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IL NEO-ISTITUZIONALISMO IN SCIENZA POLITICA: IL CONTRIBUTO DELLA TEORIA DELLA SCELTA RAZIONALE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2018

Daniela Giannetti

Introduzione

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Insieme alla ripresa di interesse per il tema dello stato, lo studio delle istituzioni è tornato al centro dell'analisi politologica. È opinione condivisa che il rinnovato interesse per le istituzioni rappresenti una reazione alla rivoluzione comportamentista, la quale a sua volta - con l'enfasi sul comportamento osservabile e sui processi informali di potere e influenza - reagiva all'impostazione legalistica e formalistica degli esordi della disciplina. Ciò che, non senza qualche eccesso polemico, è stato definito uno «slittamento paradigmatico» ha coinvolto una varietà di approcci, accomunati dal riconoscimento dei limiti della behavioral persuasion, e in particolare dei due orientamenti teorici ad essa associati in scienza politica: il pluralismo, con l'accento posto sulla politica come processo e la conseguente messa in ombra degli elementi strutturali, e il funzionalismo, un approccio tendenzialmente più inclusivo ma che in scienza politica si è identificato sostanzialmente con la versione almondiana. Rispetto ai più ambiziosi tentativi teorici del funzionalismo sociologico, essa ha fornito soprattutto uno schema categoriale per l'analisi comparata dei sistemi politici, in cui è attribuito rilievo centrale alle funzioni di input o ai processi che vanno dalla società alla politica.

Summary

Summary

In the last decade several remarkable developments within the rational choice approach have been known as New Institutionalism. The renewal of interest in economic and political institutions springs from the recognition of the shortcomings of behavioral revolution in political science and the explicative inadequacies of neoclassical paradigm in economics. Within the New Institutionalism a number of different lines of investigation can be distinguished.

This essay focuses on political institutions with two aims: 1) to identify two main strands of research, one rooted in the positive political theory, particularly in the social choice literature, the other one in the transaction costs economics, in order to show their analytical similarities and to illustrate potential extensions to the study of parliamentary systems and to the analysis of the development of modern representative institutions.

Some general implications of the analysis are drawn and objections to the overall line of inquiry are discussed in the concluding section.

Type
RASSEGNE
Information
Italian Political Science Review / Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , April 1993 , pp. 153 - 183
Copyright
Copyright © Societ Italiana di Scienza Politica 

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