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Translating impartiality into operations from a financial perspective: Uncertainties and solutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 May 2024

Yue Wang*
Affiliation:
Lecturer, School of International Organizations, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing, China
Ting Fang
Affiliation:
Protection Delegate, Kandahar Sub-Delegation, International Committee of the Red Cross, Kandahar, Afghanistan
*
*Corresponding author email: elainewangjnu@163.com

Abstract

Considering the drastic changes in the nature of conflicts, humanitarian organizations (HOs) and donors, investing more attention into impartiality is critical for HOs if they are to survive and improve the quality of their humanitarian activities. As one of the four fundamental humanitarian principles, impartiality has critical implications for humanitarian action in relation to three aspects: its symbolic meaning for humanitarian action, its procedural significance for humanitarian access, and its operational importance for needs assessments. This article analyzes how the practice of impartiality is challenged by the current humanitarian financing model from five angles: funding source, funding amount, funding allocation, financial management and funding categorization. To cope with these obstacles, we focus on the financial perspective and propose three suggestions for international HOs: first, digitally innovating the humanitarian financing model to ensure that overall humanitarian needs are covered; second, strengthening engagement with non-traditional donors such as the Gulf countries and China, with a focus on infrastructure; and third, developing a hybrid financing model, with case studies from UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of International Committee of the Red Cross

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Footnotes

The advice, opinions and statements contained in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. The ICRC does not necessarily represent or endorse the accuracy or reliability of any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided in this article.

References

1 Except for members of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement), there are a range of international humanitarian actors who regard the principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality as their code of conduct or operational standards to guide their everyday work, such as the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Organization for Migration, the Norwegian Refugee Council and the International Rescue Committee. More information is available at: www.unocha.org/humanitarian-access; https://emergency.unhcr.org/protection/protection-principles/humanitarian-principles; www.corecommitments.unicef.org/ccc-1-3; www.wfp.org/ethical-culture; https://emergencymanual.iom.int/ioms-humanitarian-policy-principles-humanitarian-action-pha; www.nrc.no/what-we-do/speaking-up-for-rights/humanitarian-access/; www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/2802/englishirc-waycode-conducta4final.pdf (all internet references were accessed in May 2024).

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33 Ibid., p. 58.

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37 ALNAP, above note 7, p. 58.

38 A low share of management costs does not necessarily equate to efficient assistance. For instance, relief supplies may be transported by an HO's own vehicles, where the transport costs are included in management costs, or the HO may hire and pay for contractors, where transport costs are not included in management costs, but this does not make the latter more efficient. Assistance in-kind tends to account for a lower proportion than service assistance. Expenditure on preventive activities (including awareness-raising advocacy and publicity) may involve higher management costs than post-crisis response.

39 Corinna Kreidler, The Added Value of Flexible Funding to the ICRC, ICRC, Geneva, 2020, pp. 8–9.

40 Development Initiatives, Private Funding for International Humanitarian Assistance, 4 April 2022, p. 5.

41 Ibid.

42 ALNAP, above note 7, pp. 78–79.

43 UN-coordinated appeals include humanitarian response plans, flash appeals and refugee response plans. They represent the system's collective estimate of needs and costs. They do not involve all agencies: the ICRC, IFRC and Médecins Sans Frontières choose to remain outside the appeals process, and many local and national NGOs are also not directly linked to the appeals process.

44 ALNAP, above note 7, p. 83.

45 Ibid.

46 ICRC, “An Update on ICRC's Financial Situation”, 4 April 2023, www.icrc.org/en/document/update-icrc-financial-situation.

47 ICRC, “ICRC to Resize Global Footprint, Maximizing Reduced Resources in Era of Declining Aid Budgets”, 11 September 2023, available at: www.icrc.org/en/document/icrc-resize-global-footprint-maximizing-reduced-resources-era-declining-aid-budgets.

48 OCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2024, Geneva, 11 December 2023, p. 72, available at: www.unocha.org/publications/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2024-enarfres.

49 G. Carbonnier, above note 12, p. 150.

50 ALNAP, above note 7, p. 86.

51 Ibid., pp. 86–87.

52 Ibid., p. 87.

53 The respondents in this survey did not include communities that were not receiving assistance.

54 Ibid., p. 97.

55 Ibid., p. 90.

56 Ibid., p. 89.

57 Ibid., p. 97.

58 International Association of Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection, “Financial Management”, available at: https://phap.org/theme-financial-management.

59 Jeremy Konyndyk and Rose Worden, People-Driven Response: Power and Participation in Humanitarian Action, Policy Paper No. 155, Center for Global Development, September 2019, pp. 6–7.

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85 ICRC, above note 3.

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89 G. Carbonnier, above note 12, p. 44.

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91 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Structured Dialogue on Financing the Results of the UNICEF Strategic Plan, 2022–2025, E/ICEF/2023/26, 4 August 2023, p. 2.

92 Ibid., p. 11.

93 UNICEF, “Funding to UNICEF”, available at: www.unicef.org/partnerships/funding.

94 ECOSOC, above note 91, p. 24.

95 Ibid., p. 22.

96 M. Yussuf and J. L. Larrabure, above note 90, p. 11.

97 ECOSOC, above note 91, p. 2.

98 ECOSOC, UNICEF Strategic Plan: Updated Financial Estimates, 2023–2026, E/ICEF/2023/AB/L.6, 10 July 2023, p. 8.

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101 Ibid., p. 3.

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