^{page 479 note 1} Oppenheimer & ors. v. Ministers of Interior and Health (1966) (as yet unreported). For the text of the decision see 462–78 above.

^{page 479 note 2} As provided by sec. 6 of the Interpretation Ordinance, 1945, which reads: “Where no time is prescribed or allowed within which anything shall be done, such thing shall be done with all convenient speed, and as often as the prescribed occasion arises”. The convenient speed is to be decided by the court in each case according to circumstances. See Argaz v. The District Town Planning Committee, Jerusalem (1956) vol. 1, 19 P.D. 95 at 103–06.

^{page 480 note 3} The question whether statutory provisions may be enforced in the absence of implementing regulations is to be answered in each case according to the language employed by the legislature. See Klinghoffer, H., “The Rule of Law and Subordinate Legislation” (1957) Hed Hamishpat 222 at 224.Google Scholar In the Oppenheimer Case the learned judges construed the provisions of the Law (concerning the prohibitions to cause considerable noise or smell and the sanctions for the violation thereof) as being enforceable even in the absence of regulations.

^{page 480 note 4} On the question of justiciability see, generally, Witkon, A., “Justiciability” (1966) 1 Is.L.R. 40–59.Google Scholar

^{page 481 note 5} See, Leiserowitz v. The Food Controller (1956) 10 P.D. 40 at 47–48, cited with approval by Silberg D.P. in the present case.

^{page 481 note 6} See, e.g. Leiserowitz v. The Food Controller, ibid; Khouri v. Minister of Interior (1965) vol. 2, 19 P.D. 322; Savitzki v. Minister of Finance (1965) vol. 2, 19 P.D. 369.

^{page 481 note 7} See, e.g. A.G. v. Dizengoff (1959) 13 P.D. 1026; Yair v. State of Israel (1965) vol. 3, 19 P.D. 402.

^{page 481 note 8} See, e.g. Buksbaum v. Minister of Finance (1964) vol. 1, 18 P.D. 155; Hashgacha Co. Ltd. v. Director of Property Tax and Compensation Fund (1965) vol. 4, 19 P.D. 356.

^{page 481 note 9} This is the law in France. See, Laubadère, A. de, Traité élémentaire de droit administratif, 3rd ed. (1963) vol. 1, p. 203.Google Scholar In England there appears to be only one case in which an order of mandamus was issued to compel the making of subordinate legislation. See R. v. Manchester Corporation [1911] 1 K.B. 560. This case concerned a municipal by-law, and it only dealt with the question of the petitioners' standing. It is significant, however, that the learned judges took it for granted that mandamus could issue to compel the exercise of legislative powers. Yet, it would be surprising if the court would similarly treat legislative powers of government departments, since such powers are in a privileged position as far as judicial review is concerned. See, Griffith, and Street, , Principles of Administrative Law, 3rd ed. 113–16.Google Scholar

^{page 481 note 10} See, A. Witkon, op. cit., 48–53. The cases may give the impression that any matter concerning executive policy is unjusticiable. This, however, is not so. It is submitted that, generally speaking, a case involving executive policy is indistinguishable in principle from an ordinary case involving a wide discretionary power. True, in practice the court would only seldom have sufficient grounds to intervene in the exercise of such discretion. Yet the Court should be in a position to examine whether the policy-making authority acted in good faith and upon relevant considerations.

^{page 482 note 11} Cohn J. dissented because, as aforesaid, he did not think that the order of the Court was necessary or could be beneficial to the petitioners. However, as he said towards the end of his judgment, but for those reasons he would not have hesitated to join the other learned judges in making the order.

^{page 482 note 12} Sec. 6 of the Interpretation Ordinance, 1945 (see n. 2, above), is applicable to both mandatory and discretionary powers. See Argaz v. The District Town Planning Committee, Jerusalem, ibid. 103. See also Dayan v. Municipal Council of Ramat Gan (1955) 9 P.D. 1237 at 1239.

^{page 482 note 13} This follows from the general principle according to which any administrative discretion, however wide, should only be exercised upon relevant considerations and for a proper purpose. See, e.g., Kardosh v. The Registrar of Companies (1961) 15 P.D. 1151; The Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh (1962) 16 P.D. 1210. The Companies Ordinance, 1929, empowers the Registrar “in his absolute discretion” to refuse the incorporation of a company. Here it was held that where the Registrar exercised this power for an improper purpose, the court could invalidate his decision.

^{page 482 note 14} Witkon, op. cit., 58.

^{page 482 note 15} A series of regulations for the prevention of noise has now been issued pursuant to the order of the court in the Oppenheimer Case. The regulations, about a dozen in number, are directed at sealing off sources of noise. For example reg. 7 reads: “No person shall operate in a residential area a loudspeaker or any other similar device to call attention to the sale of goods, the provision of services, a public appearance, a performance, or for an announcement or an advertisement.” The regulations apply to some of the kinds of nuisances about which the petitioners complained in the Oppenheimer Case.

It was officially announced that more regulations for the implementation of the Law would follow.

^{page 484 note 1} Sec. 189 of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936 (P.G. of 1936, Supp. I, 285).

^{page 484 note 2} Sec. 199 ibid.

^{page 484 note 3} Sec. 200 ibid.

^{page 484 note 4} Sec. 44 of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 1944 (P.G. of 1944, Supp. I, 277).

^{page 484 note 5} Sec. 45 ibid.

^{page 485 note 6} Sec. 2(2) ibid.

^{page 485 note 7} Sec. 47 of the Criminal Code Ordinance, as amended by sec. 15 of the Penal Law Revision (Modes of Punishment) Law, 1954 (8 L.S.I. 206).

^{page 486 note 8} “The Rule of Law and Subordinate Legislation” (1957) Hed Hamishpat (in Hebrew) 222–26.

^{page 488 note 9} Cf. sec. 14(a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948.

^{page 489 note 10} Cf. Lechem Hai v. Minister of Commerce (1961) 15 P.D. 197. (English Summary in Lankin, D., Biennial Survey of Israel Law, 1960—1961 (Jerusalem, 1963) 64.Google Scholar)