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The Eighth Majles Elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Division in Conservative Ranks and the Politics of Moderation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji
Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji*
Affiliation:
St. Anthony’s College, University of Oxford
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Abstract

Since his inauguration in August 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad faced mounting criticism over his administration's political, economic, and social agenda. Observers noted a significant degree of rising discontent among various segments of the population as evidenced, for example, by the public unrest witnessed in June 2007 in response to the introduction of gasoline rationing.1 The situation in the months leading to the Eighth Majles Election was distinctive because this dissatisfaction also began resonating among segments of the political elite, prompting the emergence of not only reformist, but also conservative opposition to Ahmadinejad.

Type
Research Article
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 42 , Issue 4 , September 2009 , pp. 621 - 648
Copyright
Copyright © The International Society for Iranian Studies 2009

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References

1 “Iran Fuel Rations Spark Violence,” BBC News, 27 June 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6243644.stm. Accessed: 2 February 2008.

2 See Table 1.

3 For a historical overview of elections in Iran, see Gheissari, Ali and Nasr, Vali, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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6 See “Karroubi: Eslāh-Talabi-Ye Dorān-E Khātami Jomhuri-Ye Eslami-Rā Zir-E So’āl Mibord,” Mizan News, 8 March 2008.

7 Various Iranian newspapers that published the election results also coded the reformists as a single faction. Ex., “Amār-E Ghat'i-Ye Shomāresh-E Ara Dar 206 Houz-E Ba Gerayesh,” Tābnāk Professional News Site, 15 March 2008.

8 “Iran Reformists Form Coalition to End ‘Crisis’,” Agence France Presse, 14 December 2007.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 For a detailed description of this agenda, see “Barnāmeh-Ye Setād-E E'etelāf-E Eslāh-Talabān Barā-Ye Majles-E Hashtom,” Agāh Sāzi, 9 March 2008.

12 Ex., Scott Peterson, “Iran's Reformers to US: Let's Talk,” The Christian Science Monitor, 30 November 2007.

13 Prior to the election, these bodies were respectively headed by Ayatollah Janati, an outspoken supporter of Ahmadinejad, and Mostafa Pur-Mohammadi, the former deputy intelligence minister from 1987 to 1999 implicated in the “Chain Murder” assassinations.

14 Vahid Sepehri, “Iran: Politicians Concerned About New Election Date,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8 June 2007.

15 “Guardian Council Receives 3000 Complaints: Basij May Help Ensure Electoral Security,” Iran Daily, 10 February 2008.

16 Ex. Hossein Abdullahifar, “Nou-Āvarihā-Ye Jebhe-Ye Eslāhāt Dar Entekhābāt,” Sobh-e Sādeq, 3 March 2008.

17 Ex., “Pas Az Motahem-E Haste'i-Ye, ‘Aghājāri-Ye Mortād’ Dar List-E Dovom-E Khordād!,” Ansār News, March 2008.

18 Whereas during Khatami's presidency Rafsanjani was seen as belonging to the conservative right, since Ahmadinejad's presidency he has bridged into the reformist camp and is now a self-proclaimed reformist.

19 Sahar Zahedifar, “Principalists See Khatami as Threat,” Miāneh, 11 September 2007.

20 Ex., “Bush: Az Eslāh-Talabān Hemāyat Mikonim!,” Ansār News, March 2008.

21 Mehrdad Farhamand, “Sokhanan-E Bush, Mizani Bara-Ye Marzbandi Miyan-E Eslah Talaban,” BBC Persian, 16 January 2008. http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2008/01/080116_mf_us_support.shtml. Accessed: 18 January 2008.

22 “Mardom Nagozārand Entekhābat Māl'ebe-Ye Dast-E Bigānegan Shavad,” Ansār News, March 2008.

23 Saeed Barzin, “Iran Media Lean to the Right,” BBC News, 13 March 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7292194.stm. Accessed: 15 March 2008.

24 Ex., “E'dām-E Chāp-E Agāhi-Ye Pāyegāh-E E'telā’ā-Resāni-Ye E'etelāf-E Eslāh-Talabān-E Khorāsān,” Bahrestān-e Irān, 5 February 2008.

25 Mohammad Ali Abtahi, member of the Reformist Coalition, quoted in Michael Slackman and Nazila Fathi, “Most Reformists Appear Purged from Iran Ballot,” New York Times, 24 January 2008.

26 Eshraqi quoted in “Iran Vetoes Candidates,” New York Times, 7 February 2008.

27 “Tajdeed Nazar Dar Mored-E Salāhiyat-E Davāzdah Namāyande-Ye Majles,” BBC Persian, 8 February 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2008/02/080208_dd_mps.shtml. Accessed: 10 February 2008.

28 “Khātami Rond-E Radsalāhiyat-Hā-Rā Fāje'e Khānd,” BBC Persian, 7 February 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2008/02/080207_dd_vetting.shtml. Accessed: 07 February 2008.

29 Mostafa Tajzadeh, “Faghat 130 Korsi Barāy-E Reghābat Be Tor-E Nasbi Barāy-E Mā Vojood Dārad,” Agāh Sāzi, 11 March 2008.

30 “About 44 Million Iranians Eligible to Vote on March 14,” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), March 11 2008.

31 “Tabliqāt-E 4476 Nāmzad Vorood Be Majles-E Hashtom Aghāz Shod,” Fars News Agency, 6 March 2008.

32 See Table 2 above.

33 Ex., Julian Borger, “Conservative Wins in Iran Poll Show Sanctions Are Failing, Say Analysts,” The Guardian, 22 March 2008.

34 For extensive analysis of the developments that occurred during the 2005 presidential elections, see Gheissari, Ali and Sanandaji, Kaveh-Cyrus, “New Conservative Politics and Electoral Behavior in Iran,” in Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, and Politics, ed. Gheissari, Ali (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35 See Figure 1.

36 Ex., Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Zweiri, Mahjoob, Iran and the Rise of Its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran's Silent Revolution (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37 Gheissari and Sanandaji, “New Conservative Politics and Electoral Behavior in Iran.”

38 “Forsat-E Nahāie-Ye 21 Nafar-E Aval Hā’ezan-E Bishtarin Ārāy-E Shorāy-E Shahr-E Tehrān,” Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), 21 December 2006.

39 This hard-line faction is comprised of numerous smaller organizations, including Jebhe-ye Ruhāniyun-e Mobārez (Combatant Clerics’ Front), Islamic Society of Engineers, Hezb-e Mo'talefeh-ye Eslami (Islamic Coalition Party), and Jāme'eh-ye Anjomanhā-ye Eslāmi-ye Asnāf va Bazār (Society of Islamic Associations of the Guilds and Bazar).

40 Disenchantment with Ahmadinejad in fall 2007 triggered lawmakers from the Moderation and Development Party to temporarily establish an opposition list, Jebhe-ye Etehād-e Melli (National Unity Front), which served as the precursor to the Grand Principalist Coalition.

41 “Mayor Latest Conservative to Criticise Iran President,” Iran News, 17 November 2007.

42 Ex., Sazegara, Mohsen, “What Should ‘We’ Do Now?,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 4 (2005): 64–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43 Ex., Menashri, David, “Iran's Majlis Elections: All in the Family,” Iran Pulse 20 (2008)Google Scholar, http://www.tau.ac.il/humanities/iranian_studies/files/pulse20.eng.pdf.

44 Ex., Douzet, Frederick, Kousser, Thad, and Miller, Ken, eds., The New Political Geography of California (Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 2008).Google Scholar

45 Pur-Muhammadi's dismissal as Interior Minister has aggravated this situation by causing greater disorganization in the MOI. Please note that the provincial data employed herein is thus tentative, until confirmed by the MOI, which at the time of writing has not yet occurred. The provincial-level analysis therefore provides preliminary research findings and not definite conclusions.

46 Ex., Anoush Ehteshami, “The Rise and Impact of Iran's Neocons,” Policy Analysis Brief (2008), http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/RiseandImpactEhteshami08PAB.pdf. Accessed: 20 April 2008.

47 See Table 1 for a breakdown of the seats secured by each coalition.

48 See Figure 2.

49 “Larijani Be Onvān-E Ra'is-E Movaqat-E Majles-E Hashtom Entekhāb Shod,” Khāne-ye Mellat, 28 May 2008.

50 Ibid.

51 I have previously expanded on the relationship between grievances and electoral behavior. See Kaveh-Cyrus Sanandaji, “The Emergence of Embryonic Democracies: Foundations for Future Democracy in Iran?”, dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego (UCSD, 2007).

52 These provinces most notably include Azerbaijan-e Sharqi, Azerbaijan-e Gharbi, Golestan, Hormozgan, Ilam, Kermanshah, Kordestan, and Sistan va Baluchestan. Each registered greater than 50 percent support for reformist candidates during the 1997, 2000, 2001, and 2005 national elections. Interestingly, the socio-economic characteristics of these provinces are not consistent, supporting my assertion that socio-cultural grievances more accurately account for the observable variation in voting behavior. Note that this analysis omits the 2004 parliamentary election because the Guardian Council vetting process significantly limited the ability of voters to register their support for reformist candidates, thus serving as an inaccurate measure of voters’ preferences for reform. However, the pattern of non-participation and spoilt ballots cast in 2004 resembles the above map, with the highest rates of dissent exhibited in these ethno-linguistic minority dominated provinces.

53 Aghajanian, Akbar, “Ethnic Inequality in Iran: An Overview,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 15, no. 2 (1983): 211–224.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

54 Rafsanjani received his greatest support from Golestan, Hormozgan, Kermanshah, Kordestan, Lorestan, and Sistan va Baluchestan provinces during the second round of the 2005 presidential elections. The consonance between these areas in which Rafsanjani received his greatest support and those identified as traditional reformist strongholds is not coincidental; it is in these areas that those with the greatest socio-cultural grievances reside. For an illustration of Rafsanjani's geographic support base, see Figure 9.3, Gheissari and Sanandaji, “New Conservative Politics and Electoral Behavior in Iran,” 292.

55 For examples of Ahmadinejad's “economic mismanagement,” see Naji, Kasra, Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Pages 213–219 and 229–238 are of particular interest.

56 For examples of the clampdown on freedom of expression, which have since 2005 included the closure of various newspapers, arrests of student protesters, and the crackdown on those who do not wear full hejab (Islamic dress code) see: “Freedom of the Press Worldwide in 2008,” in Annual Report (Paris: Reporters Without Borders, 2008), 3.Google Scholar “New Hijab Plan Launched in Iran,” Iran News, 22 April 2007. “Crackdown in Iran over Dress Codes,” BBC News, 27 April 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6596933.stm. Accessed: 05 May 2008.

57 See.

58 Compare Table 2 and Appendix Table 1.

59 See Appendix Table 2.

60 See Table 2.

61 See Appendix Table 2.