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‘Our Strike’: Equality, Anticolonial Politics and the 1947–48 Railway Strike in French West Africa

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 January 2009

Frederick Cooper
Affiliation:
University of Michigan

Extract

This essay is both a reinterpretation of the place of the French West African railway strike in labor history and part of an exploration of its effects on politics and political memory. This vast strike needs to be studied in railway depots from Senegal to the Ivory Coast. Historians need both to engage the fictional version of the strike in Ousmanne Sembene's God's Bits of Wood and avoid being caught up in it. Interviews in the key railway and union town of Thiès, Senegal, suggest that strike veterans want to distinguish an experience they regard as their own from the novelist's portrayal. They accept the heroic vision of the strike, but offer different interpretations of its relationship to family and community and suggest that its political implications include co-optation and betrayal as much as anticolonial solidarity. Interviews complement the reports of police spies as sources for the historian. The central irony of the strike is that it was sustained on the basis of railwaymen's integration into local communities but that its central demand took railwaymen into a professionally defined, nonracial category of railwayman. The strike thus needs to be situated in relation to French efforts to define a new imperialism for the post-war era and the government's inability to control the implications of its own actions and rhetoric. Negotiating with a new, young, politically aware railway union leadership in 1946 and 1947, officials were unwilling to defend the old racial wage scales, accepted in principle the cadre unique demanded by the union, but fought over the question of power – who was to decide the details that would give such a cadre meaning? The article analyzes the tension between the principles of nonracial equality and African community among the railwaymen and that between colonial power and notions of assimilation and development within the government. It examines the extent to which the strike remained a railway strike or spilled over into a wider and longer term question of proletarian solidarity and anticolonial mobilization.

Type
Labor in Colonial West Africa
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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References

1 The quoted phrase comes from an interview with Amadou Bouta Gueye, 9 Aug. 1994, Thiès. Oumar NDiaye, interviewed the same day, made much the same point. These interviews were part of a workshop and field studies program conducted in August 1994, by Dr Babacar Fall of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar, and the present author. A series of training sessions for graduate students was led by Dr Robert Korstad of the Center for Documentary Studies of Duke University, and I accompanied groups of students who interviewed eyewitnesses in Dakar and Thiès. The students participating in these interviews included Aminata Diena, Makhali NDaiye, Oumar Gueye, Alioune Ba, Biram NDour, and Ouseynou NDaiye. I am particularly grateful to Ms Diena for setting up the Thiès interviews and to Mr M. NDaiye, Mr Ba, and Mr Gueye for organizing the Dakar interviews. This workshop in turn was inspired by a visit that Dr Fall and I made to Thiès in July 1990, in which a graduate student working with Dr Fall, Mor Sene, took us to interview two important witnesses to the 1947–8 events. Mr Sene has himself contributed to the historiography of the strike in his master's thesis, ‘La grève des cheminots du Dakar-Niger, 1947–1948’ (Mémoire de maîtrise, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Université Cheikh Anta Diop, 1986–7). Following the 1994 workshop, students in Dakar will conduct interviews as part of their research on their own theses and dissertations, and will contribute tapes to an archive of contemporary oral history under the supervision of Dr Fall. Tapes of interviews cited here are preserved at the Ecole Normale Supérieure. My collaboration with Dr Fall in the study of African labor history over the last nine years has been a deeply gratifying one, and I would like to thank him for all the help he has given me along the way, for his comments on an earlier draft of this article and for his leadership in setting up the 1994 workshop.

2 The spies' reports appear in the archives as ‘Renseignements’, often with a notation such as ‘African source–good’. Most came from the Sûreté at Thiès, where the almost daily mass meetings were held, but reports from other regions are also used. Archival sources from the Archives Nationales du Sénégal include (from the Government General of Afrique Occidentale Française) series K (labor), 17 G (politics), 2 G (annual reports), and (from the government of Senegal) series D (political and administrative files). The series IGT (Inspection Générale du Travail) and AP (Affaires Politiques) are from France, Archives Nationales, Section Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence. The abbreviation ‘AOF,’ for Afrique Occidentale Française, occurs frequently in the notes.

3 Cooper, Frederick, ‘The Senegalese General Strike of 1946 and the labor question in post-war French Africa’, Can. J. Afr. Studies, XXIV (1990), 165215Google Scholar and ‘Le mouvement ouvrier et le nationalisme: la grève générale du 1946 et la grève des cheminots de 1947–48’, Historiens et Géographes du Sénégal, VI (1991), 3242.Google Scholar

4 There was considerable discontent on the railway in the period before the Dakar strike. Renseignements, 9, 27 04 1943, 7 09 1944, 27 02 1945, 11 D 1/1392.Google Scholar

5 Governor General to Minister, 19 01 1946, 17 G 132.Google Scholar The other side of Gning's connections was that, from 1944 until his dethronement in 1946, he had access to the Governor General and negotiated a number of concessions for the railwaymen. Renseignements, Thiès, 30 08, 1, 4 09 1944, K 329 (26)Google Scholar; Renseignements, 10 01 1946Google Scholar, and Directeur du Réseau, transcript of meeting of Conseil du Réseau, 24 01 1946, K 328 (26).Google Scholar

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8 Tall told an early meeting of the ‘Jeunes’ of the need to ‘bring about in a short time a complete assimilation in all domains with Europeans and a larger participation of the indigenous element in the administration of the country’. The union apparently began as an offshoot led by the militant Tall against the conservative Gning within yet another of the discussion-cum-political groups of the immediate post-war years, the Comité d'Etudes Franco-Africaines. Renseignements, 26 06 1945, 11 D 1/1396.Google Scholar The Comité faded while the union took off. Chef du 2e Secteur de la Sûreté to Commandant de Cercle, 13 10 1945, 11 D 1/1396.Google Scholar

9 Commissaire de Police, Thiès, to Commandant de Cercle, Thiès, 22 08 27, 28 09 1945Google Scholar; Renseignements, Thiès, 3 12 1945, 11 09 1946Google Scholar; Commissaire de Police to Chef de la Sûreté du Sénégal, 22 11 1945Google Scholar; Commandant de Cercle, note for Governor of Senegal, 26 04 1946Google Scholar; Chef du 2e Secteur de la Sûreté to Chef de la Sûreté du Sénégal, 20 07 13 11 1945Google Scholar; Note by Chef de la Police Spéciale du Réseau Dakar-Niger, 7 08 1945, in 11 D 1/1396.Google Scholar The Union des Jeunes established contacts with Leopold Senghor and felt they had his sympathy despite his unwillingness at the time to follow them in criticizing his mentor, Lamine Gueye. Renseignements, 17 05 1946, 11 D 1/1396.Google Scholar

10 Commissaire de Police to Commandant de Cercle, 28 09 1945, 11 D 1/1396Google Scholar; Renseignements, 22 09 1945, 11 D 1/1392.Google Scholar

11 On Sarr's background, see Sene, , ‘Grève des cheminots’.Google Scholar His pre-strike activism in the Union des Jeunes was noted by police informants. See Chef du 2e Secteur de la Sûreté de Thiès to Commandant de Cercle, 9 07 1945Google Scholar, Note by Chef de la Police Spéciale du Réseau Dakar-Niger, 7 08 1945, 11 D 1/1396.Google Scholar Sarr was listed in the latter document as one of the editors of Jeunesse et Démocratie. His connection to a leading Mouride marabout and its importance to the strikers was described by a well-informed strike veteran. Mansour Niang, interview, Dakar, 4 08 1994Google Scholar, by Makhali NDiaye, Aminata Diena, Alioune Ba and Frederick Cooper.

12 Renseignements, 6 04 1946, K 328 (26)Google Scholar; Renseignements, 14 05 1946Google Scholar, enclosing transcript of meeting of 4 May 1946 of Comité Directeur, K 352 (26). The director of the railway system, like Gning, thought that a progressive policy aimed at the élite of railway workers had ‘produced fruit’. In particular, he argued that reforms of December 1945 which had opened up the cadre secondaire to Africans, who could compete for posts ‘with equality of credentials or of merit’, had contributed to the willingness of this élite to co-operate with the union leadership in keeping the rest of the personnel on the job during the January strike. These reforms had permitted 1,100 Africans (out of 20,000) to be examined for possible promotion into the cadre secondaire. Directeur du Réseau, Compte Rendu on the Conseil du Réseau, 24 01 1946, K 328 (26).Google Scholar

13 ‘Revolution’ was the word used by a strike veteran Adoulaye Souleye Sarr, interview, Thiès, 22 July 1990, by Mor Sene, Babacar Fall and Frederick Cooper. He pointed to the milieu of Thiès as the incubus of the revolution.

14 Renseignements, 22, 23, 24, 25 05 1946, 11 D 1/1392.Google Scholar Gning bitterly attacked the ‘conspiracies’ of certain écrivains associated with the Union des Jeunes but accepted the will of the assembly, wishing the union well in trying to find a Secretary General ‘more sincere’ than he. Sarr had been transferred by the railway administration from Thiès to Dakar because of his activities in the Union des Jeunes, but the railway transferred him back so he could be near the union headquarters at Thiès, and he was promoted to the cadre secondaire on 1 Jan. 1947. Commissaire de Police to Chef de la Sûreté du Sénégal, 25 05 1946, 11 D 1/1392.Google Scholar For a list of members of the Comité Directeur, see Renseignements, 19 07 1946, 11 D 1/1392.Google Scholar This narrative and explanation is quite close to that given by informants, notably Ndiaye, Oumar, Gueye, Amadou Bouta (interview, Thiès, 9 08 1994)Google Scholar, Niang, Mansour (interview, 4 08 1994)Google Scholar, and Sarr, Abdoulaye Souleye (interview, 22 07 1990).Google Scholar

15 Renseignements, 28 05 1946, K 352 (26)Google Scholar; Sene, , ‘Grève des cheminots’, 46.Google Scholar In July, Sarr and his colleagues, still fearing a comeback by Gning, played out an unpleasant little game: they threatened a strike unless the Direction of the railway transferred Gning away from Thiès. The demand was refused, but Sarr was put off by a promise to arrange a meeting with the Governor General and the moment passed. Renseignements, 27 07 1946, 17 G 527.Google Scholar

16 Iba der Thiam, ‘La grève des cheminots du Sénégal de Septembre 1938’(Mémoire de maîtrise, Université de Dakar, 1972).

17 A month into his tenure, Sarr was criticized at a meeting of auxiliaries for not doing enough for them, and he responded with a meeting to assure them that he was and made the integration of all railwaymen into the cadre unique the main theme of his tour of the lines. Renseignements, 27 06 2 07 1946, 11 D 1/1392.Google Scholar Abdoulaye Souleye Sarr recalled that in the early days lower ranking workers were called travailleurs indigènes rather than cheminots (interview, 22 July 1990).

18 Syndicat des Travailleurs Africains de la Région Dakar-Niger, Transcript of Assemblée Générale of 9 02 1947, K 459 (179)Google Scholar; Sene, , ‘Grève des cheminots’, 4750Google Scholar; Renseignements, 20 06 2 07 1946, 11 D 1/1392.Google Scholar The politics of the unions in each line remain to be elucidated, as does the obvious question of why they were willing to cede so much control to Thiès. Some powerful personalities, notably Gaston Fiankan in the Ivory Coast, existed in the different lines. The Federation-wide organization paralleled efforts in the same years of individual trade unions to organize confederations first within each territory, then on the level of French West Africa. The Conféderation Générale du Travail was the most successful at forging this kind of centralized organization. AOF, Inspection Générale du Travail, Annual Reports, 1947, 1948.

19 Governor General to Minister 20 04 and 19 06 1946, 17 G 132Google Scholar; Renseignements, Dahomey, 06 07 08 1946Google Scholar, and Report of the Gendarmerie Nationale, Porto Novo, 13 08 and 18 09 1946, K 352 (26)Google Scholar; Renseignements, Guinea, 1 07 1947, 08 1947Google Scholar, and Gendarmarie Nationale, Conakry, report, 1, 5 08 1947, K 352(26)Google Scholar; Renseignements, Soudan, 8 06 1946, 7 07 3 08 1947, K 352(26)Google Scholar; Chef de la Région Abidjan-Niger to Directeur, Chemins de Fer de l'AOF, 20 09 1946, 17 G 591Google Scholar; Ivory Coast, Police et Sûreté, Rapport Politique Mensuel, 3 10 1946Google Scholar, and Renseignements, 6 05 1947, 17 G 139Google Scholar; Report of Commandant du Peloton de Marché d'Abidjan on strike movement at Tafiré (Korhogo), 16–17 08 1946, 17 G 138.Google Scholar

20 AOF, Inspection Générale du Travail (IGT), Annual Report, 1947, 56–9Google Scholar; ibid., 1948, 83. One reason the railwaymen shied away from the CGT or other centrales was that white railwaymen were mostly in the CGT, and their overt racism and unwillingness to make common cause with Africans was not a strong advertisement for solidarity. Suret-Canale, Jean. ‘The French West African railway workers' strike, 1947–48’, in Cohen, Robin, Copans, Jean and Gutkind, Peter C. W. (eds.), African Labor History (Beverly Hills, CA, 1978), 152, n. 8.Google Scholar

21 AOF, IGT, Annual Report, 1947, 60–1Google Scholar; Sene, , ‘Grève des cheminots’, 16.Google Scholar The importance to strikers of the statut issue was emphasized by Mansour Niang (interview 4 Aug. 1994).

22 AOF, Direction Générale des Travaux Publics, Direction des Chemins de Fer et Transports, Annual Report, 1946, quoted in Suret-Canale, , ‘Railway workers' strike’, 152, n. 5.Google Scholar

23 This was precisely the kind of thinking that emerged from the 1946 general strike. Cooper, , ‘The Senegalese General Strike’.Google Scholar

24 Inspecteur Général du Travail, ‘La Grève des Cheminots de l'AOF (1/10/47–16/3/48)’, IGT 13/2; AOF, IGT, Annual Report, 1947, 60Google Scholar; Renseignements, 19 08 1946, 11 D 1/1392Google Scholar; Suret-Canale, , ‘Railway workers' strike’, 134–5.Google Scholar Sarr, in explaining the withdrawal from the Commission, told an assembly of workers on 9 February, ‘The “toubabs”, in perfect unity, lined up against us in the Commission Paritaire’. He and others complained of the racist comments continuously made by representatives of European workers in the commission, and warned of ‘a battle with the Europeans’. The latter phrase was used by Mody Camara. Renseignements, 1, 10 02 1947, K 377 (26).Google Scholar

25 Police spies reported on a series of meetings at Thiès in early April at which the strike was planned: leaders calculated that high officials would accept union claims to avoid the embarrassment of having their President witness an ongoing strike. There were also rumors that 3,000 Africans were about to lose their jobs, and the strike thus had a defensive element to it. Renseignements, 11, 13 04 1947Google Scholar, and Gendarmerie Nationale, Thiès, Rapport, 14 04 1947, K 377 (26).Google Scholar For reports on the strike, see telegrams from the Governors of Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Guinea and the Soudan, 20–23 04 1947Google Scholar, ibid.

26 Protocole de fin de grève, 19 04 1947, K 377 (26).Google Scholar

27 Note sur la proposition de loi présentée par M Mamadou Konaté tendant à la création d'un cadre unique des chemins de fer de l'AOF, incl. Cunéo to Governor General 30 03 1950, K 43(1).Google Scholar

28 Circular signed by Secretary General Marat (for Minister) to Hauts Commissaires, 29 04 1947.Google Scholar For warnings of a general strike, see Inspecteur du Travail Combier (Senegal), Note d'étude, 17 04 1947Google Scholar, and letter to Secretary General, 13 05 1947, IGT 13/4.Google Scholar

29 Note sur l'équilibre financier de la Régie, 12 08 1947, K 459 (179).Google Scholar

30 Valentin, Marie-Renée, ‘Les grèves des cheminots français au cours de l'année 1947’, Le Mouvement Social, CXXX (1985), 5580.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

31 Sene, , ‘Grève des cheminots’, 55–7.Google Scholar

32 Renseignements, 25 08 1947, K 377 (26).Google Scholar

33 Governor General to Minister, 28 06 16 09 1947, K 459 (179).Google Scholar This indemnity could rise as high as 7/10 of the base wage; it was a de facto mechanism for equalizing base wages while maintaining substantial inequalities. The Governor General claimed to be thinking about suppressing this for civil servants – which would set a precedent, although technically no more than that, for railway workers – and replacing it with an indemnity of residence which would apply only to high-cost areas and apply without distinction of rank or origin. The Governor General, however, feared that opening up this issue raised the possibility of a general strike throughout the civil service and railways.

34 Mémoire of Régie for the Comité Arbitral, 27 10 1947, K 459 (179).Google Scholar

35 Renseignements, Thiès, 1, 11 09 1947Google Scholar, and Renseignements, Ivory Coast, 10, 18 09 1947, K 377 (26)Google Scholar; Sûreté, Synthèse mensuelle, 10 1947, 17 G 527.Google Scholar

36 I have not seen any mention of the meeting with Senghor in the archives – apparently the police spies missed this one. It was reported independently by two knowledgeable informants in Thiès, Amadou Bouta Gueye and Oumar NDiaye (interviews, 9 Aug. 1994). It is conceivable that the railway union's later support for Senghor is being pushed backwards, but these informants (both délégués du personnel at the time) are quite specific about this meeting. On Gueye's clash with the Union des Jeunes, see Renseignements, 27 05 1946, 11 D 1/1392.Google Scholar

37 Governor General to Minister, 11 10 1947, IGT 13/2Google Scholar; AOF, IGT, Annual Report, 1947, 62.Google Scholar

38 For a narrative approach to the strike, see Sene, , ‘Grève des cheminots’.Google Scholar

39 Renseignements, 19 11 1947, K 378 (26).Google Scholar

40 The Grand Marabout of Tivaouane, Ababacar Sy, told a religious meeting in January 1948, ‘France is good and generous’, and workers would get satisfaction only if they politely asked their employers after having accomplished their tasks. ‘God the all-powerful has said he will never help his “slave” who, in demanding things impolitely and with hatred, puts forward his desire to possess’. Renseignements, 26 01 1948, K 379 (26).Google Scholar The powerful marabout Seydou Nourou Tall also worked against the strike. Renseignements, 29 10 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

41 Of the leading marabouts, Cheikh Mbacke is mentioned as having been supportive, but the tolerance of lower level marabouts is what was stressed most in interviews. Informants stressed their personal acquaintance with marabouts at the time. NDiaye, Oumar and Gueye, Amadou Bouta (interviews, 9 08 1994)Google Scholar and Niang, Mansour (interview, 4 08 1994).Google Scholar

42 Renseignements, 14 11 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar A list of donors published in Réveil, 20 11 1947Google Scholar, also listed a number of local politicians, merchants and union groups in railway towns such as Diourbel and Kaolack, as well as Dakar and Thiès. Informants noted the importance of merchants' help: NDiaye, Oumar and Gueye, Amadou Bouta (interviews, 9 08 1994)Google Scholar, Niang, Mansour (interview, 4 08 1994).Google Scholar

43 L'AOF, 25 11 12 12 1947.Google Scholar The newspaper gave considerable coverage to the strike, although its patron, Lamine Gueye, took a hands-off position throughout its course.

44 NDiaye, Oumar (interview, 9 08 1994).Google Scholar

45 Renseignements, 31 10 7 11 1947, K 379 (26).Google Scholar

46 Renseignements, 10 11 1947, K 379 (26).Google Scholar

47 Renseignements, Coyah, 20 12 1947, K 379 (26).Google Scholar

48 Inspection du Travail, Dahomey, to IGT, 4 11 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

49 Adboulaye Souleye Sarr (interview, 22 07 1990)Google Scholar, Amadou Bouta Gueye and Oumar Ndiaye (interview, 9 08 1994)Google Scholar, Niang, Mansour (interview, 4 08 1994).Google Scholar

50 Renseignements, Thiès, 4 12 1947Google Scholar, and Ivory Coast, 9 11 1947, K379 (26)Google Scholar; IGT, AOF (Pierre Pélisson), Report on Strike, 24 01 1948, IGT, 13/2Google Scholar; Sarr, Abdoulaye Soulaye, (interview, 22 07 1990).Google Scholar

51 Khady Dia, who sold peanuts by the Thiès train station, compared the role of women in the two strikes. Interview, Thiès, 9 08 1994Google Scholar, by Aminata Diena, Alioune Ba, Oumar Gueye and Frederick Cooper. Sarr, Abdoulaye Souleye (interview, 22 07 1990)Google Scholar, NDiaye, Oumar and Amadou Bouta Gueye (interviews, 9 08 1994)Google Scholar also suggested that Sembene may have elided the role of women in the two strikes. Informants call the 1938 strike ‘la grève de Diack’, after its leader Cheik Diack, while the 1947–8 strike is known as ‘la grève de Sarr’. All informants stress the importance of women's efforts to sustain families during the long strike.

52 It is hardly likely that the extensive network of police spies would have missed a public event like a march of women from Thiès to Dakar. Sembene's account was specifically denied by Sarr, Abdoulaye Souleye (interview, 22 07 1990)Google Scholar and Gueye, Amadou Bouta (interview, 9 08 1994)Google Scholar, and contradicted by Dia, Khady (interview, 9 08 1994).Google Scholar There is a report from December 1947 that when eight workers decided to return to work at Thiès ‘a band of women and children gathered in front of their (the returnees') homes and began to insult and threaten them’, so that the ex-strikers had to wait for the police to disperse the crowd before reporting to work. Gendarmarie Nationale, Thiès, Report, 23 12 1947, K 379 (26).Google Scholar See also Sene, , ‘Grève des cheminots’, 91Google Scholar, who cites an interview with Mame Fatou Diop, on the importance of songs and the taunting of strike breakers. For a literary analysis of women in Sembene's novel, see Case, F., ‘Workers' movements: revolution and women's consciousness in God's Bits of Wood’, Can. J. of Afr. Studies, XV (1981), 277–92.Google Scholar

53 Renseignements, Thiès, 26 10 1947, K 43 (1)Google Scholar; Renseignements, Thiès, 17 09 1948, 5 08 1949, 11 D 1/1392Google Scholar; Abdoulaye Souleye Sarr (interview, 22 07 1990)Google Scholar; Jacques Ibrahima Gaye, article in L'AOF, 17 10 1947, clipping in K 457 (179).Google Scholar

54 Sidya, N'Diaye, quoted in Renseignements, 29 10 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar Food supply became part of the struggle between the two sides. The co-operative supplied food only to strikers, not to railwaymen who went back to work, and officials thought this a major reason why few workers went back to work on the Dakar-Niger. The Régie tried itself to organize the delivery of rice from the Soudan to railwaymen at Thiès and Dakar who went back to work. IGT, AOF, to Deputy Dumas, 6 01 1948, K457 (179).Google Scholar

55 IGT, Report, 24 01 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

57 Report of meeting, 4 11 1947, K 379 (26)Google Scholar; Renseignements, 7 11 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

58 Resolution of Union Régionale de Guinée, 18 11 1947, K 379 (26).Google Scholar

59 Governor, Ivory Coast, to Governor General, 21 11 1947, K 237 (26).Google Scholar

60 Renseignements, Ivory Coast, 9 11 1947, K 379 (26).Google Scholar

61 Suret-Canale, , ‘Railway workers' strike’, 147.Google Scholar

62 At the Grand Conseil, Senghor noted the ‘emotion the suspension of the application of the Code du Travail raised among workers’ and urged legislative action. Bulletin du Grand Conseil, 29 01 1948, 277–8.Google Scholar See also Renseignements, 19, 28 01 1948, K 439 (179)Google Scholar; Directeur des Affaires Politiques, Note pour M. le Ministre, 20 12 1947, AP 2255/1.Google Scholar For more on the Code, see Cooper, Frederick, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa, forthcoming ch. 7.Google Scholar

63 IGT, Report, 24 01 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar The 1948 Annual Report of the Inspection du Travail for French West Africa (90) termed the railway strike ‘the only important collective conflict’ of the year. It claimed credit for the ‘favorable evolution’ of the situation. There were many more disputes registered with the Inspection in 1947, but they had not led to many serious strikes, a fact for which the Inspection also took credit. Ibid. 1947, 59.

64 Renseignements, 1 09 1947, K 377 (26).Google Scholar

65 La Voix de la RDA was published regularly as a special section of the communisant Dakar newspaper, Réveil. This article appeared in no. 283, 5 Feb. 1948.

66 Renseignements, Ivory Coast, 5, 18 11 1947, K 379 (26).Google Scholar

67 Réveil, no. 268 (15 12 1947) and no. 269 (18 12 1947).Google Scholar

68 IGT to Governor General, 12 12 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

69 Ibid. IGT 13/2.

70 AOF, Bulletin du Grand Conseil, Procès-Verbal, 23 12 1947, 80–1, 31 01 1948, 320–1.Google Scholar The assembly of the Union Française – the deliberative (but nearly powerless) body intended to allow full discussion of issues facing Overseas France among colonial and metropolitan deputies – had a longer debate on the strike, ending in a resolution calling on the administration to ‘resolve’ the conflict and not to sanction the strikers. The debate is nonetheless notable for the invocation by supporters of the strikers of images of France's unity, on its progressive role in the world, and on the importance of equality within it to justify favorable treatment for African railwaymen. Débats, Sessions of 6, 12 02 1948, 6974, 7889.Google Scholar

71 Pélisson to M le Deputé Dumas, 6 01 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

72 Senghor to Minister, 26 11 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

73 Renseignements, 17 12 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

74 Sissoko had earlier telegraphed the Ministry to remind them of the ‘lamentable situation of several thousand families’ affected by the strike, of the ‘economic perturbation’ leading to a ‘fiasco’ in the 1948 harvest, and of the unfortunate effects of turning the strike into a ‘test of force’. Sissoko to Ministry, telegram, 3 12 1947, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar This language was fully consistent with the tack being taken by most of the West African deputies.

75 Note signed by Pillot, for the Dakar-Niger Réseau, for M le Directeur Fédéral de la Régie des Chemins de Fer de l'AOF, and sent by Cunéo to the President of the Conseil d'Administration, 19 01 1948, K 457 (179).Google Scholar The administration was thinking that they could split off the Soudanais as early as the end of December. Renseignements, Thiès, 27 12 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

76 Note by Pillot, K 457 (179).

77 Secretary General of Government General, to Sissoko, 29 01 1948Google Scholar, copy enclosed Inspection du Travail, Bamako, to IGT, 7 02 1948, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

78 Inspection du Travail, Bamako, to IGT, 7 02 1948Google Scholar, Moussa Diarra, on behalf of Comité Directeur, telegram to Sarr, 29 01 1948Google Scholar, and Renseignements, 4 02 1948, K 457 (179).Google Scholar Another telegram sent by the Comité Directeur at Thiès to the Soudan attacked the entire initiative of Sissoko: ‘Regret to put you on guard against the bad propaganda of the Sage of the Soudan who despite promises of devotion to cause attempts negative propaganda of destruction through numerous telegrams and letters addressed to Soudan. Consider intervention of this man as destruction orchestrated with directors of Régie at their visit to Bamako’. Diarra to Moriba Cissoko, 4 02 1948Google Scholar, in Renseignements, Soudan, 5 02 1948, K 379 (26).Google Scholar

79 Inspection du Travail, Bamako, to IGT, 7 02 1948, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

80 A month after the strike, as Suret-Canale notes, Senghor finally wrote an article on the subject, in which he in fact mentioned that he ‘did not write a single article on the question and … if I dealt with it at times in my speeches, I did so voluntarily, in measured terms’. He claimed support for the principle of nondiscrimination and, in practical terms, for compromise. The quotation is from La Condition Humaine, 26 04 1948Google Scholar, as translated in Suret-Canale, , ‘Railway workers' strike,’ 145.Google Scholar

81 Tall, Mory, NDiaye, Oumar and Gueye, Amadou Bouta (interviews, 9 08 1994)Google Scholar, Niang, Mansour (interview, 4 08 1994).Google Scholar

82 The same thing happened to another leading labor leader of the 1950s, Alioune Cissé. His militant trade unionism never landed him in jail under the French, but Senghor put him there for his role in organizing a general strike in 1968 – an irony he remains well aware of, as he does in the case of Sarr (interview, Dakar, , 4 08 1994Google Scholar, by Oumar Gueye, Alioune Ba and Frederick Cooper).

83 Directeur Fédéral de la Régie to Directeur de l'Office Central des Chemins de Fer de la France Outre-Mer, 10 10 1947, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

84 For example, Renseignements, 25 10 1947, K 457 (179)Google Scholar: ‘One detects considerable discontent among the strikers who without any doubt did not expect a strike of this length. If it weren't for religious superstition, many would already have returned to work’. A week later, the report was, ‘The enthusiasm of the beginning has completely fallen … the women in particular are starting to get agitated and can expect that 50 percent at least of the strikers demand to return to work’. Renseignements, 3 11 1947, K 43 (1).Google Scholar Still later, it was the ‘profound weariness’ of the strikers which gave rise to expectations for a quick end to the strike. IGT to Governor General, 15 12 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar The strike still had three months to go.

85 Governor General to Minister, 11 10 1947, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

86 AOF, IGT, Annual Report, 1947, 62.Google Scholar See for example the transcript of the meeting of the Conseil d'Administration of the Régie, 15 11 1947 (K 459 [179])Google Scholar, at which Cuneo remarked: ‘Whatever may be the consequences of the strike of African personnel, it seems that respect for the decisions of the judiciary, respect for legality, forbids the opening of new negotiations’.

87 The latter concessions were made apropos of an attempt by a deputy and a leader of the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens, Joseph Dumas, to mediate the dispute, with the proviso that if the mission failed the Régie would undertake massive publicity of the terms offered in order to induce railwaymen to break with their union and go back to work. IGT to Governor General, 15 12 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar The Inspecteur Général du Travail, Pélisson, wanted to let railway workers know that their wages might be revised in parallel with revisions being planned for the civil service, and that he favored giving ‘at least partial satisfaction’ to the railwaymen, while trying ‘to save the face of the Régie’. But the Régie was not interested in saving face, and Dumas was left with narrow possibilities for maneuver, and predictably failed. IGT Note for Dumas, 18 12 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

88 Paris-Dakar, 26 12 1947Google Scholar, and Minutes of Grand Conseil, 24 12 1947Google Scholar, cited in Suret-Canale, , ‘Railway workers' strike,’ 145, 153, n. 25.Google Scholar

89 Affaires Courantes, Dakar, telegram to the new Governor General, Béchard, 3 02 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

90 Governor General to Minister, telegram, 5 11 1947Google Scholar, and Minister to Governor General, telegram, 7 11 1947, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

91 Delavignette, , ‘Grève des chemins de fer et des wharfs en AOF’, 13 12 1947, IGT, 13/2.Google Scholar For the context of post-war labor policy – notably the assertion of legitimacy through the abolition of forced labor and the attempt to build a more differentiated, stable, manageable labor force – see Cooper, , Decolonization and African Society.Google Scholar Both policies came to the fore in 1946, as did the new development program, and French officials were eager to demonstrate to a world increasingly skeptical of denials of self-determination that social, economic and political development were at the heart of colonial policy.

92 Governor General to Minister, 20 11 1947, IGT 13/2Google Scholar: Directeur, Sûreté, to IGT, 15 09 1948, K 458 (179).Google Scholar

93 Cunéo (Director of Régie) draft letter to all regional directors, 9 01 1948Google Scholar, reminding them that strikers, as of 28 November 1947, had been ‘detached’ from the Régie and warning them that if they did not return by 15 January they would be dislodged: K 457 (179). For earlier threats, see Renseignements, 19 11 1947, K 378 (26)Google Scholar, and Inspection du Travail, Guinea, to IGT, 19 11 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

94 Annex to Renseignements, Ivory Coast, 30 12 1947, K 379 (26).Google Scholar Boldface and underlining in original.

95 IGT, AOF, to IGT, Paris, 8 01 1948, IGT 13/2Google Scholar; AOF, Inspection du Travail, Annual Report, 1947, 62.Google Scholar In February, Africans en service for the Régie founded a new Professional Association, headed by none other than François Gning. The call to its first meeting stated, ‘We speak to you here with a French heart for the true France’. Its goal was to ‘constitute in the heart of the Régie a true family of railwaymen where love of work will be the uniting trait between management and staff’. Even at this meeting, objections were made to Gning's leadership. The Association would give rise to a union, which would contest Sarr's union after the strike, but without a great deal of success. Renseignements, 8 02 1948, K 457 (179).Google Scholar

96 On these three lines, 839 workers had returned to their posts (including a few who had never left them) and 2,155 had been hired. Situation de la Régie au l er Fevrier 1948, K 457 (179).

97 Governor General to Minister, 21 11 1947, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

98 Directeur Général de l'Office Central des Chemins de Fer de la France Outre-Mer, Note, 15 12 1947, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar Similar disappointment was felt with strike-breaking labor on the wharf in Dahomey. Dahomey, , Inspection du Travail, Annual Report, 1947, 33.Google Scholar

99 Affaires Courantes, Dakar, to Minister, 14 02 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

100 Inspection du Travail, Guinea, to IGT, 19 11 1947, K 457 (179)Google Scholar; Delavignette, , ‘Grève des chemins de fer…’, 13 12 1947, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

101 Gendarmerie Mobile, Rapport, 15 11 1947, K 43 (1)Google Scholar; Suret-Canale, , ‘Railway workers' strike’, 140Google Scholar; Abdoulaye Soulaye Sarr (interview, 22 07 1990)Google Scholar; Sene, , ‘Grève des cheminots’, 117.Google Scholar

102 Renseignements, 25 10 1947, K 43 (1).Google Scholar His warning was later published in Réveil, 20 11 1947.Google Scholar The orders against demonstrations were passed out in the Soudan as well. Renseignements, Bamako, 11 10 1947, K 43 (1).Google Scholar

103 Renseignements, 13 11 1947, K 457 (179)Google Scholar, in regard to Sarr's trip to the Soudan. There are extensive reports from police spies of meetings at Thiès and elsewhere. See, for example, Renseignements, 29 10 25 12 1947Google Scholar, ibid, and Renseignements, 16 10 1947, K 43 (1).Google Scholar

104 Sissoko therefore saw convincing Sarr as the key. He miscalculated the nature of the union leadership, however, since the strike committee ordered a wavering Sarr not to give in. Governor, Soudan, to Governor General, 12 01 1948, K 378 (26).Google Scholar

105 IGT, Report, 24 01 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

106 Renseignements, Ivory Coast, 14, 15 11 30 12 1947, K 379 (26).Google Scholar On Houphouët-Boigny's role, see Renseignements, 5 11 1947Google Scholar, ibid, and IGT to Deputy Dumas, 6 01 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

107 Renseignements, Ivory Coast, 31 12 1947, 3, 4, 7, 8 01 1948, K 379 (26).Google Scholar

108 Renseignements, 7 01 1948, K 379 (26).Google Scholar At Port-Bouet the next day, Fiankan was greeted with such hostility that he had to leave. Ibid., 8 Jan. 1948.

109 The strike had not been as solid on the Abidjan-Niger line as on the other lines. On the former, 519 workers had returned to work by 1 January 1948, out of a theoretical labor force of 3,111. On the Dakar-Niger, only 236 out of 6,765 had given up by that date, while only 71 workers on the other two lines combined went back before the new year. IGT, AOF, to IGT, Paris, 8 01 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

110 Governor, Ivory Coast, to High Commissioner, telegram, 12 01 1948Google Scholar, and Affaires Politiques, Administratives et Sociales to Governor, Ivory Coast, telegram, 20 01 1948, K 378 (26).Google Scholar

111 High Commissioner's narrative of strike, 1 04 1948, K 458 (179).Google Scholar

112 High Commissioner's narrative, 1 04 1948, K 458 (179)Google Scholar; Protocole de Reprise du Travail, 15 03 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

113 Renseignements, 10 03 1948, K 458 (179)Google Scholar; Sene, , ‘Grève des cheminots’, 104, 112.Google Scholar The administration feared that auxiliaries, who were still at risk, might try to block the return to work, but Sarr vowed to defend them, and officials noted that ‘we must assume that he will not give way on this point’. Renseignements, 16 03 1948, K 458 (179).Google Scholar

114 Sarr, Abdoulaye Souleye (interview, 22 07 1990)Google Scholar, NDiaye, Oumar and Gueye, Amadou Bouta (interview, 9 08 1994)Google Scholar and Niang, Mansour (interview, 4 08 1994).Google Scholar

115 The Inspection du Travail realized immediately that the question of rehiring auxiliaries would be the crucial one in the upcoming weeks. Pélisson thought that the less senior auxiliaries, who were vulnerable to lose their jobs, should be clearly informed of this, so that any who had taken other jobs during their strike could decide if it were advisable to keep them. He thought that Inspecteurs du Travail, not the Régie, should be the ones to break the bad news. IGT, circular to Inspecteurs Territoriaux du Travail, 17 03 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

116 These ups and downs are traced in IGT to Inspecteur Général des Colonies, 6 09 1948, K 458 (179)Google Scholar, and can be followed in Renseignements, 0609 1948, 11 D 1/1392.Google Scholar The 14,748 figure was agreed to, by a vote of 11–2, at the meeting of the Conseil d'Administration of the Régie, 25 June 1948, transcript in IGT 13/2. At this time, the plan was to fire 2,500 unskilled workers on 31 July, followed by three batches of 850 each of skilled workers. The actual firings turned out to be considerably less drastic.

117 Inspecteur Territorial du Travail, Dahomey, to IGT, 1 04 1948, IGT 13/2Google Scholar; IGT, Réglement de la grève des chemins de fer africain de l AOF, 24 09 1948Google Scholar, ibid. The tension at Thiès was heightened by the presence of the union of nonstrikers organized on the Dakar-Niger by Gning. But for all of Gning's obsequiousness vis-à-vis the administration, the latter wanted no part of his union, for it knew where the power lay, and it systematically denied it a place on the bodies which negotiated terms of layoffs and rehirings. High Commissioner to Gning, 15 06 1948, K 458 (179).Google Scholar

118 Directeur Fédéral de la Régie des Chemins de Fer to Inspecteur Général du Travail, 9 04 1948, K 458 (179).Google Scholar

119 Statements of Pillot and Mahé for the Régie and Ousmane N'Gom for the union, Transcript of Meeting of Conseil d'Administration des Chemins de Fer de l'AOF, 25 06 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

120 IGT ‘Règlement de la grève des chemins …’ 24 09 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar The union's role in establishing lists of workers to be fired was not defined in the Protocol of 15 March, but was apparently offered ‘spontaneously’ by the Régie when it came up with its staffing table, undoubtedly to insure that the union was complicit in hard decisions that had to be made. This lengthened the proceedings, and let attrition take care of part of the problem. IGT to Sarr, 28 10 1948, K 458 (179).Google Scholar In October, the Régie, with the consent of the union, decided to pension off auxiliaries over 55 years of age, claiming that the life-pensions or layoff indemnities were expensive, but that this would leave a more effective workforce (and would presumably ease the anxieties of younger workers). The rival union, led by Gning, complained about this, but got little more than an explanation of why the main union, Sarr's, and the Régie, had agreed to it. IGT to Gning, 18 10 1948, K 458 (179).Google Scholar

121 In the Ivory Coast, 342 scheduled layoffs were reduced to 187. Inspection du Travail, Ivory Coast, Rapport sur l'evolution de règlement de la grève de la Régie des Chemins de fer de l'AOF (Région Abidjan-Niger), 28 08 1948Google Scholar; Inspection du Travail, Dahomey, Rapport sur l'évolution de réglement de la grève des cheminots Africains de la Région Bénin-Niger, 25 08 1948, K 458 (179).Google Scholar In the Soudan, most of the laborers laid off were quickly rehired, as were 73 of the 202 skilled workers. The biggest problem was auxiliaries whose skills were specific to railway work. Governor, Soudan, to High Commissioner, 9 10 1948, K 458 (179).Google Scholar

122 IGT, ‘Règlement de la grève des chemins …’, 24 09 1948, IGT 13/2.Google Scholar

123 Circular signed Abdoulaye Ba from the union to union subdivisions, apparently intercepted by Sûreté and filed as Renseignements, 8 09 1948, K 458 (179).Google Scholar

124 ‘La vie syndicale en AOF’, 31 01 1949, AP 3406/1.Google Scholar There were more protests later in 1949. Renseignements, n.d. [c. 11 1949] n D 1/1392.Google Scholar

125 Labor reports noted ‘malaise’ in the civil service and railways. The former received legal assurance of equal pay and benefits from the ‘Lamine Gueye Law’ of 1950, although its implementation remained a subject of contestation. IGT, ‘Rapport: cessation d'application du Protocole de reprise du Travail sur les Chemins de Fer de l'Afrique occidentale française’, 2 07 1949, IGT 13/2Google Scholar; Ibrahima Sarr, for Fédération des Syndicats des Cheminots Africains de l'AOF to Inspecteur Général du Travail, 18 08 1952, 18G 163Google Scholar; High Commissioner to Minister, 20 11 1948Google Scholar, Union des Syndicats Confédérés de Dakar, Revendications, 1 05 1949Google Scholar, Secretary General, Services des Etudes, Note pour l'Inspecteur Général du Travail, 18 05 1949Google Scholar, High Commissioner to Minister, 12 01 25 02 1950, all in K 424 (165).Google Scholar

126 IGT to Inspecteur Général des Colonies, 6 09 1948, K 458 (179)Google Scholar; Directeur Fédéral de la Régie to IGT, 30 06 1950, K 43 (1).Google Scholar

127 Monguillot, Mission, ‘Situation Financière de la Régie Générale des Chemins de Fer de l'AOF’, Rapport 93/D, 10 04 1952Google Scholar; Directeur Général des Finances to Monguillot, 5 05 1952Google Scholar, and High Commissioner to Monguillot, 17 07 1952, AP 2306/7.Google Scholar

128 For example, Sarr told an audience at Kayes in November: ‘We have suffered famine and thirst and we have marched naked to defend purely French interests; nothing prevents us to suffer as much today when it is a question of our own interests.’ Renseignements, 31 11 1947, K 457 (179).Google Scholar The Comité Directeur included anciens combattants, who remained proud of their service to both causes. Sarr, Abdoulaye Souleye (interview, 22 07 1990)Google Scholar, Gueye, Amadou Bouta (interview, 9 08 1994).Google Scholar

129 Echenberg, Myron, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857–1960 (Portsmouth, XH: Heinemann, 1991), 152.Google Scholar

130 Niang, Mansour (interview, 4 08 1994).Google Scholar

131 ‘La vie syndicale en AOF au cours de l'année 1948’, 31 01 1949Google Scholar, including High Commissioner to Minister, 2 02 1949, AP 3406/1.Google Scholar This report makes it clear that the union remained clear of political involvement during the strike, but that afterward politicians, and Senghor in particular, realized that ‘the African railwaymen constitute in effect a very important electoral trump card in Senegal’.

132 The phrase boubou politique was used in an interview by a former government worker and low-level official in a civil service union, while the notion of becoming ‘auxiliaries’ to political parties comes from Mory Tall. Moussa Konaté, interview Dakar, , 8 08 1994Google Scholar, by Cooper, Frederick and Tall, Alioune Ba. interview, by the équipe de Thiès, 9 08 1994.Google Scholar

133 This theme is discussed at length in Cooper, , Decolonization and African Society, ch. 11.Google Scholar

134 This is a major theme of the concluding part of my Decolonization and African Society.

135 ‘La vie syndicale en AOF’, 31 01 1949, AP 3406/1.Google Scholar

136 The largest subsequent event was a one-day general strike in November 1952 throughout French West Africa, spearheaded by the CGT and intended to bring pressure on the French legislature to pass the Code du Travail. There were co-ordinated strikes in 1953 over the terms of implementation of that code, but while those strikes revealed impressive co-ordination they did not entail the kind of community dynamic of the earlier ones.