things and do not come under the rule. Fourth, the bmg must actually escape. On the principles of strict liability, see Baker, op. cit., ch. 16. An escape of crude oil or oily waste fulfils all the above four conditions. Accordingly, any dangerous incident involving crude oil can be potentially prosecuted. The defendant is strictly liable for damage, which removes the plaintiff's burden of proof. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove any negligence or breach of duty of care.

³⁵ (1975) 9–11 SC 155.Google Scholar

³⁶ This insight was assisted by a discussion of the Umudje case in Kodilinye, Gilbert, The Nigerian Law of Torts. Ibadan, 1982, 116–117.Google Scholar

³⁷ See, for instance, Shell v. Tiebo VII (1996) 4 NWLR 657Google Scholar and Shell v. Isaiah (1997) 6 NWLR 236.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Kodilinye, op. cit. 117–121. An act of a stranger may also be called an “independent act of a third party” (on limitations of strict liability, see also Percy, op. cit., 855–866).

³⁹ (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 159) 693.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ (1992) 8 NWLR 335.Google Scholar

⁴¹ (1997) 6 NWLR 236.Google Scholar

⁴² This argument has been made in Frynas, , “Political instability and business: focus on Shell in Nigeria”, (1998) 19(3) Third World Quarterly 457 at 465.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴³ Cap. 320, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.

⁴⁴ Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Act, 1977, Cap. 320. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, 12(1).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ (1994) 10 KLR (pt. 22) 68.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ On statutes of limitation in general, see e.g. Baker, op. cit., 436–437. The six-year period of limitation was confirmed by Koiawolf, J.C.A., in Nwadim v. Shell (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 322.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ The problems of the latency period and scientific uncertainty in relation to court cases invoking environmental damage are briefly explained in general terms in Eggen, Jean Macchiaroli, Toxic Torts in a Nutshell. St Paul, MN, 1995, 5–8.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Problems of barriers to justice in Nigeria were investigated in the context of a survey of 154 legal practitioners in Frynas, Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities, op. cit., ch. 5.

⁴⁹ (1974) 2 RSLR 126.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 159) 693.Google Scholar

⁵¹ (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 480) 148.Google Scholar

⁵² This principle was firmly established in Seismograph Service v. Onokpasa (1972) 1 All NLR 347 where the Supreme Court ruled that the correct test for the relevance of the witness's opinion as that of an expert is whether he or she is specially skilled in the particular scientific subject matter.Google Scholar

⁵³ (1990) 6 NWLR (l't. 159) 693.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ On some problems in the enforcement of locus standi in Nigeria, see Ogowewo, Tunde I., “The problem with standing to sue in Nigeria”. [1995] 39 J.A.L. 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁵ (1974) 2 RSLR 126.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ (1992) 8 NWLR 335.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ BHC/2/83, quoted in Shell v. Enoch (1992) 8 NWLR 335.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Chinwuba Obi, S. N., The Ibo Law of Property, London, 1963, 94 and 98.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ These findings were, to a large extent, confirmed by a personal interview with Belgore, M. B., Chief Justice of the Federal High Court (Lagos, 03 1998).Google Scholar

⁶¹ (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 155.Google Scholar

⁶² Ogowewo, op. cit., 18.

⁶³ [1981] 1 All NWLR 1.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 61) 797.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ In that case, the court had to decide whether the applicant was entitled to apply for mandamus to compel private prosecution of certain persons. The Court of Appeal held that the applicant had no standing to sue as his legal rights had not been infringed. The Supreme Court set the ruling of the Court of Appeal aside and held that the locus standi had been broadened since section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State vests in every person a right to initiate a private prosecution. Nnamani, J.S.C. stated: “It is my view that in these matters which are so interlined with the criminal law, our interpretation of section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution must be approached with a true liberal spirit in the interest of the society at large. The Appellant has locus standi as any person to make the application he has brought to court, and if all other conditions are fulfilled, to initiate criminal proceedings” (at 855). The controversy on the issue of locus standi has continued. Ogowewo argued that the ruling in Fawehinmi v. Akilu does not broaden the locus standi (Ogowewo, op. cit. 17). Owaboye, on the other hand, averred that the Akilu case broadens the locus standi and should be viewed as the locus classicus on the issue. See Owaboye, Wole, “Denial of justice and concept of locus standi in Nigeria”, in Owaboye, Wole (ed.). Fundamental Legal Issues in Nigeria, Lagos, 1995, 299.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Unreported Suit No. FHC/L/CS/573/96 in the Federal High Court, Lagos division.

⁶⁷ Unreported Suit No. CA/L/143/97 in the Court of Appeal, Lagos division.

⁶⁸ (1974) 2 RSLR 1.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Several recent high-profile cases by litigants against oil companies from the 1990s can be cited: Geosource v. Biragbara (1997) 5 NWLR 607Google Scholar, Shell v. Tiebo VII (1996) 4 NWLR 657Google Scholar, Shell v. Farah (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 382) 148. In all of these cases, plaintiffs sued an oil company in a representative capacity, not as individuals.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ (1996) 4 NWLR 657.Google Scholar

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⁷⁴ See, in particular, judgments of the Supreme Court in Seismograph Service v. Onokpasa (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 347Google Scholar, Seismograph Service v. Akporuovo (1974) All NLR 95 and Seismograph Service v. Ogbeni (1976) 4 SC 85.Google Scholar

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⁷⁷ (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 350) 258.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See, for instance, Ogiale v. Shell (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 480) 148Google Scholar, in which the court relied on the evidence rules in Seismograph Service v. Onokpasa (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 347Google Scholar and Seismograph Service v. Ogbeni (1976) 4 SC 85.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ (1997) 6 NWLR 236.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 347.Google Scholar

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⁸⁴ On the principle restitutio in integrun, see Percy, op. cit., 251–252 and 588.

⁸⁵ (1974) 2 RSLR 93.Google Scholar

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⁸⁷ Based on the IMF figures for Nigerian consumer prices, see IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 1995.

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⁹⁴ According to plaintiffs’ witnesses, the sum was 50,000 Naira, not 5,500 Naira as Shell's witnesses maintained.

⁹⁵ Interestingly, the court in the Tiebo VII case did not cite the Farah case as a legal precedent. But Onalaja, J.C.A., who delivered the judgment, was one of the Court of Appeal judges in the Farah case. This would suggest that the Farah case, while important as a legal precedent, is in itself a reflection of a broader shift in judicial attitudes towards higher compensation payments.

⁹⁶ Personal interview with Belgore, M. B., Chief Justice of the Federal High Court (Lagos, 03 1998). Belgore largely confirmed our speculations that legal change was affected by the three factors: different approach to law by judicial officers, the increased professional ability of legal counsel working for those affected by oil operations, and the influence of changing social attitudes on judges. He also maintained that legal change could also be attributed to the increased frequency of accidents in the oil industry and the resulting legal disputes. It is possible that the increased frequency of litigation has accelerated the process of social learning among judges. But the quantity of litigation cannot explain per se why courts have changed their interpretation of legal rules.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Personal interview’ with Belgore, M. B., Chief Justice of the Federal High Court (Lagos, 03 1998).Google Scholar On the shifting attitudes of Nigerian judges in general, see e.g. Nweze, C. C., “A survey of the shifting trends in judicial attitudes to fundamental rights in Nigeria”, in Umezulike, I. A., and Nweze, C. C., (eds.). Perspectives in Law and Justice, Enugu, 1996.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ The case Fawehinmi v. Aminu Unrcported Suit No. FHC/L/CS/54/92 in the Federal High Court, Lagos division, which was adjudicated by Belgore, illustrates that courts have come to interpret legal statutes and legal rules in a less narrow fashion. In that case, a Nigerian legal practitioner sued the Minister of Petroleum Resources Jubril Aminu and other defendants, including the NNPC, over the use of Nigeria's oil revenues in 1990. The NNPC requested the court to discharge them on the grounds that the plaintiff did not give them 30 days statutory notice as required by section 12(2) of the NNPC Act 1977. The judge concluded:

“The right to access to Court should not be impeded by a process giving special advantage t o the defendant for no other reason than that it is an organ or semi-organ of the Government. Any law putting it in such a position is certainly against the Constitution, void and invalid.”

Belgore, therefore, dismissed the NNPC's application and declared the aforementioned section of the NNPC Act, 1977, as unconstitutional.

⁹⁹ (1974) All NLR 95.

¹⁰⁰ (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 382) 148.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ 4 ECSLR 486.

¹⁰² Under Common Law, statutes of limitation can limit the period within which a lawsuit can be brought to court. But legislation cannot limit the jurisdiction of courts to hear a tort case. Under some circumstances, courts may also override statutory limitations. On limitation of action, see Percy, op. cit., 199–230.

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¹¹² Personal interview with Belgore, M. B., Chief justice of the Federal High Court (Lagos, 03 1998).Google Scholar

¹¹³ (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt. 366) 51.Google Scholar

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¹¹⁷ In Irou v. Shell-BP Unreported Suit No. W/89/71 in the Warri High Court mentioned earlier, the judge ruled that nothing should be done to disturb the operations of ihe oil industry which “is the main source of this country's revenue”. Such pronouncements in support of the oil industry cannot be found in more recent judgments.

¹¹⁸ A number of general, theoretical problems involved in introducing European legal concepts to Africa have been discussed in Kenneth Nunn, B., “Law as a eurocentric enterprise”, Paper presented at the Critical Legal Conference entitled “Contested Communities: Critical Legal Perspectives”, University of Edinburgh, 8–10 September, 1995.Google Scholar

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¹²⁵ These arguments received an in-depth treatment in Frynas, Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and Village Communities, op. cit.

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¹²⁷ Writing on the local modification of colonial law in Africa, Allott concluded: “The most important single factor requiring the adaptation of English law is the existence of local African populations, to whom the English law is to be applied. The African populations are living under their own forms of society, having their own customs, own religion, beliefs, social organisation, patterns of marriage and divorce, land law, etc. How can English law be applied to them unadapted?”. Ibid. at 25.