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Human Dignity and Its Impact on German Substantive Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2014

Otto Lagodny
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Extract

Since 1992, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty has been in force in Israel. Its purpose according to sec. 1 is: “to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to anchor in a Basic Law the values of the state of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state”. In sec. 2 and subsec. it guarantees: preservation of life, body and dignity (sec. 2); protection of property (sec. 3); protection of life, body and dignity (sec. 4); personal liberty (sec. 5); leaving and entering Israel (sec. 6) and privacy (sec. 7). The guarantees in sec. 2 and subs. might thus be seen as a concretization of art. 1. Here we have already an interesting parallel to constitutional theory in Germany. Human dignity is the article with which our constitution begins. The following guarantees may be seen — as Dürig already pointed out in the 1950's — as an emanation of human dignity with its main aspects of freedom/liberty (Art. 2 German Basic Law [GBL]) and of equality (Art. 3 GBL).

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Articles
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Israel Law Review , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , Summer 1999 , pp. 575 - 591
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1999

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References

1 Dürig, G., “Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde”, (1956) 81 Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 117Google Scholar; today still accepted, cf. Stern, K., “Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Munich, 1988) III /1 Allgemeine Lehren der Grundrechte, §58 III 2, at 35–39Google Scholar. In general, see the in-depth analysis of Enders, C., “Die Meuschenwürde in der Verfassungs-ordnung” (Tübingen, 1997)Google Scholar.

2 See infra Part IV.

3 For more details, see Lagodny, O., “Strafrecht vor den Schranken der Grundrechte” (Tübingen, 1996) 77–135Google Scholar; Staechelin, G., “Strafgesetzgebung im Verfassungsstaat” (Berlin, 1998) 50 and 111Google Scholar and subs.; Appel, I., “Verfassung und Strafe” (Berlin, 1998) 433Google Scholar and subs. This article will not deal with the constitutionality of sanctions. With regard to the death penalty which was abolished in Germany by the constitution (art. 102 GBL), discussion was based on the question whether art. 102 GBL is a so-called “eternal” guarantee which may never be abolished according to art. 79, para. 3 GBL. As to life-long imprisonment, see (1978) 45 D.F.C.C. at 187 and subs.; (1993) 86 Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter: D.F.C.C.) at 288 and subs.

4 For more detail, see O. Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 94 and subs., 129 and subs. Also (1997) 96 D.F.C.C. 245; Schild, W., “Strafbegriff und Grundgesetz”, in Eser, A., Schittenhelm, U. and Schumann, H., eds., Festschrift für Theodor Lenckner zum 70. Geburtstag (Munich, 1998) 287, at 310Google Scholar referring also to Schild, W., Der Strafrichter in der Hauptverhandlung (Heidelberg/Hamburg, 1983) 96Google Scholar, and subs. Also I. Appel, supra n. 3, at 490 and subs., who mainly differs in calling the power to blame (“Vorwurfsermächtigung”): (the power to) “primary sanction” (“Primärsanktion”).

5 As far as criminal procedure is concerned, a distinction between the guilty verdict and the sentencing turns out to be of constitutional relevance in discussions on Germany, albeit such a distinction will not be mandatory. See: O. Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 108 and subs. Also I. Appel, supra n. 3, at 499-500.

6 Sec. 60 Code of Criminal Law (hereinafter: CCL) in general; as one special example see sec. 314 a CCL. In common law systems, the separation between the guilty-verdict and the sentencing becomes obvious already by procedural structure. From a common law perspective it might sound strange that a guilty-verdict without sentencing is of relevance. However, the basic idea of the truth commissions for crimes committed in the Apartheid era in South Africa is to establish at least the truth by confessions of the perpetrators.

7 See O. Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 98-128; see also: G. Staechelin, supra n. 3, at 114; and I. Appel, supra n. 3, at 490 and subs.

8 Also I. Appel, supra n. 3, at 570 n. 137 observes this. Hence, his critics (at 569 note 133 and at 312 note 32) and that of Staechelin, supra n. 3, at 51, 164 and subs, that I deal too much with the prohibition resp. my proposal leaves to little specifics of criminal law, are not convincing.

9 See e.g., (1979) 59 D.F.C.C. at 290, 332; (1982) 57 D.F.C.C. at 139, 159; (1983) 62 D.F.C.C. at 1, 50. See also (1969) 25 D.F.C.C. at 1, 19; 30, 292, 319; (1975) 37 D.F.C.C. at 1, 21; 39, 210, 230; (1978) 47 D.F.C.C, at 109, 117; (1986) 71 D.F.C.C. at 206, 215.

10 See e.g., (1963) 13 D.F.C.C. at 97, 113; (1979) 50 D.F.C.C. at 205, 212; (1986) 71 D.F.C.C. at 206, 215; (1994) 90 D.F.C.C. at 145, 183.

11 See (1988) 77 D.F.C.C. at 77, 84; 81, 70; see also G. Staechelin, supra n. 3, at 137 and subs.

12 E.g., (1985) 67 D.F.C.C. at 151, 173; (1988) 76 D.F.C.C. at 1, 51.

13 Alexy, R., Theorie der Grundrechte (Frankfurt a.M., 1986) 122Google Scholar and subs., esp. 146 and subs. As to the new criticism of Alexy's theory, see C. Enders, supra n. 1, at 302-310.

14 As to the dispute on the scope of art. 2, para. 1 GBL, see (1990) 80 D.F.C.C. at 137, 153 and 169; see: O. Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 90-94; and also Appel, supra n. 3, at 319-328. See also Jakobs, G., “Bookreview”, (1998) 110 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (hereinafter: ZStW) 717–725, at 718Google Scholar and subs.

15 The decision (1990) 80 D.F.C.C. at 367 and subs. leaves some doubt whether the court regards notes in a diary as belonging to this nucleus. The background was that such notes were the only evidence in a murder case. Although this decision concerned a procedural question, one could draw consequences as to substantive law because it had to deal with the limits of a state's intrusion into privacy.

16 (1993) 88 D.F.C.C. at 203, 252, 254 and subs.

17 See: O. Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 262 and subs.

18 One of the few consequences which may be drawn at this step is that it is not constitutional to punish behaviour which is justified by objective cricumstances of which the actor is not aware, see: Lagodny, O., “Grundrechtliche Vorgaben für einen Straftatbegriff”, in Arnold, J., Burkhardt, B., Gropp, W. and Koch, Hg., eds., Grenzüberschreitungen - Beiträge zum 60. Geburtstag von Albin Eser, (Freiburg, 1995) 27–37Google Scholar.

19 (1993) 86 D.F.C.C. at 28, 35 and subs.

20 Cf. only Lenckner, T., in Schönke, A. and Schröder, H., Strafgesetzbuch (Munich, 25th ed., 1997)Google Scholar annotations 8 and subs. before section 13.

21 The discussions about the concept of “Rechtsgut” reminds me of the “tû-tû”-analogy which Alf Ross, Ross, A., Tû-Tû (1956/1957) 70 Harvard L.R. 812CrossRefGoogle Scholar and subs. used to analyse the concept of guilt.

22 See O. Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 145-162 and 288-317, 424-445; and also I. Appel, supra n. 3, at 206-207, 336-390. G. Staechelin, supra n. 3, at 120 and passim, tries to lift the question of “Rechtsgut” to a higher level from a different constitutional concept (i.e., Grabitz, E., “Der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts”, (1977) 98 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 568Google Scholar and subs.), which has not been accepted in constitutional doctrine. Therefore, his approach to promulgate a concretization of the concept of proprtionality which is specific for criminal law is not convincing as long as we analyse criminal law on the basis of accepted doctrine in constitutional law.

23 See supra II B.

24 (1994) 90 D.F.C.C, at 145 and subs.. This was a landmark decision on the punishability of purchasing minor quantities of cannabis for personal consumption. The court held that punishing such special cases would be unproportional unless there were procedural solutions for dropping such cases. Before this decision, the Federal Constitutional Court practised a control of criminal law provision which was based on rather vague principles derived from a so-called principle of punishment according to the principle of guilt (“Grundsatz schuldangemessenen Strafens) which did not fit into the general practice of the court outside the area of criminal law (see: O. Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 66-70).

25 See O. Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 318-321, and I. Appel, supra n. 3, at 175 and subs. 179.

26 Wording: “(a)(i) The production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention, the 1961 Convention as amended or the 1971 Convention; […] (iii) The possession or purchase of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance for the purpose of any of the activities enumerated in (i) above; […].

27 See: O. Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 165-366.

28 (1994) 90 D.F.C.C. at 145, 173 and subs.; cf. also (1990) 80 D.F.C.C. at 244,255; (1987) 73 D.F.C.C, at 206, 253.

29 (1971) 20 D.F.C.C. at 323, 331.

30 Weber, U., “Die Vorverlegung des Strafrechtsschutzes durch Gefährdungs- und Unternehmensdelikte”, in Die Vorverlegung des Strafrechtsschutzes durch Gefährdungs- und Unternehmensdelikte, Jescheck, H.-H., ed., Supplementary to Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (Berlin, 1987) 1, 31Google Scholar.

31 See e.g., (1990) 80 D.F.C.C. at 182, 185; (1968) 22 D.F.C.C. at 49, 81; (1968) 23 D.F.C.C. at 113, 126; (1970) 27 D.F.C.C. at 18, 29.

32 Supra II B and III B.

33 (1970) 28 D.F.C.C. at 175, 188; (1980) 51 D.F.C.C. at 60, 74; Federal Constitutional Cort (1977) 30 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift at 2207Google Scholar.

34 As to the distinction between norms which have a clear-cut yes/no-answer based on a “if … then …” pattern and principles which are meant only to optimize conficting interests in the sense of “more/less”, see Alexy, supra n. 13, at 75 and subs.

35 See: O. Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 430-445, 480-488, 519-520. This is the result of bringing together again the control of the prohibition and the power to blame and to punish which Staechelin, supra n. 3, at 51, 164 and subs., misses. His critics might be influenced by the fact that these results are too “weak”, i.e., not in the sense of clear-cut unconstitutionality, from the point of view of his “Rechtsguts”-approach (see supra n. 22).

36 Special but not exclusive importance have interests which are directly protected by the constitution, i.e., the existence of the state as such etc.

37 See supra n. 24.

38 See Heine, G., “Die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit von Unternehmen” (Baden-Baden, 1995) 27Google Scholar and subs.

39 See Lagodny, supra n. 3, at 519 and subs.

40 As to this problem see in general: Kleinknecht, T. and Meyer-Goßner, L., Strafprozeßordnung (Munich, 44th ed., 1999)Google Scholar annotation 1-5 to section 110 a with further references.

41 G. Jakobs, supra n. 14, at 719 and subs.

42 See W. Schild, supra n. 4, at 290 and subs. who explicitly denies that punishment (“Strafe”) may be justified in the sense of constitutional law by the principle of proportionality. See also I. Appel, supra n. 3, at 48 and subs., 305 and subs., reporting comparable tendencies in criminal law.

43 As to the ignorance of the present legislator, see the realistic and frightening mirror which Hettinger, M., “Entwicklungen im Strafrecht und Strafverfahrensrecht der Gegenwart” (Heidelberg, 1997)Google Scholar shows us. In addition, actual changes in the criminal law by the “6. Strafrechtsreformgesetz” (6th law of criminal law reform), Federal Law Gazette [Bundesgesetzblatt], 1998 Volume I, pages 164 and subs., have caused a tremendous wave of critique because it was passed nearly out of the blue with enormous incoherency due to the lack of sufficient analysis, see Lackner, K. and Kühl, K., “Das Sechste Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts - Eine kritische Einführung” (Munich, 1998) VI–IXGoogle Scholar with further references.