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Reputation and cooperation: Guzman on international law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2009

Andrew Kydd
Andrew Kydd*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, WI, USA
*
E-mail: kydd@wisc.edu
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Abstract

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Type
Symposium on Andrew Guzman's How International Law Works
Information
International Theory , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 2009 , pp. 295 - 305
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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