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International Cooperation in a Changing World: A Challenge to United States Foreign Policy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2009
Extract
It was above all to avoid the recurrence after World War II of threats to world peace and order that the United States set out to design and bring into being the United Nations and the congeries of related agencies. “From the very beginning,” says the report of the American delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, “the problems of post-war peace and security were paramount.” This seemingly obvious observation is not as trivial as it may sound, for it is a benchmark by which to measure the transformation that has occurred in the character, emphases, and achievements of the United Nations. It will no longer do to say, as was once possible, that the UN's value can be judged solely by its success in avoiding international conflict. Today, the United Nationsvery likely would command American attention and participation even if it had no utility in the realm of peace and security.
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References
1 Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State, June 26, 1945 (Department of State Publication 2349, Conference Series 71) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 21Google Scholar.
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6 Philip E. Mosely has commented on this. See his “The Soviet Union and the United Nations” in Padelford, and Goodrich, (ed.), pp. 303–304Google Scholar.
7 Except, of course, for the famous “walkout” from the Security Council over the Iranian issue in 1946 and the “boycott” of the Security Council because of the continued seating of the Republic of China (Nationalist China) in 1950.
8 See Weiler and Simons, p. 223.
9 Indeed, with the exception of United Kingdom forces in the Cyprus operation, forces of all permanent members of the Security Council have been excluded. On the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) decision see Frye's, William R. dramatic account in A United Nations Peace Force (New York: Oceana Publications [under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], 1957), p. 12Google Scholar; and Rosner, Gabriella, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 118–119Google Scholar.
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14 In his contribution later in this volume.
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16 If the Great Powers sit benignly on the sidelines, the burdens for others may increase. As Inis Claude points out in his contribution later in this volume, the history of UN peace maintenance activities does not lend much comfort to the belief that successful UN intervention can be mounted without material and political leadership by the United States.
17 Carl Kaysen has recently written along these lines. See his “American Military Policy” in Survival, 02 1969 (Vol. 11, No. 2), pp. 51–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar, reprinted from Carl Kaysen, “Military Strategy, Military Forces, and Arms Control,” in Kermit Gordon (ed.), Agenda for the Nation (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 549–584.
18 As this is written in April 1969, Moscow and Washington seem to be searching for the bases of collaboration. It remains to be seen whether this purpose or their competitive objectives will prevail.
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21 Security Council Resolution 255 (1968), June 19, 1968.
22 See Professor Aspaturian's interesting observation later in this volume about Soviet resort to the Security Council when its “policy is oriented toward accommodation and détente with the United States.”
23 See, e.g., China, the United Nations and United States Policy: An Analysis of the Issues and Principal Alternatives with Recommendations for U.S. Policy, a report of a National Policy Panel established by the United Nations Association of the United States of America (New York: United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1966)Google Scholar.
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26 This is obviously a very truncated synopsis of—even an allusion to—a very complicated history of change. A complete analysis would have to deal with such questions as: the effects of colonial issues on United States relations with its Western European allies and the changes in the “postcolonial” era; the proposed Nordic alliance which led to Norway and Denmark joining NATO and Sweden continuing its “neutrality”; the imbroglio with the United Kingdom leading to the Suez crisis of 1956, the Skybolt misunderstanding, and the continuing “special relationship”; the episodes over Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the controversies over peacekeeping arrangements in the Americas; etc.
27 In the 1967 General Assembly session the question of South West Africa (Namibia) was dealt with in plenary session while the Nonproliferation Treaty was “relegated to the First Committee.” See ‘Issues Before the 23rd General Assembly,” International Conciliation, 09 1968 (No. 569), p. 68Google Scholar.
28 For a recent interesting study of voting patterns see Rowe, Edward T., “Changing Patterns in the Voting Success of Member States in the United Nations General Assembly: 1945–1966,” International Organization, Spring 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 2), pp. 231–253CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
29 By Hoffmann, Stanley in Gulliver's Troubles, p. 356Google Scholar.
30 See Gardner, Richard N., In Pursuit of World Order: US. Foreign Policy and International Organisations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 67–75Google Scholar, for an official argument for the utility of the UN in this crisis.
31 Although the United States sought and obtained agreement on an OAS force to make possible its own withdrawal from the Dominican Republic, success was achieved only by the narrowest of margins.
32 See an earlier suggestion that the United States might refuse to pay assessments going beyond the “proper bounds” of the General Assembly's “competence under Article 17” in “Budgetary and Financial Problems of the United Nations,” Review of the United Nations Charter: Compilation of Staff Studies Prepared for the Use of the Sub-committee on the United Nations Charter of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Pursuant to Senate Resolution 126, 83rd Congress) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 165Google Scholar.
33 See Emerson, Rupert, “Colonialism, Political Development, and the UN,” in Padelford, and Goodrich, (ed.) pp. 129–136Google Scholar. See also his Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization (Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 9) (Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 12 1964), pp. 1–24Google Scholar. For a comparison with the original balances with respect to colonial matters see Finkelstein in Padelford and Goodrich (ed.), pp. 11–13, 23; and Finkelstein, Lawrence S., “Colonial Activities,” in Leonard, L. Larry, International Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), PP. 477–533Google Scholar.
34 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960.
35 Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
36 Emerson, Rupert, “Self-Determination,” Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 60th annual meeting, Washington, 04 28–30, 1966, p. 138Google Scholar.
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39 General Assembly Resolution 2325 (XXII), December 16, 1967.
40 It is Chapter VII which provides for Security Council measures, including the use of force, to deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression.
41 General Assembly Resolution 2403 (XXIII), December 16, 1968.
42 Security Council Resolution 232 (1966) of December 30, 1966, was the first clear imposition of sanctions against a particular country under Chapter VII of the Charter. The expanded embargoes imposed in 1968 by Security Council Resolution 253 (1968) of May 29, 1968, have been described as going beyond the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations against Italy in 1935–1936. See “Issues Before the 23rd General Assembly,” International Conciliation, No. 569, p. 71.
43 See General Assembly Resolution 2383 (XXIII), November 7, 1968.
44 On some implications of the use of collective measures to enforce change see Leiss, Amelia C. (ed.), Apartheid and United Nations Collective Measures: An Analysis (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965), pp. 74–79, 163Google Scholar.
45 It is not intended to suggest that bilateral defense arrangements or even, in some circumstances, unilateral use of force are not legitimate. There is, however, a disposition to assume that the greater the number of participants in the arrangement on which the use of force is hinged, the more legitimate it is. The UN Charter, of course, heads the pecking order. Professor Claude deals with this point in his contribution hereinafter.
46 For an early expression of this view see Castañeda, Jorge, Mexico and the United Nations (National Studies in International Organization) (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company [for El Colcgio de México and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], 1958), pp. 165–196Google Scholar.
47 Zbigniew Brzezinski has referred to “parity in non-survivability.” See his “Peace and Power,” Survival, Vol. 10, No. 12, p. 390.
48 For a different view, based in good part on the diminishing importance of any force, see Holmes, John W., “Fearful Symmetry: The Dilemmas of Consultation and Coordination in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” International Organization, Autumn 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 4), pp. 822–839CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
49 In his February 24th address to NATO President Richard Nixon paid special attention to this problem and pledged “full consultation” at least with respect to negotiations with the Soviet Union. (The New Yorl Times, February 25, 1969.)
50 The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), for example, has said:
Its aim is an equitable European order on the basis of peaceful agreements, an order in which all nations can live together freely and as good neighbours. After all, the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe belong to Europe as well.
(“Note from the Federal Republic of Germany to Other Governments”) [March 25, 1966], reprinted in, e.g., Documents on Disarmament: 1966 (United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication, No.46) (Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1967), pp. 168–174. This significant statement, issued by the Ludwig Erhardt Government, marked an important step in the Federal Republic's progression of efforts toward more harmonious relations with Eastern European countries. The policy has been carried forward, indeed intensified, by the Kurt Georg Kiesinger Government. See the remarkable testimony by Chancellor, Vice and Foreign MinisterBrandt, Willy, A Peace Policy for Europe (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969)Google Scholar.
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52 Although, as Holmes, John has pointed out, the European power to prevent duopoly is limited, (International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 825.)Google Scholar
53 Or a “special relationship” between the United States and the Federal Republic.
54 In Gulliver's Troubles.
55 See, e.g., Gordon, Bernard K., “Regionalism and Instability in Southeast Asia,” in Nye, Joseph S. Jr, (ed.), International Regionalism (Boston, Mass: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 106–125Google Scholar.
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58 Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines are also SEATO members.
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62 The quote is from the Caracas Resolution. In the words of the Resolution such “domination or control … would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America.” (Ibid., p. 51.)
63 Although American intervention in Dominican Republic affairs, in the form of a naval display of force, was applauded in November 1961 when it prevented the Trujillo family's return to power. Some interventions are more interventionist than others.
64 See Slater, Jerome, “The Limits of Legitimization in International Organizations: The Organization of American States and the Dominican Crisis,” International Organization, Winter 1969 (Vol. 23, No. 1), especially p. 69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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70 The issue has been formulated this way by Morris B. Abram, a former United States representative to the UN Commission on Human Rights. The quotes are from his “United States and International Human Rights—Retrospect and Prospects” (mimeographed).
71 For a good, brief treatment of some of the issues see “Issues before the 23rd General Assembly, International Conciliation, No. 569, pp. 96–99Google Scholar. For a fuller treatment see Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, The United Nations and Human Rights (Eighteenth Annual Report) (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y: Oceana Publications, 1968)Google Scholar; and Korey, William, “The Key to Human Rights—Implementation,” International Conciliation, 11 1968 (No. 570)Google Scholar.
72 Charter of the United Nations: Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference, pp. 110—111.
73 See her essay later in this volume.
74 See Gardner, Richard N., “The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,” International Organization, Winter 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 1), pp. 115–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
75 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the International Development Association (IDA).
76 Finkelstein in Padelford and Goodrich (ed.), p. 29.
77 These issues are dealt with in the recent work by Johnson, Harry G., Economic Policies toward Less Developed Countries (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967)Google Scholar.
78 See Asher, Robert E., “Multilateral Versus Bilateral Aid: An Old Controversy Revisited,” International Organization, Autumn 1962 (Vol. 16, No. 4), pp. 697–719Google Scholar; and Coffin, Frank M., “Multilateral Assistance: Possibilities and Prospects,” International Organization, Winter 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 1), pp. 270–287Google Scholar.
79 Richard Gardner recently recalled Senator Russell Long's pertinent observation in 1964 that he was “against taxing the poor people in the rich countries for the benefit of the rich people in the poor countries.” (At a meeting of contributors to this volume and members of the Board of Editors, International Organization, March 14–15, 1969.)
80 “Emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum participation … of the people of the developing countries through die encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions.” (“Foreign Assistance Act of 1966,” in United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 80 [1966], Part 1 [Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967], p. 800.)Google Scholar
81 In a recent article Frank M. Coffin emphasized the theme and referred to the Papal injunction, “‘the new name for peace is development.’” See Coffin, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 280Google Scholar.
82 On the changing context of international law see Professor Louis Henkin's article later in this volume.
83 Delivered to the 1968 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, September 2–7, 1968.
84 Peter Kenen's article later in this volume describes the irreversible ties with the rest of the world in monetary matters.
85 Article 1, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter.