Views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Stanley Foundation.

¹ The Treaty of Tlatelolco's negotiating process was completed in 1967 and the nuclear-weapon-free zone came into force in 1969 when the requisite number of nations completed ratification.

² Report of the Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC), INFCE, January 1980.Google Scholar

³ The author explores INFCE results with particular relevance to institutional development of the nuclear fuel cycle in Latin America in “Latin America: Policy Options Following INFCE,” in Next Steps After INFCE, U.S. International Nuclear and Nonproliferation Policy, Jones, Rodney, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 03 1980).Google Scholar

⁴ The rationale for this idea is discussed in greater depth in a Stanley Foundation Conference report, Conference on Nonproliferation: 1980s,29 01–3 02 1980,Vienna, Austria.Google Scholar

⁵ The United States remains unenthused over the IAEA as a principal forum for post-INFCE discussions as it would confront considerable criticism over its supply policy. Moreover the United States could not expect to dictate to the Board of Governors the terms of reference for a committee of whole. Instead the U.S. has supported an alternative approach of a group of experts to advise the Director General.

⁶ Treaty of Tlatelolco, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 15 August 1978, Testimony of Charles van Doren, ACDA, p. 23.Google Scholar

⁷ For a thorough review and analysis see Perez-Lopez, Jorge F., “The Cuban Nuclear Power Program,” Cuban Studies (01 1979). It is of note that in May 1980 the Soviet Union and Cuba signed a new agreement for nuclear cooperation in several areas.Google Scholar

⁸ Testimony of Bushnell, John, Department of State, Treaty of Tlatelolco, op. cit., pp. 27–28.Google Scholar

⁹ The charge of pressure on the Joint Chiefs of Staff was groundless as published testimony, from earlier Protocol II hearings and the more recent Protocol I hearings, amply illustrated that DOD preferences were taken into full account in the U.S. interpretation. It is a point of fact the U.S. interpretation accompanying our earlier Protocol II ratification was largely drafted (with DOD's assistance) to meet DOD concerns. The Department of State's recommended declaration (to be made as part of the U.S. ratification of Protocol I) included a statement that “understandings and declarations attached by the U.S. to its ratification of Additional Protocol II would apply also to its ratification of Protocol I.” Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Message from the President, 24 May 1978.

¹⁰ Treaty of Tlatelolco, op. cit., Testimony of van Doren, p. 35.Google Scholar

¹¹ Memorandum by OPANAL Secretary General Gros Espiell to the U.S. Department of State, 7 February 1980.Google Scholar

¹² Alfonso García, Robles, “Las Relaciones Diplomaticas Entre Mexico y el Brazil,” Foro Jnter-nacional IV (1963–1964): 371.Google Scholar

¹³ Marini, Ruy Mauro, Olga Pellicer de, Brody, “Militarismo y Desnuclearizacion en America Latina. El Caso de Brazil,” Foro International 8 (07–09 1967): 1.Google Scholar

¹⁴ U.N. Centre for Disarmament, Fact Sheet 11, General Assembly Resolutions on Disarmament—1979 Session.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See, for example: Epstein, William, “A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Africa,” and Alley, Roderic, “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: The South Pacific Proposal” (Muscatine, IA.: The Stanley Foundation, 1975)Google Scholar; alos Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Vantage Conference Report (Muscatine, IA.: The Stanley Foundation, 1975).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See, for example: Fontaine, Roger W., Theberge, James D., eds., Latin America's New Internationalism (New York: Praeger, 1976)Google Scholar and Lowenthal, Abraham F. and Fishlow, Albert, Latin America's Emergence (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 02 1979).Google Scholar

¹⁷ The new energy linkages between Latin American and energy producing countries (i.e., Brazil and Iraq) have a potential to create an entirely new quality of relationships. However Latin American nations are seeking to develop coordinated approaches to energy problems through OLADE.

¹⁸ “Latin America: Emerging Nuclear Market,” Nuclear News, September 1979Google Scholar. For equally optimistic assessments by Latin Americans see Crespi, M. B. A.: “La Energia Nuclear en America Latina: Necesidades y Possibilidades,” Interciencia 4, 1 (01–02 1979)Google Scholar; Alonso, Marcelo, “Inter-American Cooperation in Nuclear Energy” Juan Barreda Delgado, “Nuclear Power in America—General Scope” both the latter papers were presented to the American Nuclear Society's Executive Conference,Pan-American Nuclear Technology Exchange,Miami,April 1979.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The New York Times, 9 December 1979, 24 April, 5 May 1980.Google Scholar

²⁰ Hispano (Mexico City), 21 01 1980 (special issue on Mexican nuclear energy prograr).Google Scholar

²¹ Nuclear News, February 1980.Google Scholar

²² Nucleonics Week, 24 January 1980.Google Scholar

²³ For example: Dalmau Costa, Director General, Mexican Institute for Nuclear Research, “Transfer of Technology and the Fuel Cycle,” paper prepared for the American Nuclear Society's Executive Conference,Pan-American Technical Exchange,April 1979,Miami, FloridaGoogle Scholar; and Antonio Gonzalez de, Leon, “Las Relaciones Mexico-Estados Unidos: el Caso de la Energia Nuclear,” Foro International 19, 2 (10–12, 1978).Google Scholar

²⁴ For a recent description of the Tlatelolco Treaty see Alfonso García, Robles, The Latin American Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone, Stanley Foundation Occasional Paper 21, May 1979.Google Scholar

²⁵ Juan Eivenschutz, “Energy Situation and the Outlook for Nuclear Power in Mexico,” paper prepared for the American Nuclear Society's Executive Conference,Pan-American Technical Exchange,April 1979,Miami, Florida.Google Scholar

²⁶ Nucleonics Week, 24 January 1980.Google Scholar

²⁷ Mexico oil leverage on the U.S. and related issues are discussed in The Stanley Foundation, Conference on International Issues: Mexico and the U.S.,Vantage Conference Report,June 1980.Google Scholar

²⁸ Electrical Week, 18 July 1979. Another source provides a different picture for 1979: thermal 59.9 percent, hydro 26.5 percent, nuclear 8.1 percent (Latin American Weekly Report, 15 February 1980).Google Scholar

²⁹ Nuclear Fuel, 12 November 1979. Yellowcake production of 1000 metric tons is set for 1984.Google Scholar

³⁰ La Nacion (Buenos Aires), 6 October 1978Google Scholar; Nuclear News, September 1979.Google Scholar

³¹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS, Worldwide Report, Nuclear Development and Proliferation, 28 March 1980, p. 36.Google Scholar

³² The ambiguity of Argentine statements is revealed in statements by CNEA President Castro Madero: “We are de facto full scope safeguards—when we in the future build a reprocessing plant that will also be under safeguards from the very moment fuel from either the research reactors or Atucha comes in, because all fuel elements are under safeguards and they carry safeguards along with them” (Washington Post, 160ctober 1978). And Castro Madero: “Pilot reprocessing facility [ is] under IAEA safeguards when reprocessing safeguarded fissionable materials.” (Letter from Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, 17 September 1979—emphasis added. An inference which can be drawn from the choice of words is that Argentina would not consider its reprocessing facility as being under safeguards if it were reprocessing unsafeguarded fuel.Google Scholar

³³ The circumstances surrounding the Argentine decision to purchase the German unit are explored in greater detail in the author's “U.S. and Latin America: Policy Options Following INFCE,” op. cit.

³⁴ Madero, Carlos Castro, “Argentina. Situacion Nuclear Actual,” Esrategia (March-April 1978).Google Scholar

³⁵ COPREDAL/AR/46 and 47, 11 and 12 Feburary 1967 (working documents of the Tlatelolco Treaty Preparatory Committee).Google Scholar

³⁶ This is argued forcefully in Gugliamelli, Juan E., “Argentina Ratifica el Tratado de Tlatelolco, Mientras las Superpotencias Condicionan su Adhesion al Sugundo Protocolo Adicional,” Estrategia (May-August 1978).Google Scholar

³⁷ U.N. Document A/C.1/PV15, lO October 1967.Google Scholar

³⁸ COPREDAL/AR/41, 8 February 1967.Google Scholar

³⁹ Gugliamelli, op. cit., footnote 36. Gugliamelli's position on this is disputed by some in the Argentine CNEA as not necessarily representative. However over the years, Gugliamelli has often reflected a persuasive strain of Argentine thinking on nuclear issues.

⁴⁰ Treaty of Tlatelolco, op. cit., Testimony of van Doren, p. 21.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Treaty of Tlatelolco, op. cit., Testimony of van Doren, p. 23.Google Scholar

⁴² Latin American Economic Report, 20 July 1979.Google Scholar

⁴³ BOLSA Review, November 1979, p. 666Google Scholar; Latin American Regional Report (Brazil), 9 11 1979.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Interview with NUCLEBRAS President Nogueira Batista, 1 March 1980 (FBIS, op. cit., 15 April 1980, no. 38); Nuclear News, February 1980.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Latin American Energy Report, 13 March 1980.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Interview with Nogueira Batista, 1 March 1980 (FBIS, op. cit., 28 March 1980, no. 36).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ U.N. document A/C1/PV38, 21 November 1979.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ The Brazilian Embassy, Brazil Today, 27 November 1979Google Scholar; O Globo (Rio de Janeiro, 29 October 1979).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ The full text of the Brazil-Iraq agreement is reproduced in FBIS, op. cit., 4 March 1980, 33. Iraq officials were candid in their statements that Brazilian support for the U.N. General Assembly resolution equating zionism with racism as being an important factor in their decision to develop a nuclear relationship.

⁵⁰ FBIS, op. cit., 35, p. 18.Google Scholar

⁵¹ The Tlatelolco Treaty includes a method for managing and minimizing the political impact of an Argentine or Brazilian PNE. Article 18 restricts the means and methods whereby PNEs can be detonated in Latin America, establishing procedures which are public and calls for a distinct international presence at any such explosion by OPANAL and the IAEA. The important point is that the Treaty represents a convenient regional mechanism for containment of the military and strategic impact of a nuclear explosion in the Latin American region totally absent in other more volatile regions of the world. Moreover once having contained the effort within a set of regional procedures it might short-circuit the final step toward production of actual nuclear weapons.

⁵² A more negative speculation is that in the context of Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation Germany might encourage activities (PNE development, etc.) it feels it cannot undertake in its own national territory. The Soviet Union has, in the past, advanced such charges relative to German-Brazilian rocket development and testing in northern Brazil.