The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate some features of sociolinguistic interaction and language convergence phenomena in northern Iran and Transcaucasia. In particular, I wish to explore some of the problems of language classification and the effect of sociological and geographic factors on language diversity in the extended geographic area of Iran, with the aim of offering a new and more productive model for the study of Iranian dialects and languages. Since the material that forms the basis of my discussion is the Tāti language group, I will present here a brief description of it before going on to more general questions.

Tāti, in the context of Iranian linguistics, generally refers to at least two groups of Iranian languages of different origin. The use which interests us presently refers to a group of languages of Northwest Iranian origin, generally classified as a subgroup of the Central Plateau Languages.

In July 1980, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi died in Egypt, approximately a year and a half after the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy and the subsequent establishment of the Islamic Republic. Once asked whether Madame de Pompadour's celebrated phrase, “Après nous le déluge” echoed his own sentiments, the shah had willingly agreed, and indeed, Iran has in the period since his ouster experienced the turbulent existence of a society in the throes of revolution. The prevailing climate of instability, interspersed by alleged conspiracies and widespread purges and executions, has given every indication of developing into a chronic condition, if it has not already done so. The economy has faltered under the burden of inflation, unemployment, and the inadequacy of managerial skills, and in the process, become wholly reliant on the revenues that accrue from the export of petroleum.

The social formation of Iran in the nineteenth century was marked by the predominance of a precapitalist mode of production that had lasted for centuries. A semicolonial situation, superimposed upon Iranian society by the rival colonial powers in the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, set the stage for the beginnings of “modernization” along the lines of dependent capitalism. The result was an uneven and flawed development of capitalism, leading to the emergence and growth of a dual societal type in Iran.

The dualistic character of any social formation in the transitional stage toward capitalism is attributed to the coexistence of several forms of precapitalist, as well as capitalist, modes of production.

The subject of this descriptive essay is social stratification and social control among sharecroppers and wage laborers in Haftabad, a peasant village in northeastern Iran. The aim of the essay is threefold: (1) to describe the complexity of the economic, social, and cultural differences among its residents; (2) to call attention to a critical sociocultural variable hitherto overlooked and/or underplayed in the literature on the rural people of Iran and the Middle East--the hometowner-stranger difference; and (3) to pose the question, whether a large, heterogeneous (with respect to origins) village with both dispersed and nucleated settlement patterns and a wideranging pattern of social status differences can be regarded as a community and, if so, in what sense.

A number of researchers have already called attention to the necessity of examining the complexity of rural social structure in Iran. Ajami (1969), Hooglund (1973 and 1975) and Safinejad (1969), for instance, have argued that at the very least a three-way breakdown of the population is necessary.

When Aqa Mohammad Shah Qajar overthrew the Zand dynasty and established himself on the Persian throne in 1794, large parts of the country were in the hands of tribal chieftains and local leaders. Aqa Mohammad himself had to fight several campaigns to assert his control over the provinces. Under his successors, further campaigns were waged to extend or, more frequently, to maintain or reassert central authority. In the second half of Naser al-Din Shah's reign (1848-1896), the authority of the central government appeared to observers to be more firm than in the early part of the century. But the hold of the center over the provinces, and particularly over the outlying areas, remained precarious. Any weakening of the center, deterioration of the financial situation, or other setback could potentially upset whatever delicate balance had been achieved between the center and the provinces and lead to a reassertion of provincial autonomy.

During the nineteenth century, the bazaar remained the center of commercial activity in Iran. However, the traditional structure of Iranian economy and society began to be deeply affected by Iran's increasing involvement in the international market, so that by the end of the century there had been nearly a twelvefold increase in the volume of Iran's foreign trade. This was accompanied by a rise in the general level of prosperity in the country, and an almost doubling of its population. The groups most directly affected by these developments were the merchants and craftsmen and it was the emergence of a small capitalist class which wanted a share in the political process that greatly contributed to the rise and success of the constitutional movement. The impact of the demands of the international market on crafts and guilds damaged some of the textile industry but stimulated the rise of new crafts, such as those associated with the production and processing of opium and carpets.

The study of Iranian history in the Safavid period is at a relatively rudimentary stage. Despite the wealth of chronicle, biographical, numismatic, documentary, and journalistic material available, few monographic studies of Safavid institutions have been produced. As Minorsky pointed out four decades ago, “not until all the available sources have been properly scrutinized and more material…discovered, shall we be able to get to the bedrock of social and economic conditions under the Safavids.”

His admonition holds true for political institutions as well. Certain fundamental features of the political life of Safavid Iran are well known to its students. But aside from the state structure itself, as analyzed by Minorsky in his translation of and commentary on the Tadhkirat al-muluk and in articles by Roger Savory and Ann K. S. Lambton, other aspects of political life—for instance the Safaviyya and the persistence of Sufi loyalties in political, life, the character and evolution of the qizilbash as a political party, the political integration of local aristocrats (e.g., the maliks of Farah and Sistan and the divs of Mazandaran), and the organization and functioning of tribal uymaqs—remain largely unstudied.