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Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Intervention in Yemen*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2016

Meir Ossad
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Extract

Most writers discussing pre-Republican Yemen stress its complete isolation from the rest of the world. Those sympathetic to the Republic are anxious to point out that the Imams, or kings, of the country consciously followed a policy of almost hermetic isolation in order to ensure the continuation of the feudal privileges which they and the tribal sheikhs enjoyed. Whether or not this interpretation is accurate it is necessary to point out that some countries, and not only Arab states, had already been in contact with the kingdom for several decades at the time of the 1962 coup.

Italy was the first European nation to make a deliberate attempt to develop its relations with Yemen in this century. The Italians, anxious to make their position in Eritreamore secure and, if possible, to gain an economic foothold in Arabia, concluded a Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the Imam on September 2, 1926. From that time, and in spite ofthe disappearance of Italian colonies in East Africa, the Italians have continued to enjoy a somewhat privileged position among Western Europeans in the country. At times during the past few years, they have been almost the only Westerners permitted to remain in Yemen.

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Articles
Information
Israel Law Review , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , April 1970 , pp. 216 - 248
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press and The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1970

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References

1 “Basic Chronology for a History of the Yemen”, (1963) 17 Middle East Journal 148, hereafter referred to as M.E.J.

2 Id.

3 Id., p. 149.

4 Brown, William R., “The Yemeni Dilemma”, 17 M.E.J. 349.Google Scholar

5 Ingrams, Harold, The Yemen (New York, 1963), p. 92.Google Scholar

6 Id., p. 96.

7 Id.

8 Brown, p. 353.

9 Ingrams, pp. 118, 119.

10 Id., pp. 107–109.

11 Id., p. 108.

12 Id., p. 109 ff.

13 “Ripercussioni della rivoluzione yemenita”, (1962) Relazioni Internazionali 1243, hereafter referred to as R.I.

14 Mohamed Said Attar, El”, “La République yéménite et son contexte interarabe”, (1967) 32 Politique Etrangère, 280, 286.Google Scholar

15 Hottinger, Arnold, “Der Bürgerkrieg im Jemen: Wegbereiter des Kommunismus auf der Arabischen Halbinsel”, (1966), v. I, 21 Europa Archiv 297Google Scholar, 298, hereafter referred to as E.A.

16 Cortada, James N., The Yemen Crisis (Los Angeles, 1965), p. 8.Google Scholar

17 Hottinger, Arnold, “Nassers Burgfrieden”, (1964) 19 E.A. 389, 390Google Scholar.

18 Id., p. 395.

19 For a discussion of President Nasser's difficulties and theSoviet involvement in his decisions, see Hottinger, Arnold, “Die Hintergründe der Einladung Ulbrichts nach Kairo”, (1965) 20 E.A. 107.Google Scholar

20 For example, in an article in Peking Review, dated September 3, 1965, Lin Piao writes: “The liberation of the masses is accomplished by the masses themselves—this is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses of that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way.” As quoted by Farer, Tom, “Intervention in Civil Wars: A Modest Prorjosal”, (1967) 67 Colum. L.R. 266, 277.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 Andracs, Adly, “De l'intervention dans les affaires intérieures des états souverains” (1954) 10 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 15–17.Google Scholar

22 Kamel, Mahmoud, “Existence d'un Droit International Arabe”, (1964) 34 Revue 'Al Qanoun Wal Iqtisad' (Droit et Economie) 149, 170.Google Scholar

23 Id.

24 Hamidullah, Muhammad, Muslim Conduct of State (Lahore, Pakistan, 1953), p. 85, 86.Google Scholar

25 Resolution 2131 (XX) of the General Assembly, 21 December 1965. GAOR, XX, Supp. 14 (A/6014), p. 11, 12.

26 Quoted in Doherty, Kathryn B., “Rhetoric and Reality: A Study of Contemporary Official Egyptian Attitudes toward the International Legal Order”, (1968) 62 Am. J.I.L. 335, 342Google Scholar; Doc. A/AC/125/L.17.

27 These remarks are quoted by Mr. Baroody, the Saudi representative, in a letter to the Secretary General, dated 25 April, 1967. 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Apr.-June 1967, at 47, U.N. Doc. S/7861 (1967). The records of the December, 1966, First Committee meeting, 21 U.N. GAOR, First Comm. 355 (1966), give only a summary of the Egyptian delegate's statement.

28 See note 25, supra.

29 Kimminich, Otto, “Völkerrechtsfragen der exilpolitischen Betätigung”, (1962–1963) 10 Archiv des Völkerrechts 132.Google Scholar Theauthor also quotes resolutions of the Institut de Droit International and the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

30 Id., p. 156, 157.

31 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, , International Law (7th ed., 1952), p. 259, 260.Google Scholar

32 Verdross, Alfred, Völkerrecht (Vienna, 5th ed., 1964), p. 228CrossRefGoogle Scholar: “Eine verbotene Einmischung liegt auch vor, wenn ein Staat… Unruhen in einem anderen Staate entfacht oder fördert, oder wenn er in seinem Hoheitsbereiche eine solche Propaganda duldet.”

33 U.N. GAOR, IX, Supp. 9 (A/2693), p. 11, 12, July 28, 1954.

34 Lauterpacht, H., “Revolutionary Propaganda by Governments”, (1928) 13 Transactions of the Grotius Society 143, 145.Google Scholar Also, Wright, Quincy, “Subversive Intervention”, (1960) 54 Am. J.I.L. 521, 532.Google Scholar

35 Kimminich, p. 147; Lauterpacht, p. 160.

36 The Alexandria Protocol; The Pact of the League of Arab States; etc. (Cairo, no date), p. 17.

37 Treaty of Friendship Between Egypt and Yemen, September 27, 1945, art. 1, 9 U.N.T.S. 376.

38 Ingrams, p. 124; also, Schmidt, Dana Adams, Yemen: The Unknown War (London, 1968), p. 45.Google Scholar

39 Verdross, p. 228.

40 Martin, L. J., International Propaganda (Minneapolis, 1958), pp. 80, 81.Google Scholar

41 Ingrams, p. 124.

42 Id.

43 Schmidt, p. 45.

44 Ingrams, p. 126.

45 Id.

46 Martin, p. 127.

47 Schmidt, p. 22ff.

48 Ingrams, p. 122; Schmidt, pp. 28, 45.

48 Ross, Alf, A Textbook of International Law (London, 1947), p. 243Google Scholar; the same point is made in the latest Danish, edition, Laerobog I Folkeret (4th ed., 2nd printing; Copenhagen, 1967) at p. 290.Google Scholar

50 Fortun, Willelmo C., “Intervention in Civil Wars Revisited”, (1964) 3 The Philippine I.L.J. 399, 406.Google Scholar

51 Lauterpacht, , Recognition in International Law (Cambridge, 1947), p. 158.Google Scholar

52 Ingrams, p. 132.

53 Khalil, Muhammad, The Arab States and the Arab League (Beirut, 1962), v. 2, p. 251.Google Scholar

54 Id., art. 6(a).

55 Khalil, v. 1, p. 643.

56 Union Law No. 5 Concerning the Defence of the United Arab States, Art 5(3): “The Commander-in-Chief is competent in … the distribution of the forces of the Union, in the light of the plans laid down for operation.” Id., p. 649.

57 Id., Art. 17, p. 644.

58 “Nuovo Sovrano nello Yemen,” 26 R.I. 1088.

59 17 M.E.J. 151.

60 Id., p. 141; also, Al Ahram statement, p. 5 supra.

61 The premature act of recognition is itself an illegal intervention in another state's affairs. See Verdross, p. 324; “Die Anerkennung eineraufständischen Regierung als Zentralregierung des Staates darf erst erfolgen, wenn sie sich auf dem ganzen oder fast dem ganzen Staatsgebiete durchgesetzt hat. Ihre frühere Anerkennung als Gesamtregierung des Staates bildet den Unrechtstatbestand einer vorzeitiger Aner kennung.” See also, Schwarzenberger, Georg, A Manual of International Law (5th ed. 1967), p. 70.Google Scholar

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63 Id., p. 92.

64 Id., p. 93.

65 17 M.E.J. 141.

66 Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, secs. 101 and 103 (1965).

67 3 U.N. SCOR, 294th meeting 16 (1948).

68 Anzilotti, Dionisio, Corso di Diritto Internazionale (Padua, 1955), v. 1, p. 159Google Scholar; “Il riconoscimento non è legato a particolari condizioni o presupposti, Politicamente esso può dipendere da molteplici circostanze…il diritto internazionale non conosce casi di riconoscimento lecitoo illeciteo, vietato a imposto, le considerazioni sulla tempestività del riconscimento, svolte con particolare cura dagli scrittori inglesi e nordamericani, sembrano di natura politica più che giuridica.”

69 17 M.E.J. 141.

70 Id., p. 150.

71 Id.

72 Id., p. 151.

73 Remarks of the U.A.R. delegate at U.N. General Assembly's 1202nd meeting. 17 U.N. GAOR 1228 (1962).

74 See note 25, supra.

75 See M.E.J. chronologies, v. 17–22.

76 Ingrams, p. 136.

77 Id., p. 143.

78 Brown, p. 360, 361.

79 El Attar, p. 287.

80 Schmidt, p. 226.

81 Id., p. 227.

82 “Vita difficile per lo Yemen”, (1965) 29 R.I. 716.

83 Schmidt, p. 229.

84 Id.

85 See n. 82, supra.

86 Schmidt, p. 230.

87 Id.

88 17 M.E.J. 143.

89 Schmidt, p. 239; 20 M.E.J. 516.

90 Schmidt, p. 291.

91 20 M.E.J. 516.

92 Brown, p. 362.

93 Schmidt, p. 291, 292.

94 The Alexandria Protocol, etc., p. 15.

95 Khalil, v. 2, p. 191.

96 Id., p. 198.

97 Schmidt, p. 34.

98 Asked about Arab League action, Badr told Schmidt that there was no use “shouting in the ear of the dead”, Id., p. 58.

99 MacDonald, Robert W., The League of Arab States (Princeton, 1965), p. 371.Google Scholar

100 Id., p. 150.

101 18 M.E.J. 108.

102 MacDonald, p. 377.

103 Schmidt, p. 207.

104 Id., p. 210.

105 “Saudi-U.A.R. Agreement on Yemen”, (1966) 20 M.E.J. 93; see also, El Attar, pp. 289, 290.

106 “Il Compromesso sullo Yemen”, 29 R.I. 819.

107 1962 Yearbook of the U.N. 148.

108 Id.

109 Remarks at the 1201st meeting, 17 U.N. GAOR 1220 (1962).

110 Schmidt, p. 190.

111 Cortada, p. 21.

112 “La Missione di Bunche per lo Yemen”, (1963) 27 R.I. 755.

113 18 U.N. SCOR, 1038th meeting 2ff. (1963); 18 U.N. SCOR, 1039th meeting, at p. 2 (1963).

114 1038th meeting, p. 3.

115 “Guerre e diplomazia nello Yemen”, 27 R.I. 755.

116 Id., p. 756.

117 Id., p. 755.

118 18 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Apr.-June 1963, at 47, U.N. Doe. S/5321.

119 Quoted by Schmidt, p. 196.

120 18 U.N. SCOR Supp. Apr.-June 1963, at 52, U.N. Doc. S/5331.

121 18 U.N. SCOR, Supp. July-Sep. 1963, at 153, U.N. Doc. S/5412.

122 “La Mancata Stabilizzione del regime republicano yemenita”, 27 R.I. 941.

123 18 U.N. SCOR, Supp. July-Sep. 1963, at 154.

124 Schmidt, p. 197.

125 Id.

126 Id., p. 196.

127 18 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Oct.-Dec. 1963, at 50, U.N. Doc., S/5447.

128 Id., p. 51.

129 Id.

130 Schmidt, p. 199.

131 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. July-Sep. 1964, at 258, U.N. Doc. S/5927.

132 (1964) 46 Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge 304, hereafter R.C.R.

133 121 U.N.T.S. 330 (1952).

134 Verdross, p. 443 ; see discussion in R.R. Baxter, “Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law”, (1965–66) XLI Br. Yrbk. Int. L. 275; on the subject of gas warfare, see Meyrowitz, Henri, “Les armes psychochimiques et le droit international”, 1964 Annuaire Français de Droit International 81, p. 101 ff.Google Scholar

135 Verdross, p. 442.

136 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Mar. 1964, at 7, U.N. Doc. S/5501.

137 Id., p. 8.

138 46 R.C.R. 416.

139 Ingrams, p. 144.

140 Hottinger, Arnold, Der Bürgerkrieg im Jemen”, (1966) v. I, 21E.A 300.Google Scholar

141 Schmidt, p. 168.

142 Id., pp. 257, 263.

143 Id., pp. 261–263.

144 (1967) 49 R.C.R.

145 Id., p. 279.

146 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Mar. 1967, at 194,195, U.N. Doc. S/7793.

147 Id.

148 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Apr.-June 1967, at 8, U.N. Doc. S/7842.

149 Id., p. 14.

150 Id., pp. 15–18.