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L'ATTIVITÀ LEGISLATIVA DEL PARLAMENTO ITALIANO: CONSOCIATIVISMO? POLARIZZAZIONE?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2018

Francesco Zucchini

Introduzione

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Pochi termini politologici hanno avuto altrettanto successo nella polemica politica italiana della parola consociativismo. Nonostante la sua origine specialistica, che non rimanda a nessuna nozione giuridica né ad alcuna dottrina politica o sociale, è difficile assistere ad un dibattito politico senza che qualcuno dei partecipanti non lanci alla parte avversa l'accusa di essere consociativo. Strano destino. Il successo ha un prezzo per gli uomini come per i concetti: coniato da Lijphart (1968) per rendere conto dell'esistenza di democrazie stabili e relativamente felici, che la scienza politica degli anni '50 (Almond 1956) ignorava e per le quali al tempo stesso prevedeva un tribolato avvenire, il termine consociativismo ha assunto nel nostro paese una connotazione quasi esclusivamente negativa. Consociativa è la spartizione partitica, la corruzione, l'immobilismo, la mancanza di rigore finanziario. In breve, consociativa pare essere stata tutta la Prima Repubblica e consociativi tutti i guai da essa prodotti.

Summary

Summary

The article explores the problem of the «consociational» nature of Italian democracy during the First Republic. The Author focuses on the oversized legislative coalitions that supported «particularistic» bills during this period. Two alternative approaches to explain the pattern of behavior in the Italian Parliament are discussed. The first approach emphasizes the polarized nature of Italian politics and denies the existence of real «consociationalism» in Italy. Large legislative coalitions would have passed only residual and minor laws since the main Italian parties were mutually mistrustful to agree on big issues. In contrast, the second approach explains the bulk of legislative behavior as «consociational», that is, a consistent pattern of party consensus on distributive and particularistic policies. An interpretation of law-making in the Italian Parliament is advanced, using rational choice models. The Author suggests that a nested games – approach can illuminate how rules work and help to understand the effects of institutional changes in the law-making process.

Type
Ricerche
Information
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 27 , Issue 3 , December 1997 , pp. 569 - 609
Copyright
Copyright © Societ Italiana di Scienza Politica 

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