^{page 223 note 1} Marx died in March 1883, Engels August 1895.

^{page 223 note 2} Engels, Friedrich, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophic (1888), in Werke, Marx-Engels (MEW), Vol. 21, pp. 291f.Google Scholar

^{page 223 note 3} Mehring, Franz, E., Karl Marx Fitzgerald tr. (1936), p. 123.Google Scholar

^{page 223 note 4} Mayer, Gustav, Friedrich Engels, Gilbert and Helen Highet tr. (1936), p. 104.Google Scholar

^{page 223 note 5} Ryazanov, D., Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, J. Kunitz tr. (n.d.), p. 216.Google Scholar

^{page 224 note 1} Cornu, Auguste, The Origins of Marxian Thought (1957), p. 85.Google Scholar Cornu concludes that in The Holy Family, Marx and Engels developed the same fundamental theme, but Marx more deeply (See his Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels, Vol. 3 (1962), p. 204). Marx on the other hand was still Utopian and abstract in the composition of the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts (1844), whereas Engels brought to him the corrective elements from the study of the economic situation in England (Cornu, ib., Vol. 4 (1970), pp. 267f.). Cornu's reading of the works of Marx and Engels of this period provides detail in support of a frequently encountered generality among the biographers of the two, and historians of the socialist movement generally. The interpretation of the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts is advanced there in the light of the readings of Ludwig Feuerbach at that time. If, however, Marx's work is read in the light of his subsequent writings, a different, more concrete, and practical understanding will be gained. The exclusion of either the contemporaneous or the long-term view is one-sided in regard to the concepts and praxis. The discussion of the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts is one-sided if it remains external to the work itself: they have become a symbol of Marx the “humanist” as opposed to Marx the “dialectical materialist”, “revolutionist”, etc., thus becoming a shuttlecock as between parties and interests, and hence are not evaluated as what they are in their form, internal content and relations.

^{page 224 note 2} MEW, Vol. 13, p. 469 (review by Engels of Marx, Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (1859), in: Das Volk, No 14, August 6, 1859).

^{page 224 note 3} MEW, Vol. 21, p. 27 (Foreword to Friedrich Engels, Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats (1884)); Vol. 19, p. 209 (Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft (1880–82)); Vol. 20, p. 25 (Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft (1878)).

^{page 224 note 4} MEW, Vol. 19, p. 210; Vol. 20, p. 248.

^{page 225 note 1} MEW, Vol. 19, p. 527 (Introduction of 1892 to Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft).

^{page 225 note 2} Marx, Karl, Kapital, Das, Vol. 1, 7th ed. (1914), p. 336.Google Scholar Cf. Karl Korsch, Karl Marx (1938), p. 168; id., G. Langkau ed. (1967), p. 145.

^{page 225 note 3} Korsch, Karl, Marxismus und Philosophie (1923), Gerlach, E. ed. (1966).Google Scholar

^{page 225 note 4} Lukács, Georg, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (1923), in Werke, , Vol. 2 (1968).Google Scholar

^{page 225 note 5} Lukács, op. cit., p. 175 note. A review of the problem at the time is given by Korsch in the 1929 edition of his work, and in E. Gerlach's account, introducing the 1966 ed. of it. Lukács, op. cit., p. 32, attributes his separation from the common position with Korsch to the impossibility of fighting fascism outside the (Communist) Party.

^{page 225 note 6} Hook, Sidney, Toward the Understanding of Karl Marx (1933), pp. 29ff.Google Scholar

^{page 226 note 1} Hook, S., From Hegel to Marx (1936), pp. 217f.Google Scholar

^{page 226 note 2} Ib., pp. 206, 285. See also Hook, , Reason, , Social Myth and Democracy (1940), Ch. 9.Google Scholar

^{page 226 note 3} Schumpeter, Joseph, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd ed. (1962), pp. 10–11.Google Scholar Schumpeter, however, was incapable of comprehending Marx's dialectic or relation to Hegel. On Schumpeter and the history of the problem, cf. Rosdolsky, Roman, Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Marxschen “Kapital”, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (1969), pp. 8–9.Google Scholar See also Reichelt, Helmut, Zur logischen Struktur des Kapitalbegriffs bei Karl Marx (1970), pp. 13f.Google ScholarHobsbawm, E. J. is of the opinion that Engels oversimplified, thinned out Marx's thought somewhat, having clarity of exposition in view. Cf. his Introduction, p. 18Google Scholar, to Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (1964).

^{page 226 note 4} Ib., p. 21.

^{page 226 note 5} Ib., p. 39.

^{page 226 note 6} Cf. Plekhanov, G. V., “Ocherki po istorii materializma”, Part 3, in Izbrannye Filosofskie Proizvedeniya, Vol. 2 (1956), pp. 128–194Google Scholar (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Materialismus (1896), Part 3). Cf. also Plekhanov, (N. Bel'tov), K voprosu o razvitii monisticheskogo vzglyada na istoriyu (1895)Google Scholar (The Development of the Monist View of History, A. Rothstein tr., 1947), Ch. 5. Here the relation of Engels and Morgan in relation to Marx's view is discussed.

^{page 226 note 7} Ernst, Troeltsch, Der Historismus und seine Probleme (1922) (1961), p. 315:Google Scholar Dioskurenpaar.

^{page 226 note 8} Mises, L. von, Socialism, 2nd ed. (1953), pp. 3021, 395f.Google Scholar Marx is made the author of the materialist conception of history. See ref. Sartre, p. 228, note 2 below.

^{page 226 note 9} Hayek, F. A., The Counter-Revolution of Science (1955) (1964), pp. 204f.Google Scholar

^{page 227 note 1} Lichtheim, George, The Origins of Socialism (1969), p. 59:Google Scholar “the positivist version of Marxism […] by Engels and Kautsky”. See also Lichtheim, Marxism (1964), p. 238 note: Socialism, Utopian and Scientific and other later writings of Engels, “are a veritable compendium of the new positivist world-view”. But cf. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (1960), Preface; ib., p. 323:Google Scholar “This absolutism of truth completes the philosophical heritage of Marxism and once for all separates dialectical theory from the subsequent forms of positivism and relativism.” Plainly an issue is to be resolved here which has not been driven to its end. See Adorno, T. W., Negative Dialektik (1966).Google Scholar The issue of positivity and positivism in application of the dialectic to nature by Engels, to human history by Sartre (see below, p. 228, note 2), or by Jonas Cohn, Theorie der Dialektik, to epistemology, remains to be laid bare. The volume put out by T. W. Adorno et al., Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (1969), has taken up some of these issues.

^{page 227 note 2} Jordan, Z. A., The Origins of Dialectical Materialism (1967), p. 15.Google Scholar Jordan here proposes the following schema: Engels's dialectic materialism is equated to Hegelian positivism, Marx's trend of thought to naturalism. Jordan, whose learning is great, sometimes writes inaccurately. On p. 384 of his work he mentions Croce's view that “historical necessity […] allowed Marx to prophesy the coming of the new era”. Korsch opposed this. So far so good. But then Jordan writes: “Karl Popper agreed, in substance, with this evaluation, but stated it more incisively.” However, the passage cited (Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 2 (1962), pp. 83f.Google Scholar) does not bear out Jordan. It reads: “Socialism [of Marx] was to be developed from its Utopian stage to its scientific stage; it was to be based upon the scientific method of analysing cause and effect, and upon scientific prediction. And since he assumed prediction in the field of society to be the same as historical prophecy, scientific socialism was to be based upon a study of historical causes and effects, and finally upon the prophecy of its own advent.” Popper, then, did not agree with Korsch's evaluation but with Croce's, for both impute to Marx a prophetic role, one arming him for this with historical necessity, the other with historical causes and effects. Korsch's position on Marx and Marxism was the opposite of regarding him as a prophet. On the contrary it is Jordan's interpretation of Marx, side by side with those of Croce and Popper, that places Marx in the class of prophets; according to Jordan, Marx's doctrine is not conceived as a natural necessity but a dialectical inevitability; it is the ideology of redemption; Marx's belief is not scientific but eschatological (Jordan, op. cit., p. 385). According to Popper, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 332, Engels was more dogmatic than Marx.

^{page 227 note 3} Habermas, Jürgen, Theorie und Praxis (1963) (1967), p. 167.Google Scholar See also ib., p. 202: “die naturalistische Version, die Engels der Ideologienlehre gab”.

^{page 228 note 1} Cole, G. D. H., A History of Socialist Thought, Vol. 2: Marxism and Anarchism (1954), pp. 310f.Google Scholar

^{page 228 note 2} Sartre, J.-P., Critique de la Raison Dialectique (1960), p. 690.Google Scholar According to Sartre, however, it was Marx who “constituted dialectical materialism” (ib., p. 214 note).

The relation of man to nature was not explored deeply by Engels; man as part of nature, including his fantastic and mystical representation of himself and nature, is a complex problem whose (modern) sources are found in Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, British empiricism, nineteenth century mathematical controversy over unreal and irrational numbers, etc. In the first place, the dialectical relations of abstraction to concretion in their actual and potential moments on the one side, their subjective and objective moments on the other, have not been brought out in recent discussions referring to man and nature. Sartre, op. cit., pp. 669ff., and Jordan, op. cit., pp. 167ff., have confined themselves to indications of Engels's superficialities, confusions, anti-dialectic (in Sartre: Engels is an analytic not a dialectic thinker; this regime is imposed on Engels by his economism). (Lukács and Korsch will be discussed below in this regard; on Schmidt see below, note 5.) In the second, the alienation of man from nature is, besides a problem of morality and right, one of ontology and episte-mology. Marx set forth his positions, in view of the complications of these matters, in the 1840s. They have not often been since developed with fidelity in the lines indicated by him. Cf. Georges Sorel, Reflexions sur la Violence (1908), Ch. 5, who founded his theory of violence, in particular, the distinction between force and violence, on what he understood to be Marx's theory of the natural in man. The human as opposed to the natural is, according to Sorel's grasp of the Marxian conception, equated with “creation by intelligent will”. Of the many oppositions of natural and human in Marx, this is perhaps the least appropriate or apt.

^{page 228 note 3} Lichtheim, George, Marxism (1964), Part 5, Ch. 3, 4.Google Scholar

^{page 228 note 4} Ib., pp. 234f.

^{page 228 note 5} Schmidt, Alfred, Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx (1962).Google Scholar Schmidt brings out the non-ontological character of Marx's materialism, which is a point well worth making in reference to Marx's Feuerbach Theses. The difference between Marx and Engels in regard to philosophical materialism is put bySchmidt (p. 12): the question of Marx's concept of nature necessarily is broadened to the question of the relation between the materialist conception of history and philosophical materialism generally, whereas the question of philosophical materialism in reference to Engels does not arise. (The “materialist conception of history”, however, is not a concept of Marx, and the manner in which this phrase is to be applied to his work calls for precise definition.) Nature is defined by Schmidt (pp. 19, 75) as being, in the system of Marx, the material of human activity. This needs further discussion as to the young Marx, who conceived of the dialectical relation of the actual separation and potential unity of man's relation to nature. See below, p. 230, note 1. Marx, at the time that he wrote Capital, broadened the systems of human activity in relation to nature. See below, p. 231, note 1, and p. 233, notes 1–4. For an appreciation cp. Habermas, Jürgen, Erkenntnis und Interesse (1968), pp. 49ff.Google Scholar

^{page 229 note 1} Avineri, Shlomo, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (1968), p. 202.Google Scholar

^{page 229 note 2} Fleischer, Helmut, Marx und Engels (1970), pp. 174ff.Google Scholar

^{page 230 note 1} Marx, Karl, Ökonomisch-Philosophische Manuskripte (1844), in Marx-Engels, , Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, I, Vol. 3, pp. 122–123.Google Scholar See Kraver, L., “Critique dialectique de la nature de la nature humaine”, in: L'Homme et la Société, No 10 (1968), pp. 22–23, and Addition 2, at end.Google Scholar

^{page 230 note 2} Marx, Karl, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Okonomie (1857–1858) (1953), p. 27.Google Scholar

^{page 231 note 1} Marx, Kapital, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 336–337.

^{page 231 note 2} Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Ch. 1, incipit: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”

^{page 232 note 1} Marx, Kapital, loc. cit.

^{page 232 note 2} Ökonomisch-Philosophische Manuskripte, loc. cit.

^{page 233 note 1} Marx, Kapital, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 272–273.

^{page 233 note 2} MEW, Vol. 31, p. 306; Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, I. Lasker tr. (1965), p. 189.

^{page 233 note 3} Marx, Kapital, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 593 note.

^{page 233 note 4} Ib., p. 728, also pp. 303–304.

^{page 233 note 5} MEW, Vol. 19, p. 108; Selected Correspondence, op. cit., p. 312. On chronology cp. Karl Marx, Chronik seines Lebens in Einzeldaten, V. Adoratskij ed. (1934), p. 365.

^{page 234 note 1} Marx, Kapital, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 335f.

^{page 234 note 2} MEW, Vol. 26.3, p. 482, also pp. 289, 414.

^{page 234 note 3} Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (1958); id., On Violence (1969).

^{page 235 note 1} “Marx und Engels über Feuerbach: Der erste Teil der 'Deutschen Ideologic’”, Rjazanov, D. ed., in: Marx-Engels Archiv, Vol. 1 (1926), pp. 205–306.Google Scholar The editorial introduction by Ryazanov is the most synoptic history of the manuscript available. See also MEW, Vol. 3, pp. viff. Further circumstances of its publication are given by Cornu, A., Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels, Vol. 4 (1970), pp. 170ff.Google Scholar (See Addition 2, below.)

^{page 239 note 1} 1st ed., 1884; 4th ed., 1891–1892. Engels debt to Marx: Prefaces to 1st, 4th ed. and passim. Morgan, Lewis Henry, Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of Human Progress from Savagery, through Barbarism to Civilization (New York and London, 1877).Google Scholar

^{page 239 note 2} The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx (Studies of Morgan, Phear, Maine, Lubbock), transcribed and edited, with an Introduction by Lawrence Krader (Assen, 1972). Further bibliographic precisions regarding the following discussion will be found therein. – This work contains the transcription of excerpts and notes made by Marx from the following books: Morgan, Lewis Henry, Ancient Society (1877);Google ScholarPhear, John Budd, The Aryan Village in India and Ceylon (1880)Google Scholar; Maine, Henry Sumner, Lectures on the Early History of Institutions (1875)Google Scholar; Lubbock, John (Lord Avebury), The Origin of Civilisation (1870).Google Scholar The excerpts and notes from the first three works are gathered in Notebook B 146, the fourth in Notebook B 150, of the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis. The first three sets of excerpts were made by Marx during the winter of 1880 and the first half of 1881, the fourth late in 1882, some four months before the death of Marx. Beside the excerpts from the works listed, Notebook B 146 also contains excerpts by Marx from works by J. W. B. Money on Java, Rudolph Sohm on ancient and medieval law, and E. Hospitalier on electricity. The Lubbock excerpts and notes are more restricted in form and content than the early notes but reveal, nevertheless, a remarkable state of mental activity of Marx even at the last stage of his life. Ryazanov, D., “Novye Dannye o Literaturnom Nasledstve K. Marksa i F. Engel'sa”, in: Vestnik Sotsialisticheskoy Akademii, No 6, 1923, pp. 351–376Google Scholar, has incorrectly appreciated the chronology of these sets of excerpts and notes in the last months and years of Marx's life, relative to the energy and acumen with which Marx worked upon them (see also the German translation of his lecture before the Socialist Academy: “Neueste Mitteilungen über den literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels”, in: Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, Vol. 11, 1925).Google Scholar This in no way is to diminish the services of Ryazanov in editing and publishing the writings of Marx, including those unpublished at the time of his death. Ryazanov in this lecture first called attention to the excerpts by Marx from Maine and Lubbock, in addition to the excerpts from Morgan known through Engels. – A detailed discussion of the contents and chronology of the Notebooks B 146 and B 150 is given in The Ethnological Notebooks, op. cit., pp. 86ff.

^{page 239 note 3} The doctoral dissertation is published in MEW, Erganzungsband 1, pp. 257– 373: Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie. On the Hegel clubs see the letter of Jenny von Westphalen, August 10, 1841, MEW, Ergänzungsband 1, p. 641. Publications: “Das philosophische Manifest derhistorischen Rechtsschule”, in: Zeitung, Rheinische, No 221, 08 9, 1842 (MEW, Vol. 1, pp. 78–85);Google Scholar “Zur Judenfrage”, in: Deutsch-französische Jahr-bücher, 1844 (MEW, Vol. 1, pp. 347–377); “Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechts-philosophie, Einleitung”, ib. (MEW, Vol. 1, pp. 378–391). The correspondence with Ruge was published in the same Jahrbücher (MEW, Vol. 1, pp. 337–346), which Arnold Ruge and Marx edited jointly. Die Heilige Familie (1845) was brought out jointly with Friedrich Engels (MEW, Vol. 2, pp. 3–223). While Engels was the first author listed on the title page, Marx wrote most of the work.

^{page 240 note 1} The corpus, aside from the volumes mentioned, includes as yet unpublished materials in the IISG, a part of which is now being prepared for publication by H. P. Harstick.

^{page 240 note 2} Auguste Cornu, Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels, Vol. 4: La formation du ma-térialisme historique.

^{page 240 note 3} Ib., pp. 287ff.

^{page 240 note 4} MEW, Ergänzungsband 1, p. v.

^{page 240 note 5} Louis Althusser, Pour Marx (1966), p. 233. His judgment is onesided. Korsch called attention to Marx's Preface to the Critique of 1859, where Marx indicated that “the first work undertaken for the solution of the doubts that disturbed me was a critical revision of Hegel's Philosophy of Right”. This latter work was written in 1843 (MEW, Vol. 1, pp. 203–333), and the Introduction to it published in 1844. His studies had as their outcome that legal relations and forms of the state are rooted in the material relations of life (MEW, Vol. 13, p. 8). Cf. Karl Korsch, Karl Marx (1938), p. 20. According to Marx the materialist factor, or the material relations, were already set forth by him in 1843–44, thus antedating the time limit of 1845–46 proposed by Cornu, Althusser, etc. The theory setting forth that the root of law, right, the state lies in the material relations of life is incompatible with a theory of essences, and is positively related to the subsequent formulations of Marx regarding the ensemble of social relations (against Feuer-bach), the scientific or materialist method, etc. Marx had already broken with the philosophy of essence at that earlier time. To be radical means to go to the root of things; Marx had already gone to the root in 1843.

^{page 241 note 1} See above, p. 239, note 2.

^{page 241 note 2} Kapital, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 316.

^{page 241 note 3} For the chronology of the composition of Engels's Origin of the Family see The Ethnological Notebooks, op. cit., pp. 388f.

^{page 241 note 4} MEW, Vol. 36, p. 109. The letter is dated February 16, 1884.

^{page 242 note 1} Ib., p. 194. The letter is dated August 11, 1884. Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law (1861), is referred to by implication by Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1942), p. 70 (translation of Engels, Ursprung, 4th ed.; it will be referred to hereafter as Engels, Origin); MEW, Vol. 21, p. 80. Here Engels refers to Maine's theory of the social progress from status to contract. It is propounded in Maine's work (Everyman's Library, p. 100): “If then we employ Status […] to signify these personal conditions [i.e. the powers and privileges anciently residing in the family] only, […] we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has been a movement from Status to Contract.” Engels's point, loc. cit., is that this idea had already been expressed in the Communist Manifesto. Marx, however, simply records the theory of Maine in a way that implies his accord, without a claim to right of priority, in his excerpts from Maine, Early Institutions (The Ethnological Notebooks). Maine's restriction of the derivation of status from powers and privileges in the family is here contested as being too narrow. It excludes the powers of the person that lie outside the family in classical antiquity and also outside the restricted field of privileges.

^{page 242 note 2} See The Ethnological Notebooks, pp. 89, 360, 395f. Also Marx, Chronik, op. cit., p. 374.

^{page 242 note 3} See The Ethnological Notebooks, pp. 89f. Marx had already come into contact with the work of Bancroft in conjunction with his critical notes from Kovalevsky, op. cit., IISG, Notebook B 140, pp. 19, 20, 22, etc. Kovalevsky relied heavily on Bancroft in regard to Indians of North America.

^{page 243 note 1} Engels, Origin, Preface.

^{page 243 note 2} Loc. cit.

^{page 243 note 3} Cunow, Heinrich, “Die Ökonomischen Grundlagen der Mutterherrschaft”, in: Zeit, Die Neue, Vol. 16 (1897–1898), Part 1, pp. 107–108;Google Scholar id., Die Geschichts, Marxsche, Gesellschafts und Staatstheorie, Vol. 2 (1921), pp. 140ff.Google Scholar; Eduard Bernstein, Introd. to Italian translation of Engels, Ursprung, in: Socialistische Monatshefte, Vol. 4 (1900); Izbrannye, Marx-EngelsProizvedeniya, Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1955), p. 161;Google ScholarAusgewählte, Marx-EngelsSchriften, Vol. 2 (Berlin, 1955), pp. 159f.Google Scholar Cunow's work, as can be seen, is of more than historical importance. However, Otto Mänchen-Helfen (see next note) criticized Cunow for failing to keep up with the burgeoning field of ethnology. But Cunow's mastery of the existing literature was also occasionally inexact. Cunow, Zur Urgeschichte der Ehe und Familie [Ergänzungshefte zur Neuen Zeit, No 14] (1912), pp. 51f., accused Morgan of imposing the notion of civilized men (Kulturmenschen) upon primitive peoples. “Morgan gave the word father the same meaning as procreator.” (p. 52) But that is not the usage encountered among civilized men: Engels had just shown that the Code Napoléon, Art. 312, had done exactly the reverse: “L'enfant concu pendant le mariage a pour père le mari.” (Engels, Origin, Ch. 2; MEW, Vol. 21, p. 70) Cunow would then have had to show that Morgan departed from (at least one) civilized usage in failing to distinguish between social and biological parentage. (This is nonsense, to comprise all of civilized usage in one formula.)

^{page 244 note 1} Mänchen-Helfen, Otto, “Heinrich Cunow und die Ethnologie”, in: Die Gesell-schaft, Vol. 9 (1932), Part 1, p. 447.Google Scholar

^{page 244 note 2} Letter to Marx, December 8, 1882, MEW, Vol. 35, p. 125. Engels wrote: “The similarity between Tacitus's Germans and the tribes of the Northwest Coast is in fact all the more surprising, as the mode of production is so fundamentally different – here fishers and hunters, there wandering animal breeding passing over into agriculture. This proves exactly how at this stage the kind of production is less decisive than the degree of dissolution of the old consanguineal bonds and the old mutual community of the sexes in the tribe.”

^{page 244 note 3} MEW, Vol. 3, p. 21.

^{page 244 note 4} Mänchen-Helfen, op. cit., pp. 447f; here, while praising Cunow, he has gone too far, for he has written: “The production of men, the act of procreation and birth, is the same in all societies. There is history only because there are variable factors. The production of people is a constant factor.” (As though there were no natural history! We have to deal with the interaction of two kinds of history, and not remove man from nature or nature from history. But this is a minor point compared to the services of Manchen-Helfen.)

^{page 245 note 1} Cornu has included The German Ideology within the canon of historical materialism, the editors of MEW have done likewise. But Cornu has written: “Les premiers rapports sociaux, engendrés à la fois par la production et par la procréation …”, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 178, in reference to The German Ideology. Cf. MEW, Vol. 3, Vorwort, pp. viiff. This is a confusion that introduces biological into social matters. Lucas, Erhard, “Die Rezeption Lewis H. Morgans durch Marx und Engels”, in: Saeculum, Vol. 15 (1964), pp. 153–176CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Marx' Studien”, ib., pp. 327–343, made a learned survey, but failed to distinguish between the “economic factor in history” and historical materialism as such. Engels had included (Origin, Preface) the biological factor within his idea at that time of historical materialism. Aside from the general theoretical distinction between the concepts of the “economic factor in history” and “historical materialism”, it is particularly important to do so in this context. Lucas concludes that the separation of the economic factor from primitive society by Engels had [as one] consequence that Morgan is declared to be a historical materialist (ib., pp. 171f.). But the attribution, “historical materialist”, to Morgan by Engels is not the consequence of the separation of human history into economic and pre-economic stages. One could consider Morgan to be a historical materialist not on the basis of his having founded an interpretation of primitive society on the basis of kinship but on that of property. Engels cited Morgan in regard to the latter interpretation (see the end of The Origin of the Family), as well as the former. Finally, Engels modified his welcome of Morgan into the ranks of the historical materialists by asserting that Morgan's economic treatments were “durchaus ungenügend” (Origin, Preface). This plainly means that the economic factor, according to Engels, is indeed to be found in ancient society, including primitive. Engels made increase in wealth to be the decisive factor in the overthrow in ancient society of mother-right and substitution of father-right (Origin, pp. 50f.; MEW, Vol. 21, pp. 60f.). This is connected with the period of decline of gentile society; but prior to that, while gentile society was still flourishing, an economic factor brought about a change in the form of the family, leading to the introduction of father-right and slavery. This factor, according to Engels, was the acquisition of domesticated livestock as property (ib., pp. 47ff.; MEW, Vol. 21, pp. 58ff.). Engels had not worked out an internally consistent system. On the relation between the materialist conception of history and the economic factor see also George Plekhanov, The Materialist Conception of History (various eds); Plekhanov, G. V., Izbrannye Filosofskie Proizvedeniya, Vol. 2, pp. 236–266:Google Scholar “O materialisticheskom ponimanii istorii”, pp. 267–299: “Ob ‘ekonomicheskom faktore’“.

^{page 246 note 1} The Ethnological Notebooks, p. 183.

^{page 246 note 2} Marx, Kapital, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 304. See above, discussion of The German Ideology.

^{page 247 note 1} The Ethnological Notebooks, p. 183. In the excerpts from Maine's Early History, Marx made the comment: “Better weaponry is an element resting directly on progress in the means of production (these conjoin directly, e.g., in hunting and fishing with means of destruction, means of war).” (ib., p. 330) The advances in military technology of hunting and fishing peoples is directly related by Marx to the economic factor in their history, in opposition to Engels's suggestion that the economic factor be reserved to civilized peoples. The dialectical opposition in the Morgan excerpt is without temporal movement, that is, in a state of tension against temporal movement, of stored-up temporal movement, ending in the petrification of the gens-caste relation. The dialectical opposition in the Maine excerpts has a temporal movement implicit within itself, which is the progress in the means of production in hunting and fishing (technology); upon this basis the progress in military technology rests. Cf. Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 76.

^{page 247 note 2} Aristotle, Politics, 1252b. The village appears to be earlier in time than the state, but it is not clear whether the family is logically or chronologically prior to the village according to Aristotle.

^{page 247 note 3} Ib., 1253a. Elsewhere I have suggested that Aristotle, in this passage as well as in related parts of the Nicomachaean Ethics, applied the term polis in two senses: as the actual state of all men, and as the actual state of some, the potential state of others. See Krader, Lawrence, “The Anthropology of Thomas Hobbes: Violence, a Primitive Human Condition”, in: International Society for the History of Ideas, Third International Conference (Philadelphia, 1972).Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 1} Hegel, G. W. F., Die Wissenschaft der Logik, 2nd ed. (1831), Vorrede; Aristotle, Metaphysics, A, 2, 982b.Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 2} Aristotle, ib., A, 1, 981; Hegel, loc. cit.

^{page 248 note 3} Ritchie, D. G., Darwin and Hegel (1893), p. 47.Google Scholar See also the discussion of Platonic emanation in Hegel, pp. 511, and the influence of Goethe, pp. 43ff.

^{page 248 note 4} Wallace, William, Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's Philosophy, etc. (1894), pp. 118–120.Google Scholar

^{page 248 note 5} Fischer, Kuno, Leben, Hegels, Werke, und Lehre, [Geschichte der neueren Philosophic, Vol. 8], 2nd ed. (1911), pp. 221ff.Google Scholar; Haering, T. L., Hegel, , Sein Wol-len und Sein Werk, Vol. 1 (1929), pp. 313ff., 382ff.Google Scholar, and passim, has brought out the organic and social side of Hegel's developmental thought, pp. 723ff. the physical and mechanical side. Cf. also Cassirer, Ernst, The Problem of Knowledge (1950), pp. 170f.Google Scholar, for the biological side of the matter. (Here the figure of Ernst Haeckel is not well represented; for his Social Darwinism cf. Gasman, Daniel, The Scientific Origins of National Socialism, 1970.)Google Scholar

^{page 249 note 1} Darwin, Charles, The Descent of Man (Modern Library, New York, n.d.), pp. 441ff.Google Scholar In the twentieth century Darwin's thought has been re-appraised, but its meaning has not been substantively changed by Jacques Monod, Le hasard et la nécessité (1970), who has brought out as the conditions of organic systems: telenomy, autonomous morphogenesis, and reproductive invariance. It is the combination of these which expresses concretely what Darwin intended by structures “neither beneficial nor injurious”.

^{page 249 note 2} Darwin, The Origin of Species, op. cit., p. 64 (see preceding note).

^{page 249 note 3} MEW, Vol. 30, p. 131, letter dated December 19, 1860.

^{page 249 note 4} Ib., p. 578, letter dated January 16, 1861.

^{page 250 note 1} Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring, E. Burns tr. (New York n.d.), pp. 80f.

^{page 250 note 2} Engels, Dialectics of Nature, op. cit., p. 210.

^{page 250 note 3} Cp. The Ethnological Notebooks, Introduction, passim.

^{page 251 note 1} Heinrich Cunow, “Die Ökonomischen Grundlagen”, loc. cit.; idem, Zur Urgeschichte der Ehe und Familie, op. cit.

^{page 251 note 2} Hermann Duncker, Vorbemerkung, in F. Engels, Der Ursprung, etc. (1931).

^{page 251 note 3} Morgan, , Ancient Society (1907), p. 475.Google Scholar Cf. also Part III, Ch. 1. Here Morgan rejects, as Darwin had, any thought of design or teleology.

^{page 251 note 4} Engels, Origìn, op. cit., pp. 51ff.; MEW, Vol. 21, pp. 62ff. Cf. Kovalevsky, M. M., Tableau des origines et de l'évolution de la familie et de la propriété (1890).Google Scholar

^{page 251 note 5} Engels, Origin, op. cit., p. 107; MEW, Vol. 21, p. 116.

^{page 251 note 6} Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, op. cit., p. 422.

^{page 252 note 1} Kovalev, S. I., “Znachenie ‘Proiskhozhdeniya sem'i’ F. Engel'sa v izuchenii antichnogo obshchestva”, in: Problemy istorii dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestv, Vol. 5 (1935), Nos 7–8, pp. 87–89.Google Scholar

^{page 252 note 2} Engels, , Origin, p. 55;Google Scholar MEW, Vol. 21, p. 65. This bears upon the situation at the decline of the gentile society. However, property and its disposition was considered by Engels to be the active factor in social transformation at earlier stages as well. Cf. p. 244, note 2, above. Engels, following Morgan, regarded the family as the active principle, systems of consanguinity the passive (Engels, op. cit., pp. 26–27; MEW, Vol. 21, pp. 37f.; Morgan, op. cit., p. 444). This contradicts the idea that property is the active factor, but without resolution by Engels.

Marx, , Excerpts from Morgan, The Ethnological Notebooks, p. 112Google Scholar, wrote in this connection: “Ebenso verhält es sich mit politischen, religiösen, juristischen, philosophischen Systemen überhaupt.” (See Engels, op. cit., p. 27.) It is utter nonsense to think that Marx had in mind the family as the active factor, the political, religious (the order is different in Engels), juridical, philosophical systems in general as the passive. The economic factor is implicit here, applied both to primitive and civilized societies without distinction. Engels did not establish the full and proper meaning of Marx in this case. The matter was set in order by Engels in his letter to Joseph Bloch, September 21, 1890, which was first published in Der Socialistische Akademiker, Vol. 1, No 19, October 1, 1895 (MEW, Vol. 37, pp. 462–465). It has been commented upon by Masaryk, Th. G., Wolt-mann, L., Mehring, Franz, Hermann Greulich, E. R. A., Seligman, and Sim-khovitch, V. G.. Seligman (The Economic Interpretation of History (1902), pp. 64–65)Google Scholar called attention to the coeval publication of the letter in Leipziger Volkszeitung, 1895, No 250. Engels wrote: “Die ökonomische Lage ist die Basis, aber die verschiedenen Momente des Überbaus – politische Formen des Klassenkampfs und seine Resultate – Verfassungen, nach gewonnener Schlacht durch die sie-gende Klasse festgestellt usw. – Rechtsformen, und nun gar die Reflexe aller dieser wirklichen Kämpfe im Gehirn der Beteiligten, politische, juristische, philosophische Theorien, religiöse Anschauungen und deren Weiterentwicklung zu Dogmensystemen, üben auch ihre Einwirkung auf den Verlauf der geschicht-lichen Kämpfe aus und bestimmen in vielen Fällen vorwiegend deren Form.” See also Engels to Conrad Schmidt, August 5, 1890 (MEW, Vol. 37, pp. 435–438) and Oct. 27, 1890 (ib., pp. 488–495); to Franz Mehring, July 14, 1893 (MEW, Vol. 39, pp. 96–100); to W. Borgius (not H. Starkenburg), Jan. 25, 1894 (ib., pp. 205–207; cp. p. 580).

^{page 253 note 1} Engels, Origin, pp. 96f.; MEW, Vol. 21, pp. 105f.

^{page 253 note 2} Morgan, op. cit., p. 265.

^{page 253 note 3} Morgan, op. cit., p. 267.

^{page 254 note 1} The Ethnological Notebooks, p. 210.

^{page 254 note 2} Ib., pp. 292f. 294f., 308f., 310f. The subjective side of interest in relation to the objective side is treated by Marx in Ökonomisch-Philosophische Manuskripte, Die Heilige Familie, Grundrisse, and Kapital, Vol. 3, Part 2.

^{page 254 note 3} Ib., p. 329.

^{page 255 note 1} Ib.

^{page 255 note 2} Engels, Origin, p. 161; MEW, Vol. 21, p. 171. Earlier, at the end of Ch. 3 (The Iroquois Gens) Engels wrote: “The lowest interests – mean greed, brutal sensuality, filthy avarice, selfish theft of the common wealth – consecrate the new, civilized, class society; the most despicable means – stealing, violence, perfidy, treachery – undermine the old classless society and bring about its fall.” (MEW, Vol. 21, p. 97) Here all the subjectivities are gathered together. It is not that the subjective judgment of Engels has intervened, for this is a noble inspiration; rather, the motives attributed to those who separated from the ancient classless group are entirely subjective, and the process of undermining and overthrow of the gentes is depicted by Engels in entirely subjective terms. The objective side – accumulation of property, changing social relations, changing relations to nature – are listed elsewhere by Engels; they are listed in a somewhat perfunctory manner, taken from Morgan. They are not interrelated among themselves, nor are they related to the subjective factors. The listing of the latter is nevertheless a notable service by Engels, for generally those who call themselves Marxists are contented with seeking out the objective factors alone, the “iron laws”, etc., as though mankind was without an internality. The interests are likewise listed by Engels on their subjective side alone. As we have seen, they were related as both subjective and objective by Marx; most so-called Marxists treat exclusively of the objective side of the interests. Again, we are in Engels's debt for having recalled this side of human life in society.

Engels had taken up the problem of greed in an earlier context: “The riches of the neighbors excites the greed of peoples to whom the amassing of wealth

^{page 256 note 1} Ib., p. 19; MEW, Vol. 21, p. 30.

^{page 256 note 2} Dawkins, William Boyd, Early Man in Britain (1880)Google Scholar; Engels, , “Zur Urgeschichte der Deutschen”, in MEW, Vol. 19, pp. 425ff.Google Scholar

^{page 257 note 1} Ib., pp. 37 ff.; MEW, Vol. 21, pp. 48ff., citing Lorimer Fison and Howitt, A. W., Kamilaroi and Kurnai (1880).Google Scholar

^{page 257 note 2} Childe, V. Gordon, Social Evolution (1951).Google Scholar My own research has shown that a system of kinship, the Omaha, may be evolved in more than one way.

^{page 258 note 1} Morgan, op. cit., pp. 561ff. Cf. Engels, op. cit., pp. 162f.; MEW, Vol. 21, pp. 172f. Marx, , The Ethnological Notebooks, p. 139Google Scholar, noted Morgan's passage on property. When Morgan commented that the civilization (of property) is but a fragment of man's time on earth, Marx wrote: “und zwar sehr kleines“; but he assigned no special place to this thought. Engels turned this Utopian set-piece of Morgan into his own peroration.

^{page 258 note 2} Morgan, op. cit., pp. 126, 256, 259, 282; Engels, op. cit., p. 96.

^{page 258 note 3} The Ethnological Notebooks, p. 207. Bertrand de Jouvenel, Power (1952), Ch. 5, continues the distinction between dux and rex.

^{page 259 note 1} For Marx on Cuvier, cf. Kapital, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 478. See his letter to Engels, March 25, 1868, in Selected Correspondence, 2nd ed. (1965), p. 201.Google Scholar See also, in reference to Engels and Cuvier, The Ethnological Notebooks, Introduction; Engels, Origin, op. cit., p. 27; MEW, Vol. 21, p. 38.

^{page 259 note 2} MEW, Vol. 3, p. 6. Engels published these notes of Marx, written early in 1845, as an appendix to his own Ludwig Feuerbach. Engels made insignificant changes in the text quoted (capitalization, semi-colon, etc.). N. Rotenstreich, who has written a learned and balanced commentary on the Theses, has rendered the last quoted word, Verhältnisse, as “conditions”; this is not appropriate, being neither apt nor usual. Here the meaning “relations” is restored. The reason for this is seen in Marx's continuation of the sixth thesis: “Feuerbach, who does not go into the critique of this actual essence, is therefore forced: 1. to abstract from the historical course and fix the religious temperament for itself, and to presuppose an abstractly – isolatedly – human individual. 2. The essence can therefore be taken only as ‘genus’, as inner, silent universality, which binds many individuals naturally together.” The abstraction that Feuerbach made posits an isolated individual, the opposite of the individual in his social relations. The isolation is not the opposite of a condition, its overcoming is the establishment of a relation. Marx opposed Feuerbach's “genus” for the latter had conceived this as the universal which naturally binds the many individuals. According to Feuerbach, the bond is not social but natural (Marx's emphasis), to which Marx opposes the social. Man is an ensemble of that which is not isolated but linked together, related. The linkage then serves as the condition sine qua non of social life; but it must first be established. Rotenstreich omitted this step (Rotenstreich, Nathan, Basic Problems of Marx's Philosophy (1965), pp. 69–78).Google Scholar

^{page 259 note 3} Böhm-Bawerk, E. v., Marx, Karl and the Close of his System, and Hilferding, Rudolf, Böhm-Bawerk's Criticism of Marx, Sweezy, P. M. ed. (1966). Cf. Hilferding, pp. 132f., and Ed. Introd., p. xx.Google Scholar

^{page 260 note 1} Some of these places are given in Krader, “Critique dialectique de la nature de la nature humaine”, loc. cit.

^{page 260 note 2} From the Preface to the English edition of The Communist Manifesto (1888).

^{page 260 note 3} Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887). Lukács, op. cit., p. 310, has brought out the relation of Tönnies to Marx regarding the impact of social, economic and technical relations upon the form and content of ideas, their history, etc. A defense of Marx's solution of the average rate of profit, in connection with his theory of value in economics, against the attacks by the Austrian and German economists (as Böhm-Bawerk, see above), was included in the 1911 edition (Part 1, § 40). His contribution, however, as compared with that of L. von Bortkiewicz, his contemporary, has passed more or less unnoticed, and with reason. See P. M. Sweezy ed., Introd., loc. cit.

^{page 261 note 1} Tönnies, op. cit., Part 4, § 9. The relation of the -ism to the practice, of the ideology of the commune to the social reality, of the ideology of society to the social practice and relations of society, is implicit in the terms communism, socialism. Tönnies made a step forward by positing his part of the problem. He cannot be said to have advanced his conception of it very far, still less to have resolved the relation between the fact of community and of society on the one side, the ideology raised upon those facts, communism and socialism, on the other. In the period since he wrote, no one else appears to have done so. The opposition of community and society is today somewhat clearer than it was at the time that he wrote, the opposition of individualism and communism /socialism is no clearer. The relation of communism to socialism was left unclear, pragmatic, by Engels, and there it rests. – Cp. Masaryk, Th. G., Die philosophischen und sociologischen Grundlagen des Marxismus (1899) (1963), p. 185.Google Scholar Here, Feuer-bach's “Gemeinmensch = Communist”; Marx's “Mensch ist ‘Gesellschafts-mensch’”. But the parallel of Gemeinschajt and Gesellschaft was overlooked (ib., p. 203). Further, Masaryk attributed to Marx the position that the individual consciousness is illusory, the collective consciousness alone is real (pp. 184ff.). Contra Masaryk: Labriola, Antonio, Essais sur la conception matérialiste de l'histoire, 2nd ed. (1902), pp. 279–313Google Scholar (Rivista Italiana di Sociologia, May 1899).

^{page 262 note 1} “Briefwechsel zwischen Vera Zasulič und Karl Marx”, D. Rjazanov ed., in: Marx-Engels Archiv, Vol. 1 (1926), pp. 309–342.Google Scholar

^{page 262 note 2} Marx's excerpts from Morgan, The Ethnological Notebooks, passim.

^{page 262 note 3} S. I. Kovalev, loc. cit. (cf. p. 252, note 1, above), p. 96, expressed the objections to the theory of the Asiatic mode of production then current in the Soviet Union: it was the theory of counterrevolutionary Trotskyism; and it served as the basis for the historical development of the Orient as separate, “original”.

^{page 262 note 4} The Ethnological Notebooks, pp. 58ff.

^{page 263 note 1} Krader, L., “Transition from Serf to Peasant in Eastern Europe“, in: Anthropological Quarterly, Washington, Vol. 33 (1960), pp. 76–90.Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 2} The literature on this subject is very large. For Russia see Carsten Goehrke, Die Theorien über Entstehung und Entwicklung des “mir” (1964).

^{page 263 note 3} Excerpts from Lubbock, The Ethnological Notebooks, pp. 343, 421.Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 1} Kovalevsky, M. M., Obshchinnoe Zemlevladenie (Moscow, 1879), pp. 93f.Google Scholar On landownership in common (in principle) down to English period in India, see Marx, Excerpts from Kovalevsky, op. cit., IISG, Notebook B 140, p. 73.

^{page 264 note 2} Marx, ib., pp. 34f.

^{page 265 note 1} Kovalevsky, op. cit., pp. 75f.; Marx, op cit., p. 29.

^{page 265 note 2} Marx, Kapital, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 54. See also Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 75–77.

^{page 266 note 1} Engels, , “Fränkische Zeit,” in MEW, Vol. 19, p. 474.Google Scholar

^{page 266 note 2} Engels, , “Die Mark”, in MEW, Vol. 19, p. 318.Google Scholar

^{page 266 note 3} Engels, , “Ergänzung und Nachtrag zum III. Buch des ‘Kapital’”, in: Die Neue Zeit, Vol. 14 (1895–1896), Nos 1 and 2, reprinted in MEW, Vol. 25, pp. 897ff.Google Scholar; see p. 906.

^{page 267 note 1} Kovalevsky had proposed that India, particularly at the time of the Mogul Empire, had a feudal regime in the western European sense. Marx advanced the following against this proposal: “Weil sich ‘Beneficialwesen’, ‘Weggabe von Aemtern auf Pacht’ [dies doch durchaus nicht bloss feudal, teste Rom] und Commendatio in Indien findet, findet Kovalevsky hier Feudalismus im west-europäischen Sinn. Kovalevsky vergisst u.a. die Leibeigenschaft, die nicht in Indien und die ein wesentliches Moment. [Was aber die individuelle Rolle des Schutzes (cf. Palgrave), nicht nur über unfreie, sondern auch über freie Bauern betrifft – durch die Feudalherrn (die als Vogte Rolle spielen), so spielt das in Indien geringe Rolle mit Ausnahme der Wakuf] [von der dem romanisch-ger-manischen Feudalismus eignen Bodenpoesie (see Maurer) findet sich in Indien so wenig wie in Rom. Der Boden ist nirgendwo noble in Indien, so dass er etwa unveräusserlich an roturiers wäre!] Kovalevsky selbst findet aber einen Haupt-unterschied selbst: keine Patrimonialgerichtsbarkeit, namentlich bezüglich des Civilrechts im Reich der Grossmoguls.” Of the five main points raised by Marx, the first brings in Rome together with Mogul India and feudal western Europe; there is nothing particularly feudal about selling or letting of offices. The fourth point is to the opposite effect: the mystique of life on the land was no more found in India than in Rome; the land was indeed alienated in India to speculators in that commodity. Three remaining points determine the absence in India of fundamental institutions of western European feudalism: serfdom, service of individuals as bailey or Vogt over peasants free or bound (save in regard to the religious foundation, the waqf), and patrimonial jurisdiction, particularly in civil law. One set of arguments points to common features as between India and Rome in the first case including feudal Europe, in the second excluding it. The second set of arguments continues to exclude Indian from European historical practice. The entire direction of Marx's argumentation is toward the separation of Indian from European history. It is not in point, therefore, to think of a general category of feudalism, with one variant of it in western Europe and another in Mogul India. India shares with ancient Rome certain features, Rome is in turn separate from European feudalism as an epoch of society, history, culture, mode of production, etc., and from Oriental society. The entire line of Marx in this matter is against universal schemes of periodization of human history. (Marx, Excerpts from M. Kovalevsky, Obshchinnoe zemlevladenie, op. cit., IISG, Notebook B 140, p. 67. The Russian translation of Marx's excerpts from Kovalevsky, published in Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie, 1958, Nos 3–5, and Problemy Vostokovedeniya, 1959, No 1, is generally sound. It has rendered Marx's phrase “keine Patrimonialgerichtsbarkeit” as “otsutstvie patrimonial'noy yustitsii” (Kovalevsky's phrase) (Sov. Vostokovedenie, 1958, No 5, p. 12Google Scholar; Kovalevsky, op. cit., p. 153). The matter cannot be left there: it is not the lack of patrimonial justice but the lack of the patrimonial jurisdiction in the civil law of the Mogul Empire that Marx brought out. The reference to justice is to the abstraction, that to Gerichtsbarkeit is to the concretion.) – On Phear and Maine see The Ethnological Notebooks. These considerations may help to bring to an end any doubts as to Marx's considered and repeated statements that Asian history, society and mode of production are different from the West European.

^{page 268 note 1} Engels, Origin, pp. 158f. See Part 1 of this Section, above.

^{page 268 note 2} Ib., pp. 471, 145f. There is a basis here for multilinear evolutionism, but this was not brought out by Engels.

^{page 268 note 3} Wittfogel, K. A., Oriental Despotism (1962), pp. 382ff.Google Scholar Engels avoided reference to an Asiatic particularity in the English edition of the Communist Manifesto (1888). Here, in the first footnote to Ch. 1 he wrote of landownership in common by village communities “from India to Ireland”, and related this phenomenon to the gens of Morgan. The emphasis here is therefore on generality rather than particularity. In the Preface to the Russian edition of the Manifesto (1882), written jointly with Marx, the emphasis was placed on the particularity of Russian development, from a “form of the primeval common landownership to the higher form”.

^{page 269 note 1} Engels, , Anti-Dühring, p. 206.Google Scholar Engels turned to the phrase “thousands of years“ no less than three times in writing of the primitive communities in their relation to the history of India, the Slavs, Russia, and the Oriental despotism generally. Engels, Origin, p. 143, alludes to labor slavery of classical antiquity, and to domestic slavery of the Orient (MEW, Vol. 21, p. 150).

^{page 269 note 2} Wittfogel, op. cit., p. 384.

^{page 269 note 3} Ib., p. 386.

^{page 270 note 1} Marx, Kapital, Vol. 3, op. cit., Part 1, pp. 259–260.

^{page 270 note 2} MEW, Vol. 25, pp. 906, 910f. (see above, p. 266, note 3).

^{page 270 note 3} See above, p. 251, notes 5 and 6.

^{page 270 note 4} Marx, Kapital, Vol. 3, 3rd ed. (1911), Part 1, p. 156.

^{page 270 note 5} Kapital, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 54.

^{page 270 note 6} Kapital, Vol. 3, ib., note.

^{page 271 note 1} Wittfogel, op. cit., Ch. 7, passim.

^{page 272 note 1} Ib., pp. 324ff.