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Corroboration of Accomplice Evidence in Swaziland: Some Thoughts on Judicial Interpretations and their Implications
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
Extract
The recent decision by Justice Francis Rooney of the High Court of Swaziland in the case of Rex v. Simon Dvuba has once again brought to the fore the need to re-examine the law governing accomplice evidence and its relevance to the contemporary situation in Swaziland. In that case, the accused was charged with the murder of his brother, Mxolisi, Chief of Mpolonjeni area in the Hhohho District. It was alleged that after Mxolisi's death certain parts of his body were cut away with the intention of using them for preparing ritual muthi, mainly to enhance the accused's chances of succession to the chieftaincy to which he asserted a claim of right. Ritual murder is an offence committed in private and parties bind themselves to utmost secrecy. During the trial, four witnesses gave evidence implicating the accused. Three of them claimed to have been told by him in advance of the murder that he wanted to kill the deceased. The fourth one went even further and testified that the accused admitted to her that he was responsible. What the court found surprising was that none of the witnesses warned the deceased of his impending fate or bothered to report the matter to the relevant authorities.
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References
1 Criminal Case No. 107/89, High Court of Swaziland.
2 Muthi is a medicinal mixture made up of parts of human flesh and other ingredients which is supposed to bring fortune or good luck to the person on whose behalf the ritual is being performed.
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