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India and Pakistan: nuclear rivals in South Asia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Onkar Marwah
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Extract

The new international nuclear regime requires accession to fullscope safeguards and an acceptance of the formal restraints imposed by the London Nuclear Suppliers Group on the worldwide availability of sensitive nuclear technology, materials, and equipment. The underside of the nuclear market, however, consists of surreptitious transfers by suppliers to special recipient states. Pakistan has capitalized on the existence of such a market to acquire the means to make nuclear weapons. Though South Asia is likely to be the first region outside of the central strategic system to harbor nuclear-armed national rivals, the situation is manageable through the imposition of innovative institutionalized constraints on the region. Neutrally conceived, these constraints can be adapted for other regions facing nuclearization. In the long run, the imbalance of capabilities between India and Pakistan will manifest itself in the nuclear field as it has in others.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , Winter 1981 , pp. 165 - 179
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1981

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References

1 Power, Paul F., “The Indo-American Nuclear Controversy,” Asian Survey XIX, 6 (06 1979): 574–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 The “scope” of fullscope safeguards has never been precisely defined, perhaps as a measure of deliberate policy. That is probably due to the fact that a finite application of the safeguards would limit the extension of the system to equipment and technology which, currently safe, might later be considered sensitive.

3 “India gets bolder on nuclear tests: they will go ahead.” Christian Science Monitor, 19 03 1980, p. 4.Google Scholar

4 For South Africa, see a monograph by Smith, Dan, South Africa's Nuclear Capability (New York: U.N. Center Against Apartheid, 02 1980).Google Scholar

5 See Smith, Colin and Bhatia, Shyam, “How Dr. Khan Stole The Bomb For Islam.” The Observer (London), 9 12 1979, p. 11Google Scholar; and “Atoms For War,” The Observer (London) 16 12 1979, p. 12.Google Scholar

6 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, If I Am Assassinated…. (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), passim.Google Scholar

7 For Pakistan, see Khalilzad, Zalmay, “Pakistan and the Bomb,” Survival XXI, 6 (11-12, 1979): 244–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for India, see, Marwah, Onkar, “India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy” International Security 2, 2 (Fall 1977): 96–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 For instance, up until May 1980 Pakistan had already received assistance worth $1,700 million from donor countries in the Islamic world. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 26 06 1980, p. 6.Google Scholar

9 General Zia ul-Haq, President of Pakistan, has denied the possibility of nuclear-related transfers to other states in the following words: “Do you honestly think we'd go around giving other people our nuclear secrets?” (quoted in Smith, Colin and Bhatia, Shyam), “How Dr. Khan Stole The Bomb For Islam.” The Observer (London), op. cit., p. 11.Google Scholar

10 It remains to be seen as to whether the transfers, if they occur, would consist only of nuclear technology and materials. Given the currently-modest levels of technical capability in states such as Libya and Saudi Arabia, the demand and the supply might well include completed nuclear weapons.

11 Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, Pakistan's Quest For Nuclear Technology The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies. Working Paper No. 19 (Canberra: The Australian National University), pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

12 Unlike for instance the well-intentioned but stillborn attempt to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia on the example of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. The institutional analogy is artificial inasmuch as South Asia, unlike Latin America, cannot be separated from areas to the north and south of the subcontinent where exist nuclear weapon powers and their armed might.