World politics is commonly referred to as anarchic, meaning that it lacks a common government. Yet a Hobbesian “war of all against all” does not usually ensue: even sovereign governments that recognize no common authority may engage in limited cooperation. The anarchic structure of world politics does mean, however, that the achievement of cooperation can depend neither on deference to hierarchical authority nor on centralized enforcement. On the contrary, if cooperation is to emerge, whatever produces it must be consistent with the principles of sovereignty and self-help.

In a recent paper, Barry Buzan disputes the widespread theory that associates a liberal international economic structure positively, and a mercantilist structure negatively, with international security. We do not take issue with Buzan's arguments on this point; rather we disagree with some of his assumptions concerning the relationship between mercantilistic policies and the international economic order. Those of Buzan's points that we question represent generally accepted views in the literature on mercantilism

Buzan's definition of mercantilism focuses essentially if not exclusively on protectionist trade policies. We prefer a more general definition based on Keynesian and post-Keynesian literature. By including the macroeconomic goals of neomercantilism, this definition accounts for a country's foreign economic policy.

If a “structural” theory is one that purports to explain behavior in terms of environmental conditions and that largely eschews analysis of the internal processes of decision makers, then it is difficult to identify a theory of commercial policy which is not “structural.” Most microeconomic theory is structural; so are most balance-of-power theories. In the realm of theories of commercial policy, hegemonic stability theories as well as some recently developed theories of international tariff levels fit this description. In the latter category Judith Goldstein's work, which attempts to account for American commercial policy in terms of the ideology of American central decision makers, and Charles Kindleberger's ambitious sketch of a general theory of 19th-century tariff changes in terms of the diffusion of liberal ideology constitute lonely examples of nonstructural research strategies.

The recent revival of the discipline of political economy challenges purely economic explanations of economic growth, technological innovation, and sectoral change. This approach recognizes that political actors, institutions, and strategies to organize the economic process together shape the economic development of industrial societies. Whereas economists have emphasized determinants of growth such as savings and investment rates, degrees of domestic and international competition in an industry, or the supply of labor, the new political economists view the political definition of property rights, the nature of state intervention in the economy, the resources of politically mobilized groups, and political actors' belief systems as critical determinants of economic transformations. Both economists and political economists, however, share the assumption that actors are rational; they pursue their interests in a calculated manner within a given system of institutional constraints.

Like two gigantic waves, the oil shocks crested over the advanced industrial world during the 1970s. The relatively stable postwar petroleum regime, managed by the large oil firms and protected by American diplomatic and military strength, collapsed. In seven years crude oil prices, adjusted for inflation, increased more than 500 percent. A multitude of national security, economic, and political challenges confronted the advanced industrial states. But unlike war, where the threat is observable and lines of conflict quickly become apparent, the oil shocks cast up problems that were more insidious—problems of energy security, economic adjustment, and industrial competitiveness. These international dilemmas could be defined in various ways, and a host of policy responses could be brought to bear upon them.

Rarely has an issue in the field of international political economy aroused more controversy than the role of the state in economic development. Much of the debate centers on theories of dependency which portray the state as a captive of the “universal standards” of international markets, constrained by its position in the international capitalist economy. In response to this provocative stance, there has been a recent renaissance of theories which see the state as a prominent force in the contemporary world economy. Numerous authors from a wide ideological spectrum have endorsed this argument. In their view, the state is not a helpless puppet subject to the whims of international capital and a comprador bourgeoisie. On the contrary, it is a key economic player capable of using international capital to forward its own interests.