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A possible legal framework for the exploitation of natural resources by non-State armed groups
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 July 2023
Abstract
The law of belligerent occupation permits the Occupying Power to administer and use the natural resources in the occupied territory under the rules of usufruct. This provision has no counterpart in the provisions of humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed conflicts, which may suggest that any exploitation of natural resources by non-State armed groups is illegal. The International Committee of the Red Cross's updated 2020 Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict did not touch on this issue, and nor did the International Law Commission in its 2022 Draft Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, where it applied the notion of sustainable use of natural resources instead of usufruct. The present paper aims to fill this gap. It first reviews the development of the concept of usufruct and then studies whether the current international law entitles non-State armed groups with de facto control over a territory to exploit natural resources. By delving into the proposals raised by some commentators to justify such exploitation for the purpose of administering the daily life of civilian populations, the paper advocates for a limited version of this formula as the appropriate lex ferenda. In the final section, the paper discusses how situations of disaster, as circumstances which may preclude the wrongfulness of the act, may justify the exploitation of natural resources by non-State armed groups in the current international legal order.
Keywords
- Type
- Other Actors
- Information
- International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 105 , Issue 924: Protecting the Environment in Armed Conflict , December 2023 , pp. 1522 - 1542
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the ICRC.
Footnotes
The advice, opinions and statements contained in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. The ICRC does not necessarily represent or endorse the accuracy or reliability of any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided in this article.
References
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6 ICRC, Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Armed Conflict, Geneva, 2020 (ICRC Guidelines), p. 4.
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13 Ibid.
14 Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863 (Lieber Code), Art. 31, in D. Schindler and J. Toman (eds), above note 12, pp. 3–23.
15 Institut de Droit International, Annuaire de l'IDI, Vol. 5, 1888, p. 151; see also Project of an International Declaration concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, 27 August 1874, Art. 7.
16 Roman law scholars considered property as the sum total of three rights that, together, gave one absolute control over a thing. These three rights were called usus (the right to use the thing), fructus (the right to take its fruits) and abusus (the right to dispose of the thing). Thomas J. McSweeney, “Property before Property: Romanizing the English Law of Land”, Buffalo Law Review, Vol. 60, No. 4, 2012, pp. 1158–1159.
17 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899 (1899 Hague Regulations), Art. 55; Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annexed to Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (1907 Hague Regulations), Art. 55.
18 While both the Brussels Declaration and the Oxford Manual formed the basis of the two Hague Conventions on land warfare and the Regulations annexed to them, adopted in 1899 and 1907, the discussion on why the members of the Conference preferred the formulation of the Brussels Declaration is not recorded.
19 Art. 7: “L'armée d'occupation n'a que le droit d'administration et de jouissance des édifices publics, immeubles, forets et exploitations agricoles apparentent à l’État ennemi et se trouvent dans le paye occupe. Elle doit autant que possible sauvegarder le fonds de ces propriétés et s'abstenir de tout ce qui ne serait pas justifié par l'usufruit.” Projet d'une convention internationale concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre (texte primitif soumis à la conférence): Conférence intergouvernementale (1874, Bruxelles), Les Freres van Cleef, The Hague, 1890 (Brussels Declaration), p. 215.
20 Ibid., p. 102.
21 Ibid., p. 103.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 104. Article 3 of the Brussels Deceleration reads: “With this object he shall maintain the laws which were in force in the country in time of peace, and shall not modify, suspend or replace them unless necessary.”
26 Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, USA v. Friedrich Flick et al., Case V, 3 March 1947–22 December 1947.
27 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 2: Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, Rule 51, available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl.
28 Canada, The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Levels, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 13 August 2001, para. 1243.
29 United Kingdom, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, Ministry of Defence, 1 July 2004, para. 11.86.
30 Marja Lehto, First Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, UN Doc. A/CN.4/720, 30 April 2018, para. 30.
31 The Special Rapporteur argues that “the occupying State should use natural resources only to the extent of military necessity”: ibid., para. 31; See also para. 36, where she states that “[p]ursuant to article 55, the occupying State, as usufructuary, would be required to prevent overexploitation of the assets and to maintain their long-term value”.
32 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168, para. 249.
33 M. Lehto, above note 30, paras 32–37.
34 Ibid., para. 50.
35 Ibid., para. 96.
36 Ibid.
37 ILC Draft Principles on the Environment, above note 7, Principle 20.
38 Ibid., commentary on Principle 20, paras 8–9.
39 Ibid., para. 9.
40 Marja Lehto, Third Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, UN Doc. A/CN.4/750, 1 June 2022, paras 235, 240.
41 Official Records of the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/73/SR.29, 31 October 2018, para. 46.
42 Official Records of the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.33, 6 November 2019, paras 35–36.
43 Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Comments and Observations Received from Governments, International Organizations and Others, UN Doc. A/CN.4/749, 17 January 2022, p. 117.
44 M. Lehto, above note 40, para. 245 (emphasis added).
45 Ibid., para. 245.
46 Biodiversity Information System for Europe, “Overexploitation”, available at: https://biodiversity.europa.eu/europes-biodiversity/threats/overexploitation.
47 ICRC Guidelines, above note 6, commentary on Rule 15(b), para. 194.
48 ILC Draft Principles on the Environment, above note 7, p. 149.
49 Ibid., para. 7.
50 See, for example, UNSC Res. 1457, 24 January 2003, para. 2, in which the Council “[s]trongly condemns the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”; and UNSC Res. 2136, 30 January 2014.
51 ILC Draft Principles on the Environment, above note 7, para. 7.
52 ICRC Guidelines, above note 6, commentary on Rule 14, para. 184.
53 Ibid., para. 182.
54 ICJ, Armed Activities, above note 32, paras 237–250.
55 While different definitions of natural resources exist, in the present paper natural resources and renewable/non-renewable resources should be understood as per the definition used by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and relied on by the ICRC in its Guidelines: “Natural resources are actual or potential sources of wealth that occur in a natural state, such as timber, water, fertile land, wildlife, minerals, metals, stones, and hydrocarbons. A natural resource qualifies as a renewable resource if it is replenished by natural processes at a rate comparable to its rate of consumption by humans or other users. A natural resource is considered non-renewable when it exists in a fixed amount, or when it cannot be regenerated on a scale comparative to its consumption.” ICRC Guidelines, above note 3, p. 75 fn. 416. Compared this with the definition of natural resources used by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which includes the element of “scarce and economically useful in production or consumption”: WTO, World Trade Report 2010, 2010, p. 46, available at: www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report10_e.pdf.
56 Marja Lehto, Second Report on Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, UN Doc. A/CN.4/728, 27 March 2019, para. 58.
57 Matthew Bamber-Zryd, “ICRC Engagement with Armed Groups in 2022”, Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog, 12 January 2023, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2023/01/12/icrc-engagement-armed-groups-2022/.
58 More concretely, 82% of groups that fully control territory have done so for four years or more and 62% of groups that fluidly control territory have done so for four years or more. Ibid.
59 Phoebe Okowa, “Sovereignty Contests and the Protection of Natural Resources in Conflict Zones”, Current Legal Problems, Vol. 66, No. 1, 2013, p. 73.
60 Stefan Talmon, “Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council”, ASIL Insights, Vol. 15, No. 16, 2011, available at: www.asil.org/insights/volume/15/issue/16/recognition-libyan-national-transitional-council.
61 P. Okowa, above note 59, p. 37.
62 See above note 8; see also Thibaud de la Bourdonnaye, “Greener Insurgencies? Engaging Non-State Armed Groups for the Protection of the Natural Environment during Non-International Armed Conflicts”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 102, No. 914, 2020.
63 Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP, Art. 10.
64 Jong, Daniëlla Dam-de, “Greening the Economy of Armed Conflict: Natural Resource Exploitation by Armed Groups and Their Engagement with Environmental Protection”, Hague Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 32, 2019, p. 184Google Scholar.
65 Ibid.
66 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16.
67 D. Dam-de Jong, above note 64, p. 185.
68 Ibid., p. 206.
69 Ibid., p. 184.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 185.
72 Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609, 8 June 1977 (entered into force 7 December 1978).
73 D. Dam-de Jong, above note 64, p. 206.
74 Jong, Daniëlla Dam-de, “Armed Opposition Groups and the Right to Exercise Control over Public Natural Resources: A Legal Analysis of the Cases of Libya and Syria”, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2015, p. 21Google Scholar.
75 See, for example, UNSC Res. 1625, 14 September 2005, para. 6. See also the statement of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council in which he notes that since 1990, 75% of civil wars in Africa have been partially funded by revenues from natural resources. António Guterres, “Remarks to Security Council on the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: The Root Causes of Conflict – The Role of Natural Resources”, 16 October 2018, available at: www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-10-16/maintenance-international-peace-and-security-remarks-security-council.
76 For example, a study on the causes of conflict in Darfur from 1930 to 2000 demonstrated that competition for pastoral land and water has been a driving force behind the majority of local confrontations for the last seventy years. See UNEP, Toolkit and Guidance for Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict, 8 October 2012, p. 30, available at: www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/GN_Renew.pdf
77 For example, see the practice of the so-called Islamic State group in weaponizing water resources. Tobias von Lossow, “Water as Weapon: IS on the Euphrates and Tigris”, SWP Comments No. 3, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2016, available at: www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2016C03_lsw.pdf; Irene Mia and Rica Pepe, “Climate Change and the Instrumentalisation of Natural Resources in the Continuum of War: The Role of Non-state Armed Groups and International Responses”, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 November 2022, available at: www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/11/acs-2022-climate-change-and-the-instrumentalisation-of-natural-resources; Daoudy, Marwa, “Water Weaponization in the Syrian Conflict: Strategies of Domination and Cooperation”, International Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 5, 2020CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
78 ILC Draft Principles on the Environment, above note 7, Principle 20, para. 9.
79 According to a report published by UNEP in 2009, since 1990, at least eighteen civil wars have been fuelled by non-renewable natural resources such as diamonds, timber, oil, and minerals. UNEP, Protecting the Environment during Armed Conflict, 2009, p. 8.
80 Apart from the risk of abuse by NSAGs, which is also a risk with regard to occupying States, we believe that in granting rights to NSAGs comparable to those of States, it should not be forgotten that States, besides the rights granted to them, have heavy legally binding obligations under international law. For example, corresponding to the right of a State to exploit the natural resources located in an occupied territory in the context of usufruct, Geneva Convention IV, the Hague Regulations and other applicable rules impose many obligations on that State as the Occupying Power. These rules do not necessarily encompass many counterpart obligations applicable to NSAGs. From this, it can be also suggested that in the process of designing lex ferenda, any right granted to NSAGs must be accompanied by related obligations.
81 D. Dam-de Jong, above note 64, p. 188.
82 ILC, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, with Commentaries, UN Doc. A/71/10, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, Part 2, 2016 (ILC Draft Articles on Disasters).
83 See, for example, Herbet, Irénée and Drevon, Jérome, “Engaging Armed Groups at the International Committee of the Red Cross: Challenges, Opportunities and COVID-19”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 102, No. 915, 2020CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Geneva Call's COVID-19 Armed Non-State Actors’ Response Monitor, available at: www.genevacall.org/covid-19-armed-non-state-actors-response-monitor/.
84 Sandra Krähenmann, Ximena Galvez Lima and Hiba Mikhail, “Emergency Governance: Armed Non-State Actors Facing COVID-19”, Armed Groups and International Law, 2 March 2022, available at: www.armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2022/03/02/emergency-governance-armed-non-state-actors-facing-covid-19/.
85 Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations, 2296 UNTS 5, 18 June 1998.
86 ILC Draft Articles on Disasters, above note 82, para. 5.
87 Ayesha Siddiqi, “Disasters in Conflict Areas: Finding the Politics”, Disasters, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2018, p. 4.
88 See also ILC Draft Articles on Disasters, above note 82, para. 10.
89 Ibid., commentary on Art. 3, paras 8–9. The commentary on Article 18 further states: “The present draft articles would thus contribute to filling legal gaps in the protection of persons affected by disasters during an armed conflict while international humanitarian law shall prevail in situations regulated by both the draft articles and international humanitarian law”: ibid., commentary on Art. 18, para. 9.
90 Article 5 emphasizes that these persons are “entitled to the respect for and protection of their human rights in accordance with international law”.
91 Ibid., commentary on Art. 10, para. 3.
92 Ibid., commentary on Art. 3, para. 15.
93 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 2019, p. 52.
94 See, for example, Katharine Fortin, The Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.
95 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 2011, pp. 14–15, available at: www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf.
96 See Rodenhäuser, Tilman, “The Legal Protection of Persons Living under the Control of Non-State Armed Groups”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 102, No. 915, 2021Google Scholar.
97 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, Part 2, 2001 (ARSIWA); ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, Part 2, 2011 (DARIO).
98 DARIO, above note 97, p. 70, Introduction to Chap. V, para. 2.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., commentary on Art. 25, para. 4.
101 See, for example, Heffes, Ezequiel and Frenke, Brian E., “The International Responsibility of Non-State Armed Groups: In Search of the Applicable Rules”, Goettingen Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2017Google Scholar; Laura Inigo Alvarez, Towards a Regime of Responsibility of Armed Groups in International Law, Intersentia, 2020; Annyssa Bellal, “Establishing the Direct Responsibility of Non-State Armed Groups for Violations of International Norms: Issues of Attribution”, in Noemi Gal-Or, Cedric Ryngaert and Math Noortmann (eds), Responsibilities of the Non-State Actor in Armed Conflict and the Market Place, Brill, Leiden, 2015. See also ILA, Washington Conference 2014: Non-State Actors, 3rd report prepared by co-rapporteurs Cedric Ryngaert and Jean d'Aspremont, 2014.
102 ILC Draft Principles on the Environment, above note 7, commentary on Principle 9, para. 12.
103 M. Lehto, above note 56, para. 58.
104 ILA, above note 101, p. 11.
105 For further discussion, see Federica I. Paddeu, “Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness”, Oxford Public International Law, 2014, available at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2151.
106 ARSIWA, above note 97, commentary on Chap. V, para. 2.
107 Herman, Olivia, “Beyond the State of Play: Establishing a Duty of Non-State Armed Groups to Provide Reparations”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 102, No. 915, 2020, p. 1043CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
108 ARSIWA, above note 97, Art. 24; DARIO, above note 97, Art. 24.
109 DARIO, above note 97, commentary on Art. 27, para. 1.
110 Paddeu, Federica and Waibel, Michael, “Necessity 20 Years On: The Limits of Article 25”, ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1–2, 2022, p. 181Google Scholar.
111 Ibid., p. 182.
112 ARSIWA, above note 97, commentary on Art. 27, para.1.