¹ UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Progress Report for 1951, Document A/1985.

² Even so, the last report of the Commission mentions that on the second point no agreement could be reached after more than three years. United Nations Review, November 1956, p. 8.

³ See Israel and the United Nations, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956, p. 100 ffGoogle Scholar.

⁴ See the factual details in Commander Hutchison's, E. H. otherwise controversial Violent Truce, New York, Devin-Adair, 1956Google Scholar.

⁵ A Security Council resolution of October 19, 1948, already mentions the latter point; see Mohn, Paul, “Problems of Truce Supervision, “International Conciliation, No. 478, 02 1952, especially p. 75–92Google Scholar.

⁶ Resolution of March 30, 1955.

⁷ Resolution of September 8, 1955.

⁸ The text of his report (Document S/3596) can be found in the United Nations Review, June 1956, p. 6.

⁹ Resolution of June 4, 1956.

¹⁰ Annex to Document S/3682.

¹¹ Israel, dissatisfied with a decision of the Jordan-Israel Commission, withdrew from it (and launched a brutal raid into Jordan). The Egypt-Israel Commission collapsed when Israel rejected Mr. Hammarskjold's thesis of “unconditional” observance, counter-attacked with its thesis of “indivisible” observance, decided to limit the freedom of movement of observers in the demilitarized zone of El Auja in retaliation for th e blockade of Israel-bound shipping through the Suez Canal, and argued that since Israeli forces had occupied the demilitarized zone, there was no need for UN observers there; the Commission, which had its seat at El Auja, was paralyzed, as Israel did not give Egyptian authorities access to El Auja.

¹² Document S/3682. Text in United Nations Review, November 1956, p. 32 and 60–61.

¹³ Statement by Mr. Hammarskjold at the Security Council's 748th meeting, October 30, 1056.

¹⁴ New York Times, October 15, 1956.

¹⁵ Knesset speech, October 15, 1956.

¹⁶ 745th meeting of the Security Council, October 25, 1956.

¹⁷ In accordance with previous practices of convenient vagueness, neither the Security Council's requests the special Assembly's resolutions indicated whether the acts with which the UN was dealing were considered to be threats to the peace, breaches of the or acts of aggression. The Security Council resolution of October 31 considered “that a grave situation been created by actions undertaken against Egypt”.

¹⁸ In the Cause of Peace, New York, Macmillan Co., 1954, p. 193Google Scholar.

¹⁹ See the texts in: Subcommittee on the UN Charter, Review of the UN Charter, United States Senate, 83d Congress (2d session), Document No. 87, p. 606–672Google Scholar. See also Goodrich, and Simons, , The UN and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, Washington, the Brookings Institution, 1955, p. 408ffGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ In 1954 an Assembly debate indicated growing indifference. “Several representatives… stressed that each state would determine for itself what and how it would contribute to any collective action” (UN Yearbook, 1954, p. 22), and the Assembly merely directed the Committee “to remain in a position to pursue such further studies as it may deem desirable”.

²¹ Katzin, A. G., “Collective Security—the work of the Collective Measures Committee,” Annual Review of UN Affairs, 1952, p. 205Google Scholar.

²² Pearson, Lester B., “Force for U.N.” Foreign Affairs, 04 1957 (Vol. 35, No. 3), p. 400CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ Report of MrSpiropoulos, to the International Law Commission in The American journal of International Law, Vol. 45 (1951), Supplement, p. 119Google Scholar.

²¹ Various types of definitions have been proposed. The best survey is to be found in Pompe, C. A., Aggressive War an International Crime, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1953CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Stone, Julius, Legal Controls of International Conflicts, New York, Rinehart & Co., 1954, p. 330ffGoogle Scholar. Abstract definitions too often use words as vague as the word whose definition is attempted–words such as “war” or “self-defense”. Or else, they merely equate aggression with the use of force except in the circumstances of Article 51 or under an international mandate; this erases the politically important difference between complex and continuous situations where the search for “the” guilty party is misleading or vain, and clear-cut cases where the value-loaded concept of aggression is entirely in order. (See for instance Wright, Quincy, “The Prevention of Aggression,” American Journal of International Law, 07 1956 [Vol. 50, No. 3], p. 514ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. His discussion of self-defense, at p. 520, could be used by supporters of Israel's invasion of Egypt. This he denies in: “Intervention 1956,” American Journal of International Law, 04 1957 [Vol. 51, No. 2], at p. 271–272Google Scholar, where he takes a narrower view.) Enumerative definitions, on the other hand, are never broad enough to cover all conceivable hypotheses, but at the same time they are often broad enough to play strange tricks. It is easy to show that the Soviet definition of aggression (text in UN Yearbook, 1950, p. 210) would condemn as aggression the Soviet intervention in Hungary. In a letter to the New York Times (December 29, 1956) Mr. Mark Vishniak has shown that under the definition, in the Middle Eastern crisis, Colonel Nasser could be considered as the aggressor on six counts.

²⁵ American Journal of International Law, Vol. 45 (1951), Supplement, p. 123Google Scholar.

²⁶ On that distinction, see Association Française de Science Politique, les Fondements de la Politique étrangère, Paris, A. Colin, 1954, p. 372–57)Google Scholar, and Aron, Raymond, “Une philosophic de la politique étrangère,” Revue Française de Science Politique, 01–03 1953, p. 87–91Google Scholar.

²⁷ See Goodrich and Simons, cited above, Chapters IX–XII and XIV–XV.

²⁸ 748th meeting of the Security Council, October 30, 1956.

²⁹ The passage of the United States draft of October 30, which asked Members to refrain from aiding Israel, was dropped and replaced in the November 1 resolution by a request to Members to refrain from “introducing military goods in the area of hostilities”. The resolution also noted the disregard of the armistice agreements “by parties”.

³⁰ On this point, see “The Storm Center,” Political Quarterly, 04–06 1957 (Vol. 28, No. 2), p. 101–106Google Scholar.

³¹ Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly, January 24, 1957. Text in United Nations Review, March 1957, p. 56.

³² Thus, the rather weak and impartial mediation exercised by the UN during the first Indonesian conflict had ended in disaster for the Republic of Indonesia; when the Dutch, for the second time, tried to impose their own solution by violence, the Security Council, in a series of resolutions, switched in effect from pure conciliation to a mixture of mediation and coercion of the Netherlands. Resolutions of December 24 and 28, 1948, and January 28, 1949.

³³ Goodrich and Simons, cited above, p. 378ff. Only during the Negeb crisis of October–November 1948, when the Security Council referred to Chapter VII of the Charter, had a withdrawal been asked (but not obtained). The requests for withdrawal were made in terms which left much leeway to the Acting Mediator (resolutions of October 19, November 4 and November 16, 1948). In the second Indonesian conflict, the Council accepted the principle of a withdrawal of Dutch forces from the territory occupied, thanks to the new “police operation”, but implementation of this principle was left to the UN Commission in Indonesia.

³⁴ See the record of the 57d plenary meeting of the Assembly (First Emergency Special Session, November 10, 1956). Mr. Nixon emphasized again the importance of a settlement of underlying issues in his speech of December 6, 1956.

³⁵ During the second Indonesian conflict, the end of military operations and the restoration of the Republic—i.e. the measures tending to wipe out the gains made by the Netherlands through the use of force—were linked to continued negotiations toward a political settlement, whose main lines were defined in the same Security Council resolution. When the Council in the summer of 1948 forced the Arabs to accept first a cease-fire and later a permanent truce, the mediator was simultaneously negotiating with the parties over the substantive issues; he was in fact recommending important concessions from Israel.

³⁶ There was an inherent contradiction between the Secretary-General's policy of absolute observance of the armistice and his decision to give a sort of privileged position to certain articles, by “lifting the cease-fire clause out of the armistice agreements”. (See note 8; see also the Secretary-General's report of September 12, 1956, in United Nations Review, 11 1956, p. 60)Google Scholar. Mr. Hammarskjold himself suggested in three of his reports or memoranda in answer to Israeli questions that the Israelis' desire to see the Gulf of Aqaba open to their ships could not be fulfilled unless they scrupulously observed the other provisions of the armistice agreements (reports of January 24 [United Nations Review, March 1957, p. 59], February 10 [United Nations Review, March 1957, p. 60–61], and note of February 25, 1957 [United Nations Review, April 1957, p. 23].

³⁷ See note 31.

³⁸ Carroll, Lewis, Through the Looking Glass, New York, Macmillan Co., p. 26Google Scholar.

³⁹ New York Times, March 30 and April 9, 1957.

⁴⁰ “Report of February 10 (see note 36).

⁴¹ Resolution of September 1, 1951, concerning Israel-bound shipping. (See: “The Security Council and the Suez Canal,“ International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1952 [Vol. 1, part 1], p. 85–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.)

⁴² These were the terms used by MrLodge, in the Assembly on March 1, 1957 (United Nations Review, 04 1957, p. 13Google Scholar) and by MrEisenhower, in his letter to MrGurion, Ben (New York Times, 03 3, 1957)Google Scholar. On the role of the United States at this stage, see the Economist, 03 2, 1957, p. 701Google Scholar, and Schmidt, D. in the New York Times, 03 7, 1957, p. 7Google Scholar.

⁴³ Note of February 25, 1957 (see note 36).

⁴⁴ The resolution of November 4, 1956, asked the Force to “secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the… resolution” of November 2 (which referred to the withdrawal, the end of raids, and the scrupulous observance of the armistice provisions. The Secretary-General has expressed the desire to obtain arrangements which will entrust the functions of the Truce Supervision Organization on the Egyptian-Israeli border to UNEF (report of January 24. Report of March 7, United Nations Review, 04 1957, p. 16)Google Scholar. MrHammarskjold's, visit to Egypt does not seem to have produced many results (see New York Times, 03 25, 1957)Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ See note 43.

⁴⁶ The Secretary-General has indicated that the force's functions will be to prevent acts of belligerency, “subject to the qualification that UNEF is never to be used in such a way as to force a solution of any controversial or legal problem” (see note 42). Previously he had stated that UNEF “is not to be deployed in such a way as to protect any special position or (controversial) questions, although at least transitionally, it may function in support of mutual restraint in accordance with the foregoing”. (See note 30.)

⁴⁷ MrsMeir's, statement in the Assembly, March 1, 1957 (United Nations Review, 04 1957, p. 12)Google Scholar. The United States in its memorandum of February 11 (text in New York Times, 02 18, 1957)Google Scholar, has declared itself prepared to exercise its right of free passage. This was not a guarantee.

⁴³ See the official Egyptian statement in the New York Times, March 16, 1957.

⁴⁹ See MrFawzi's, speeches in the Assembly on November 27 (New York Times, 11 28, 1956, p. 10Google Scholar) and February 2 (New York Times, February 3, 1957. p. 22). It is one thing to reject the view according to which UNEF should be a weapon of pressure on Egypt, coercing Egypt into concessions on both the deep underlying issues and on the intermediate ones (the original Anglo-French position, joint statement of November 3, letters of November 5, was close to such a view; a change came on November 6, when Sir Anthony Eden announced in the House of Commons his acceptance of the UN terms). It is quite another thing to reduce UNEF to being “a background for efforts toward resolving… pending problems”.

⁵⁰ See the Assembly speeches of February 2, 1957 (United Nations Review, March 1957, p. 32–33) and February 26 (United Nations Review, April 1957, p. 9–10). He stated that the task of UNEF had to be clearly denned by the UN; that the Assembly should affirm the right of free navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba; that the Assembly should take measures against new raids from the Gaza Strip and establish a transitional international regime on the Strip until a final agreement on the fate of this territory had been reached by the parties, under UN responsibility.

⁵¹ To take one example: Mr. Hammarskjold suggested that after Israel's withdrawal behind the armistice lines, the provisions of the November 2 resolution which urged the parties to desist from raids across the armistice lines and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements would gain “added importance”. (Report to the Assembly, January 16, 1957: United Nations Review, February 1957, p. 20). Mr. Pearson agreed that Israel's withdrawal was “first in order of priority”, but he stressed that a “middle course” could be found, in which withdrawal would be accompanied by arrangements “which will take effect only after Israel has accepted… to withdraw”, but which would have been decided before.

⁵² See Lehrman's, Hal argument in “The U.S. and Israel,” Commentary, 03 1957, p. 206–208Google Scholar.

⁵³ Similarly, Egypt obtained both a withdrawal of UNEF from the Canal before freedom of navigation had been restored and a delay in Canal clearing operations until after Anglo-French evacuation—two victories which did not at all follow from the November 2 resolution. This resolution (“all” the terms of which were supposed to be observed by UNEF according to the resolution of November 4—see note 44) urged that “upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation”. See the Economist, November 17, 1956. P. 575–576, December 8, p. 850 and 859, and December 29, p. 1114–1115.

⁵⁴ Most of the resolutions of last fall asked the Secretary-General to report on implementation; this opened the way for an explanation of the obstacles which were delaying implementation, and for suggestions aimed at removing such obstacles, as the Economist observed on January 26, 1957, p. 267.

⁵⁵ See in particular MrLodge's, speeches of January 28 and February 2, 1957 (United Nations Review, 03 1957, p. 30, 31)Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Economist, March 2, 1957, p. 735.

⁵⁷ MrMenon's, speech in the Assembly, December 10 (United Nations Review, 01 1957, p. 11–12)Google Scholar; draft resolution submitted by Ceylon, Indonesia and Burma on December 10.

⁵⁸ See Drummond, R. in the New York Herald Tribune, 12 17, 1956Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Lewis, Bernard, “The Middle Eastern reaction to Soviet pressures,“ Middle East Journal, Spring 1956 (Vol. 10, No. 2)Google Scholar; and Holte, R. H., “Year of Decision in the Middle East,” Yale Review, Winter 1957. p. 228–244Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ At the end of a debate concerning Israel's work on the river Jordan at the Syrian border, UN Year-book, 1953, p. 224–233.

⁶¹ Security Council, 749th–750th meetings, October 30, 1956; the Soviet Union proposed as a draft resolution part of a United States draft which France and England had vetoed. Lippmann's, Walter comments, New York Herald Tribune, 11 1, 1956Google Scholar.

⁶² Economist, November 10, 1956, p. 403.

⁶³ Julius Stone, cited above, p. 266ff.

⁶⁴ See footnote 57. It took some subtle prodding from the Secretary-General to get the “Special Committee” of investigation on Hungary established by the Assembly; MrHammarskjold's, report of January 5 (United Nations Renew, 02 1957, p. 7–8Google Scholar) suggested such a committee “under somewhat broader terms of reference“ (by comparison with previous resolutions). (This indicates, incidentally, how similar prodding of the Assembly over Middle Eastern affairs might have operated: 24 nations sponsored a resolution which implemented the Secretary-General's proposal). The quiet dropping of the suggestion to use diplomats in Hungary as observers was a symptom of many nations' fear of stepping even lightly on the bear's toe.

⁶⁵ Osgood, Robert E., Limited War, University of Chicago Press, 1937, p. 208ffGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁶ Hoffmann, Stanley, “The Role of International Organization: Limits and Possibilities,” International Organization, 08 1956 (Vol. 10, No. 3), p. 361–364CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁷ Hence, for instance, the shelving of the two United States draft resolutions of November 1, the vagueness of the resolution of February 2 (a price the United States had to pay in order to obtain Indian and Indonesian co-sponsorship) and the lack of any resolution at the end of February.

⁶⁸ See the communique published by the prime ministers of India, Indonesia, Ceylon and Burma, New York Times, November 15, 1956.

⁶⁹ MrPineau's, speech in the General Assembly, New York Times, 11 23, 1956Google Scholar; Spaak, Paul-Henri, “The West in Disarray,” Foreign Affain, 01 1957 (Vol. 35, No. 2), p. 184–190CrossRefGoogle Scholar; MrLloyd's, speech at the UN association dinner, New York Times, 06 1, 1957Google Scholar; articles by Father Bruckberger and Reinhold Niebuhr, Reporter, December 29 and March 7, respectively.

⁷⁰ In fact the terms used toward the Soviet Union by the UN resolutions are much harsher.

⁷¹ Speech of February 20, 1957, New York Times, February 21.

⁷¹ Unpublished lecture at Harvard University, February 25, 1957.

⁷³ Eban, Abba, Assembly debate November 4, 1956, United Nations Review, 12 1956, p. 36Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ United Nations Review, January 1957, p. 10.

⁷⁵ See footnote 57.

⁷⁶ See footnote 57.

⁷⁷ The fact that the Soviets, as Lippmann, Walter has stressed (New York Herald Tribune, 11 15, 1956)Google Scholar do act in the main outside of the UN has already led the United States to take the initiative outside the UN; for example, the “Eisenhower doctrine” and its quite elastic use in the Jordanian crisis.

⁷⁸ Compare his “The New UN and the Revisions of the Charter,” Review of Politics, 01 1954 (Vol. 16, No. 1), p. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and his articles in the New Republic, December 10 and 17, 1956 and January 7, 1957.

⁷⁹ See Lippmann, Walter, New York Herald Tribune, 02 2, 1957Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ Gaitskell, H., The Challenge of Coexistence, Harvard University Press, 1957CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸¹ To prevent: In colonial affairs, certain policies of repression by western nations are ruled out by the fear of UN intervention. To stop: Cease-fires have been obtained regularly by the UN. To legitimize: The partition of Palestine in 1947–48 is the best example.

⁸² For such criticisms see: “The Real Police Force,” Round Table, No. 186, 03 1957, p. 103–106Google Scholar; or Lord Cherwell's well-publicized speech (see Krock's, A. column in the New York Times, 04 24, 1957Google Scholar; or Halle, Louis J., “A Touch of Nausea,” New Republic, 01 21, 1957Google Scholar; or Beloff, Max, “Suez and the British Conscience,” Commentator, 04 1957Google Scholar.

⁸³ Speech by MrDulles, , New York Times, 08 3, 1956Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ Sir Pierson Dixon's argument that “we felt confident that we should have the general support of the UN for what we are doing” indicated a grudging acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the UN. 748th meeting of the Security Council, October 30, 1956.

⁸⁵ I. L. Claude, cited above, p. 242.

⁸⁶ See MrPineau's, speech at the first London conference, New York Times, 08 17, 1956Google Scholar; Huang, Thomas T. F., “Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question,” American Journal of International Law, 04 1957 (Vol. 51, No. 2)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Georges Scelle, “La nationalisation du Canal de Suez et le droit international,” and Linto, Roger, “l'affaire de Suez,” Annuaire Francais de Droit International, 1956, p. 3–45Google Scholar; ProfessorFriedmann's, letter to the New York Times, 12r 8, 1956, p. 3Google Scholar; and ProfessorPinto's, study in Le Monde, 10 3, 1956, p. 3Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ See Mostofi, Khrostow, “The Suez Dispute,“ Western Political Quarterly, 03 1957 (Vol. 10, No. 1)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸⁸ Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan and Japan.

⁸⁸ This point is particularly well made in Wint, G. and Calvocoressi, P., The Middle East Crisis, London, Penguin Books, 1937Google Scholar. The clumsy argumentation of England and France in the Security Council on October 30 and 31 is criticized in “After the Cease-fire,“ Round Table, 12 1956, No. 185, p. 3–7Google Scholar; the fact that the intervention was presented as definitely not linked to the Suez nationalization issue, in particular, made it even easier for the Assembly to separate the various inter-connected problems.

⁹⁰ Similarly, if all procedures of adjustment fail and conciliation seems to lead nowhere, a fatal clash can still be averted if western nations are ready to defened their interests through all methods of pressure short of war; see Nutting's, Anthony argument in the New York Herald Tribune, 01 18, 1957Google Scholar.

⁹¹ Mr. Pearson has made excellent suggestions to that effect, and even though the danger of preparing once more for the previous explosions is strong, there is more need for supervisory mechanisms than for collective security planning. Mr. Pearson brings us back to the idea that states should earmark contingents for UN use.

⁹² See Bokhari, Ahmed S., “Parliaments, Priests and Prophets,“ Foreign Afairs, 04 1957 (Vol. 35, No. 3), p. 405CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Canada and lie UN, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956, Chap. 6Google Scholar.

⁹³ “Foreign Policy and Presidential Moralism,” The Reporter, May 2, 1957, p. 10–14.

⁹⁴ For a discussion of the issue, see Gaitskell, H., cited above, and Brzezinski, Z. K., “U.S. foreign policy in East Central Europe,” Journal of International Affairs, 1957 (Vol. XI, No. 1), p. 60–71Google Scholar.