An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., 22 March 1980. Research in India during 1977–78 was generously supported by a Shell International Studies Fellowship, by a Duke University Dissertation Travel Grant, and by a fellowship from the University of California at Berkeley Professional Studies Program. My special thanks go to the Lok Sabha (Parliament) Secretariat and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry for granting access to their archival holdings. For detailed criticisms of earlier drafts, I am grateful to Robert Keohane, Ronald Rogowski, and Louis Wells. For errors of fact or interpretation that remain, I alone am culpable.

¹ This estimate of investments during the late 1970s is based on sketchy data provided in the several country studies cited below. Since much of this is happening at the fringes of local law and is of recent origin, available dataware very likely to underestimate substantially the size of Third World foreign direct investment. For example, the International Monetary Fund's Balance of Payments Yearbook (1979) lists no direct investment abroad by Indian firms. For a recent attempt to compile available data, see Wells, Louis T. Jr., “Multinationals from Latin American and Asian Developing Countries: How They Differ,” mimeo, Harvard Business School, 1981.Google Scholar

Throughout this study, the term “Third World” will be used to refer to the economically less-developed and oil-producing countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

² Data on foreign-owned manufacturing plants controlled by nonresident Third World firms are currently being gathered by the Harvard Business School project on Third World multinationals, directed by Louis T. Wells, Jr. In all, some 1900 manufacturing, extractive, and service subsidiaries have been identified, each with foreign equity participation in excess of 20%. (These figures were generously supplied by Professor Wells.)

³ For comparisons using incomplete data on investments based in various countries, see United Nations, Commission on Transnational Corporations, Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-Examination (E/C. 10/38), 20 March 1978.Google Scholar

⁴ Reported in Louis Wells, T. Jr., “The Internationalization of Firms from Developing Countries,” in Agmon, Tamir and Kindleberger, Charles P., eds., Multinationals from Small Countries (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), p. 133.Google Scholar

⁵ For general surveys of Indian foreign investors, see Gopal Agrawal, Ram, “Third World Joint Ventures: Indian Experience,” in Kumar, Krishna and McLeod, Maxwell G., eds., Multinationals from Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981), pp. 115–32Google Scholar; Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, India's Joint Ventures Abroad (New Delhi: IIFT, 1978)Google Scholar; and Balakrishnan, K., “Indian Joint Ventures Abroad: Geographic and Industry Patterns,” Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay): Review of Management, 29 May 1976, pp. M35–M48Google Scholar. Additional sources include “Indian Multinationals Spring Fresh Drive into Asian Markets,” Business Asia (Hong Kong and New York), 19 December 1980, pp. 404–5Google Scholar; Chaudhry, N. G., “Joint Ventures Abroad,” Indian and Foreign Review, 1–14 04 1980, p. 4Google Scholar; “The New Multinationals,” Business India (Calcutta), 20 August and 2 September 1979, pp. 33–35 and 44–47Google Scholar; “Indian Companies as Foreign Investors: Partners and Competitors,” Business Asia, 15 December 1978, p. 400Google Scholar. For more information, see fn. 16 below.

⁶ For general surveys of foreign investors from the Third World, see Wells, Louis T. Jr., “Foreign Investors from the Third World,” in Kumar and McLeod, Multinationals from Developing Countries, pp. 23–36Google Scholar; Wells, , “Third World Multinationals,” Multinational Business (Economist Intelligence Unit, no. 1, 1980), pp. 12–19Google Scholar; and Heenan, David A. and Keegan, Warren J., “The Rise of Third World Multinationals,” Harvard Business Review, 01-02 1979, pp. 101–9.Google Scholar

For general surveys of Latin American foreign investors, see White, Eduardo, “The International Projection of Firms from Latin American Countries,” in Kumar, and McLeod, , Multinationals from Developing Countries, pp. 155–86Google Scholar; White, Eduardo, Campos, J., and Ondarts, G., Las Empresas Conjuntas Latinoamericanas (Buenos Aires: Institute for Latin American Integration [INTAL], 1977)Google Scholar; Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos F., “Foreign Direct Investment by Latin Americans,” in Agmon, and Kindleberger, , Multinationals from Small Countries, pp. 167–95Google Scholar; and UNCTAD, Joint Ventures Among Latin American Countries by Antonio, Casas-Gonzalez (TD/B/AC.19/R.2 and Corr. 1), 22 10 1975.Google Scholar

For general surveys of Asian investors, grouped by country, see Chen, Edward K. Y., “Hong Kong Multinationals in Asia: Characteristics and Objectives,” in Kumar, and McLeod, , Multinationals from Developing Countries, pp. 79–100Google Scholar; Wells, Louis T. Jr., “Foreign Investment from the Third World: The Experience of Chinese Firms from Hong Kong,” Columbia Journal of World Business, Spring 1978, pp. 39–49Google Scholar; Jo, Sun-Hwan, “Overseas Direct Investment by South Korean Firms: Direction and Pattern,” in Kumar, and McLeod, , Multinationals from Developing Countries, pp. 53–78Google Scholar; Ten-Lee Ting and Chi Schive, “Direct Investment and Technology Transfer from Taiwan,” in ibid., pp. 101–14; Kumar, Krishna, “The Third World Multinationals: A Study of Taiwanese Firms,” mimeo, East-West Center, Honolulu, 1980Google Scholar; and UNCTAD, Joint Ventures Among Developing Asian Countries by Agrawal, Ram Gopal (TD/ B/AC.19/R.7 and Corr. 1), 1 10 1975.Google Scholar

⁷ See Kidron, Michael, Foreign Investments in India (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), esp. pp. 185–224.Google Scholar

⁸ For a survey of evidence, see Kumar, Krishna, “Multinationalization of Third-World Public Sector Enterprises,” in Kumar, and McLeod, , Multinationals from Developing Countries, pp. 187–201.Google Scholar

⁹ This comparison of Indian investors with Latin American and other Asian entrepreneurs has benefited from Wells, “Multinationals from Latin American and Asian Countries.”

¹⁰ Reuber, Grant L. et al., Private Foreign Investment in Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press for the OECD, 1973)Google Scholar; Vernon, Raymond, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises (New York: Basic Books, 1971)Google Scholar; Franko, Lawrence, The European Multinationals (New York: Harper & Row, 1976)Google Scholar; Yoshino, M. Y., Japan's Multinational Enterprises (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).Google Scholar

¹¹ For host-country studies of Third World investment in Asia, grouped by country, see: Lecraw, Donald J., “Internationalization of Firms from LDCs: Evidence from the ASEAN Region,” in Kumar, and McLeod, , Multinationals from Developing Countries, pp. 37–52Google Scholar; Kian-Wie Thee, “Indonesia as a Host Country to Indian Joint Ventures,” in ibid., pp. 133–44; Wells, Louis T. Jr. and Warren, V'Ella, “Developing Country Investors in Indonesia,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 15 (03 1979): 69–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Busjeet, Vinod, “Foreign Investors from Less-Developed Countries: A Strategic Profile,” DBA thesis, Harvard Business School, 1980Google Scholar; Luey, Paul, “Hong Kong Investment,” in Hughes, Helen and Seng, You Poh, eds., Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Singapore (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp. 112–39Google Scholar; Paul Luey and Ung Gim Sei, “Taiwan Investment,” in ibid., pp. 140–53; and Lecraw, Donald J., “Direct Investment by Firms from Less Dveloped Countries,” Oxford Economic Papers 29 (11 1977): 442–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Host country considerations relevant to Latin American foreign direct investment are discussed in the general surveys of Latin American investors cited in fn. 6 above.

¹² See Nambudiri, C. N. S. et al., “Third-World-Country Firms in Nigeria,” in Kumar, and McLeod, , eds., Multinationals from Developing Countries, pp. 145–54Google Scholar; UNCTAD, Joint Ventures Among African Countries by Okigbo, Pius N. C. (TD/B/AC.19/R.3), 12 10 1975Google Scholar; UNCTAD, Joint Ventures Among Arab Countries by Shihata, Ibrahim (TD/B/AC.19/R.5), n.d.Google Scholar

¹³ For reviews of theory and evidence, see Wells, , “Firms from Developing Countries,” pp. 145–57Google Scholar; and Wells, , “Investors from the Third World,” pp. 25–31Google Scholar. Of the various theories explored by researchers, the product-cycle model figures prominently; for more detail, see Vernon, Raymond, “International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 (05 1966): 466–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ The range of home market constraints and incentives that may spur investment abroad by Third World firms is outlined in Wells, , “Firms from Developing Countries,” pp. 135–36.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For a more extensive examination of these issues, see Encarnation, Dennis J., “A Rationalist Theory of Collection Action and the Policy Process: The Political Economy of Capital-State Relations in India,” Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1980.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Unless otherwise noted, data for this section were derived from two sources: Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Report on Workshop on Indian Joint Ventures and Turnkey Projects Abroad (New Delhi: FICCI, 1977), Annexure I, pp. 37–78 (hereafter referred to as FICCI, Workshop)Google Scholar; and Indian Investment Centre, Joint Ventures Abroad (New Delhi: IIC, 1977), Annexure VII, pp. 71–101 (hereafter referred to as IIC, Joint Ventures).Google Scholar

¹⁷ IIC, Joint Ventures, p. 16.

¹⁸ Estimates vary around the figure of Rs. 200 million, before conversion. See FICCI, Workshop, p. 24; also “Indian Companies,” Business Asia, p. 400. By 1979, 110 Indian joint ventures valued at U.S. $;35 million were in production abroad; see Agrawal, , “Indian Experience,” p. 128.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Of course, as Wells notes, the presence of ethnic minorities of subcontinent origin residing in the host country may also have deleterious effects; see his “Multinationals from Latin American and Asian Countries,” pp. 5–6.

²⁰ Estimates vary around the figure of Rs. 490 million, before conversion; see FICCI, Work-shop, p. 18. By 1979, 87 projects valued at U.S. $;50 million were still under implementation; see Agrawal, , “Indian Experience,” pp. 123, 128.Google Scholar

²¹ Rs. 20 million (approx. U.S. $;2.4 million) in dividends and Rs. 40 million (approx. U.S. $;4.8 million) in technical know-how and engineering fees; see “Indian Companies,” Business Asia, p. 400. By 1979, repatriated earnings were estimated at U.S. $;10 million; see Agrawal, , “Indian Experience,” p. 129.Google Scholar

²² Balakrishnan, , “Indian Joint Ventures,” pp. M35–M48Google Scholar; also discussed below.

²³ For a summary of studies, see Wells, , “Foreign Investors from the Third World,” pp. 26–31.Google Scholar

²⁴ Nayyar, Deepak, India's Exports and Export Policies in the 1960's (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 196, 366Google Scholar; Balakrishnan, , “Indian Joint Ventures,” p. M45.Google Scholar

²⁵ The single most important characteristic of large-scale private capital in India is its organization into a small number (often estimated at roughly 75) of business or industrial houses, each of which tightly controls a large number of firms and, hence, a significant proportion of private capital. The term “business house” originally referred to the managing agency system (or holding company) adopted by British and then Indian capital to maintain control over an expanding number of diversified business concerns. Ties of family, religion, caste, language, and region have also reinforced financial and managerial controls. For more details, see Misra, B. B., The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in Modern Times (London: Oxford University Press, 1961)Google Scholar. Rank orderings of business house assets reported below are derived from the Economic Times (Bombay), 14 February 1977, p. 4.Google Scholar

²⁶ IIFT, India's Joint Ventures Abroad, pp. 80–81.

²⁷ IIC, Joint Ventures, p. 19; these data probably assume (fallaciously) that lump-sum payments will be made in the same year as purchase. For further discussion of the size and scope of India's exports of technology, see Lall, Sanjaya, “Developing Countries and the Emerging International Technological Order,” Journal of International Affairs 33 (Spring/Summer 1979): 79–83.Google Scholar

²⁸ Data in IIC, Joint Ventures, Annexure XII, pp. 111–13.

²⁹ Diaz-Alejandro, , “Investment by Latin Americans,” p. 173Google Scholar; Sung-Hwan, Jo, “Investment by South Korean Firms,” pp. 73–74.Google Scholar

³⁰ Diaz-Alejandro, , “Investment by Latin Americans,” p. 173.Google Scholar

³¹ Nayyar, , India's Export Policies, pp. 219–95.Google Scholar

³² Lecraw, , “Direct Investment by Finns,” pp. 445–46.Google Scholar

³³ ibid., pp. 450–56; Wells, and Warren, , “Developing Country Investors,” pp. 71–79Google Scholar; Bus-jeet, , “Foreign Investors,” pp. 156–232Google Scholar; Lecraw, , “Internationalization of Firms,” pp. 43–49.Google Scholar

³⁴ Wells, , “Multinationals From Latin American and Asian Countries,” pp. 7–11.Google Scholar

³⁵ Nayyar, , India's Export Policies, pp. 22–28, 356–71.Google Scholar

³⁶ ibid., pp. 23, 358, 366; the following discussion of the market distribution of Indian engineering goods is derived from ibid., 190–94.

³⁷ Busjeet, , “Foreign Investors,” pp. 46, 57Google Scholar; Lecraw, , “Direct Investment by Firms,” p. 444Google Scholar; Singh, D. R., “Capital Budgeting and Indian Investment in Foreign Countries,” Management International Review 17, 1 (1977): 101–110.Google Scholar

³⁸ Balakrishnan, , “Indian Joint Ventures,” p. 2Google Scholar; IIFT, India's Joint Ventures, pp. 44–45. This policy was adjusted by the Janata government during 1977 to allow selected outflows of capital following an improvement in India's balance of payments (see below).

³⁹ India (Republic), Parliament, House of the People, Estimates Committee, 1967–68, Ninth Report, Fourth Lok Sabha (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1967), p. 237Google Scholar; Estimates Committee, 1971–72, Fourteenth Report, Fifth Lok Sabha (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1972)Google Scholar; Estimates Committee, 1973–74, Fifty-Fourth Report, Fifth Lok Sabha (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1974), pp. 47–52.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Nayyar, , India's Export Policies, pp. 201–9Google Scholar; Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and Desai, Padma, India: Planning for Industrialization (London: Oxford University Press for the OECD, 1970), pp. 281–474Google Scholar; Bhagwati, Jagdish N. and Srinivasan, T. N., Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: India (New York: Columbia University Press for the NBER, 1975).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Economic Times (Bombay), 9 December 1977, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁴² For a more detailed discussion of the Indian state as principal financier, see Encarnation, , “Capital-State Relations in India,” pp. 91–99.Google Scholar

⁴³ Business Asia (Hong Kong and New York), 27 March 1981, p. 103Google Scholar; this new, fully government-owned corporation is expected to act as the main coordinating body for export finance and export promotion institutions.

⁴⁴ Economic Times (Bombay), 6 December 1977, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For a discussion of taxation policies and their effects at home and abroad, see FICCI, Workshop, pp. 29, 31–34.

⁴⁶ For a review of the services provided, see IIC, Joint Ventures, pp. 34–35, 103–27.

⁴⁷ Data on exports of Indian capital goods were derived from the following sources: India (Republic), Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, Monthly Statistics of the Foreign Trade of India: Supplement, Volume II, Trade by Countries for Twelve Months Ended March 1968 (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1970)Google Scholar, and Monthly Statistics of the Foreign Trade of India: Supplement, Volume II, Trade by Countries for Twelve Months Ending March 1972 (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1974).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Note that total exports, and exports of manufactures and of capital goods, increased in current and absolute value over this period; exports of capital goods merely increased at a faster rate relative to total exports generally and manufactured exports specifically.

⁴⁹ These included Indonesia (host to the second largest number of Indian joint ventures), Thailand, the Philippines, Fiji, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Uganda, and Kuwait.

⁵⁰ Lecraw, , “Direct Investment by Firms,” p. 454, table VIGoogle Scholar. However, the relationship between trade and investment may be attenuated when domestic and foreign demand for machinery outstrips supply. Busjeet (“Foreign Investors,” pp. 46, 61–63) found that exports of capital goods to Indian joint ventures operating in Mauritius and the Philippines were less than expected when Indian machinery manufacturers were not suffering from a recession.

⁵¹ ibid., pp. 46, 57–58; Lecraw, , “Direct Investment by Firms,” pp. 444–45.Google Scholar

⁵² IIFT, India's Joint Ventures, pp. 74–75; other policies cited were the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of 1973 and corporate taxation policies.

⁵³ Busjeet, , “Foreign Investors,” pp. 57–58.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ There are several rationales for these manipulations. First, data on abandonment are so varied as to defy systematic evaluation (see IIFT, India's Joint Ventures, pp. 80–83; Bala-krishnan, , “Indian Joint Ventures,” pp. M38–M40)Google Scholar. Furthermore, such data would shed little light on our understanding of which firms and interests have the most to gain financially from the government policies examined here. Second, among those service industries excluded from the analysis, consultancy and construction ventures will be examined in detail below in the discussion of the interests of public sector enterprises in joint ventures abroad. And third, most government policy pronouncements designed to promote joint ventures abroad refer to India's shared experience with the economically less-developed countries of Africa and Asia; thus, our focus is on these countries alone.

⁵⁵ Wells, , “Firms from Developing Countries,” pp. 138–39.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ TELCO (Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co.) started with a license, terminated in 1967, from Daimler-Benz; the German firm still maintains a 14% nonvoting equity. For further details, see Lall, Sanjaya, “Vertical Inter-Firm Linkages in LDCs: An Empirical Study,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 42 (08 1980), pp. 209–10.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ The extent of foreign ownership in this firm is itself in dispute; for possible resolution of the controversy, see Eastern Economist [Calcutta]: Annual Number 1969, 13 December 1968, p. 1191.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Of course, as Wells has noted (“Firms from Developing Countries,” pp. 138–39), this technology was probably modified subsequent to acquisition in response to new factor prices. Still, the initial advantage was gained as a result of foreign collaboration to serve the home market.

⁵⁹ IIFT, India's Joint Ventures, p. 39; Busjeet, , “Foreign Investors,” pp. 61–63.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ FICCI, Workshop, p. 24; the plant was constructed in Kenya.

⁶¹ Agrawal, , “Indian Experience,” p. 126.Google Scholar

⁶² IIC, Joint Ventures, p. 14.

⁶³ Balakrishnan, , “Indian Joint Ventures,” p. 10.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ IIC, Joint Ventures, p. 14; “Indian Companies,” Business Asia, p. 400.

⁶⁵ Lall, , “International Technological Order,” pp. 79–83Google Scholar; note that the Indian financial press is replete with articles detailing actual and potential subcontracting deals.

⁶⁶ FICCI, Workshop, pp. 37, 45, 48, 57.

⁶⁷ For further details, see Encarnation, , “Capital-State Relations in India,” pp. 80–90Google Scholar; also see Reserve Bank of India, Foreign Collaboration in Indian Industry: Second Survey Report, 1974 (Bombay: Reserve Bank of India, 1975), pp. 80–131Google Scholar; India (Republic), Parliament, House of the People, Committee on Public Undertakings, 1975–76, Eighty-Ninth Report: Foreign Collaboration in Public Undertakings, Fifth Lok Sabha (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1976), passim.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ IIC, Joint Ventures, p. 27; FICCI, Workshop, pp. 77, 80.

⁶⁹ IIC, Joint Ventures, pp. 26–27; data on HMT technical collaborations in India can be found in India (Republic), Directorate General of Technical Development, Handbook of Industrial Data: 1975 (New Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1975), p. 283.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ “The 500 Largest Industrial Corporations Outside of the U.S.,” Fortune, 14 August 1978, p. 171Google Scholar; for other BHEL activities abroad, see Lall, , “International Technological Order,” p. 80.Google Scholar

⁷¹ The following information is derived from IIC, Joint Ventures, pp. 26–28.

⁷² Bombay Suburban Electric Supply, Ltd., the Killick-controlled MRTP company, was awarded a subcontract for the supply of the transmission network.

⁷³ Detail drawn from Economic Times (Bombay), 27 December 1977, pp. 1, 4.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ For criticism in Parliament by leftist MPs, see India (Republic), Parliament, Joint Committee on the Foreign Exchange Regulation Bill, 1972, Report (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1973), minutes of dissent, esp. p. xxv.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Government equity participation in TELCO, for example, was estimated at 42%; participation in Tata business house generally approached 33%. Likewise, government equity participation in other business houses operating joint ventures abroad—including Birla and Shri Ram—approached 20 to 25%. For further evidence and documentation, see Encarnation, , “Capital-State Relations in India,” pp. 86–109Google Scholar, especially tables 3-10 and 3-11.

⁷⁶ For lists of participants and the workshop agenda, see FICCI, Workshop, pp. 1–16.

⁷⁷ Economic Times (Bombay), 19 February 1978, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ A recent slump in foreign exchange earnings has led the new Congress government to reconsider this liberalization; see Business Asia, 1 May 1981, p. 143.Google Scholar

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⁸⁰ India (Republic), Parliament, Joint Committee on the Foreign Exchange Regulation Bill, 1972, Evidence (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1973), especially testimony from the Indo-German and Indo-American Chambers of Commerce, pp. 407–13, 431–46Google Scholar; also, practically every issue of Business Asia during 1972–73 contained warnings about FERA.

⁸¹ Editorial in Economic Times (Bombay), 22 December 1972, p. 5.Google Scholar

⁸² See, for example, Economic Times (Bombay), 20 May 1971, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁸³ The Programme provided training in India for technical personnel from Africa and Asia, deputation of Indian experts to countries in these areas, and contributions of certain equipment and essential commodities to overseas development projects.

⁸⁴ FICCI, Correspondence and Relevant Documents Relating to Important Questions Dealt with by the Federation During the Year 1969 (New Delhi: FICCI, 1970), pp. 41–42.Google Scholar

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⁸⁶ As a result, Sri Lanka was ranked tenth in terms of the number of joint ventures in operation during 1977 even though it was the third-largest importer of Indian engineering goods during 1970–71 (Nayyar, , India's Export Policies, p. 193).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Childers, Erskine, “Technological Co-Operation Among Developing Countries: History and Prospects,” Journal of International Affairs 33 (Spring/Summer 1979), p. 33.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Lall, , “International Technological Order,” pp. 77–79Google Scholar. The export of technology by Third World enterprises has begun to attract much attention; see, for example, Lall, Sanjaya, Developing Countries as Exporters of Technology (London: Macmillan, 1981).Google Scholar