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‘Rewarding Impatience’ Revisited: A Response to Goodrich

  • Lisa Blaydes (a1)

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In “Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC” (International Organization, Spring 2004) I presented a theoretical model that suggested that in strategic situations where a bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisoners' dilemma, impatient actors earned better outcomes than their more patient rivals. I also modeled the division of cartel profits in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons, and found that there is some threshold level for which states that discount the future more heavily tend to receive better production offers than those that do not. The critique presented in Goodrich deals with the final section of the article, which presents the results of statistical analysis testing the implications of these theoretical models.I am grateful to Jeff Lewis, Drew Linzer, and Ken Schultz for suggestions and advice. Many thanks to Thomas Plümper for sharing the computer code for his procedure to analyze fixed effects with time-invariant covariates in Stata. The usual disclaimers apply.

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REFERENCES

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Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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International Organization
  • ISSN: 0020-8183
  • EISSN: 1531-5088
  • URL: /core/journals/international-organization
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