¹ This point is developed by O'Leary, Michael K., “The Nature of the Inter-American System,”; in International Organization in the Western Hemisphere, ed. Gregg, Robert W. (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1968), especially pp. 168–172.Google Scholar

² Connell-Smith, Gordon, The Inter-American System (London: Oxford University Press [under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs], 1966);Google ScholarBrams, Steven J., “Transaction Flows in the International System,” American Political Science Review, 12 1966 (Vol. 60, No. 4), pp. 880–898;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Bailey, Norman A., Latin America in World Politics (New York: Walker & Co., 1967).Google Scholar

³ For a greater elaboration see Zimmerman, William, “The Transformation of the Modern State-System: The Exhaustion of Communist Alternatives,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 06 1972 (Vol. 16, No. 2), forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle ScholarJamgotch, Nish Jr, Soviet-East European Dialogue: International Relations of a New Type? (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1968),Google Scholar also treats Soviet-East European relations as a separate international constellation.

⁴ The Communist Chinese view is vividly expressed in “Theories of ‘Limited Sovereignty’ and ‘International Dictatorship’ Are Soviet Revisionist Social-Imperialist Gangster Theories,” Peking Review, 03 28, 1969 (Vol. 12, No. 13), p. 24:Google Scholar

⁵ The quotation is from Connell-Smith, p. 252.

⁶ See Fox, William T. R., The Super Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union — Their Responsibility for Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1944).Google Scholar

⁷ Note, for example, the Radio Bucharest statement on April 10, 1969, by the minister of defense that Romania was to take steps in case of armed attack in Europe.

⁸ Korbonski, Andrzej, “The Warsaw Pact,” International Conciliation, 05 1969 (No. 513), p. 66;Google Scholar see also Herrick, R. Waring, “The Warsaw Pact, Brezhnev Doctrine, and China,” Radio Liberty Dispatch, 04 28, 1969.Google Scholar

⁹ Some of the snidest exchanges between Peking and Moscow turned exactly on this point. For a discussion of the free-rider problem in alliances see Olson, Mancur, Jr., and Zeckhauser, Richard, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” in Economic Theories of International Politics, ed. Russett, Bruce M. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968), chapter 2.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Ceausescu's statement is taken from the Yugoslav daily, Politika, January 12, 1970. Similarly, Robert Rosko, a Slovak sociologist, argued in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia that an “authentically conceived proletarian internationalism” would “imply the coexistence and collaboration of political systems with different measures of democratization.” His remarks are cited in Herrick, R. Waring, “The ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’ versus Peaceful Co-existence in Socialist States,” Radio Liberty Dispatch, November 10, 1968.Google Scholar For a somewhat different interpretation see Jowitt, Kenneth, “The Romanian Communist Party and the World Socialist System: A Redefinition of Unity,” World Politics, 10 1970 (Vol. 23, No. 1), pp. 38–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Even strategic considerations have been infused by doctrinally conditioned attention to control rather than influence; see Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1960), chapter 1.Google Scholar

¹² For a case study illustrating the significance of events in Czechoslovakia for the Soviet Union see Hodnett, Grey and Potichny, Peter J., The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Occasional Paper, No. 6) (Canberra: Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1970).Google Scholar

¹³ Cited by Wionczek, Miguel S., “Latin American Integration and United States Economic Policies,” in Gregg, p. 137.Google Scholar See by the same author, “Latin American Free Trade Association,” International Conciliation, 01 1965 (No. 551).Google Scholar On Central American integration, which the United States has clearly encouraged, see Nye, Joseph S., “Central American Regional Integration,” International Conciliation, 03 1967 (No. 562).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Applying the term “small power” to every hierarchical system member other than the regional hegemon is open to serious question if the gradations between states involve more than a simple dichotomy. For many purposes it makes sense to regard a major industrial power such as the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) or a state the size of Brazil as a middle rather than a small power. Since power is a relational concept, however, and since there is an immense asymmetry between the resources autonomously available to the super-power for foreign policy purposes and those available to any other member state, it is my assumption that the differences in relative power between similar states vis-à-vis the regional hegemon are not behaviorally relevant. What matters surely is not the differences in power terms between Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay but the nature of the regime in the state in question. In any event, as will be seen, the recent efforts in the East European context to increase the penetrability of the regional system's boundaries have come from Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian People's Republic, and Romania, states which are appropriately considered small powers by their leaders.

¹⁵ Rothstein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 25,Google Scholar says, “the Small Power is forced into an intense concentration on short-run and local matters to the exclusion of, or at least to the detriment of, any concern for long-run stability.”

¹⁶ The impact of dominant-system tension on small-power maneuverability is revealed in the remark of Mexico's Nemesio Garcia Naranjo in March 1951: Experience tells us that this is not the time to oppose the United States …. The most rudimentary instincts of self preservation advise us not to rebel [at the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs] when the colossus of the North confronts one of the greatest crises of its history. Furthermore, let us not forget that at this critical time the United States is right and girds itself with the standard of Western culture.

Nemesio Garcia Naranjo, “Los aplausos de la galeria,” Hoy, 03 31, 1951, pp. 14–15,Google Scholar quoted in Mecham, J. Lloyd, The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889–1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), p. 436.Google Scholar

¹⁷ For a similar view see Kolkowicz, Roman, ed., The Warsaw Pact: Report on a Conference on the Warsaw Treaty Organization held at the Institute of Defense Analyses, May 17–19, 1967 (Research Paper, P-496) (Arlington, Va: International and Social Studies Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, 03 1969), p. 29.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Thus, for instance, Todor Zhivkov, first secretary of the Communist party of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, has stated that: The line of our foreign policy is peace, firm unity, co-operation and mutual assistance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.… We are well aware of the fact that we are a small country, but we honestly believe that small countries can play a positive role in the international arena by means of [a] constructive and peace-loving policy.… Deviations from the principles of the socialist commonwealth would not merely decrease but would seriously undermine the international prestige of any country which yielded to nationalism and wrongly interpreted national interests. In this case, too, a small country can play an important role either [sic] it can make a considerable contribution to the unification of fraternal countries, or — willy-nilly—it will give valuable support to the activities of imperialism in the international arena. This is our interpretation of the role of small socialist countries. “The Results of Socialism Make Possible Closer Relations between Bulgaria and Hungary (An Interview with Todor Zhivkov),” from Nepszabsag, translated and published in Radio Free Europe, Hungarian Press Survey, 07 9, 1969 (No. 2019), p. 4.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See the reference to “the inquiry organized by Literarni listy by Alexander Kliment who, after having declared his faith in active neutrality, recommended that we should entrust ourselves and follow our own ideas, for ‘only a free and selfconscious nation can fulfill an international mission, in our case a European mission.’” Cited in Jaroslav Brabec, “Neutrality—Can We Afford It?” Predvoj, March 21, 1968, translated in Radio Free Europe, Czechoslovak Press Survey, 04 16, 1968 (No. 2054), p. 8.Google Scholar

²⁰ Radio Free Europe, “Czechoslovak Action Program,” Czechoslovak Press Survey, 05 20, 1968 (No. 2074), p. 60.Google Scholar The entire Action Program is reprinted in that issue; the original version appeared in Rude pravo, April 10, 1968.

²¹ While the fear of spontaneity is characteristic of those imbued with the Leninist tradition, the striking similarity in the epithets used by United States decisionmakers to characterize the Dominican Republic's former president, Juan Bosch, and Soviet characterizations of Alexander Dubcek, former head of state and party first secretary, should be noted. See especially Martin, John Bartlow, Overtaken by Events (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966).Google Scholar In Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970),Google ScholarSlater, Jerome refers to the “almost universal disdain and distrust for Bosch throughout the U.S. Government“ (p. 194).Google Scholar

²² Czechoslovak Press Survey, No. 2054, p. 60.

²³ PAP (the Polish news agency), September 9, 1968, as reported in “The Problems of Comecon,” Radio Liberty Dispatch, December 27, 1968. See also Iskra's assertion that “as a matter of fact Yugoslavia is part, not of the socialist, but of the capitalist international division of labor.” Iskra, Wieslaw, “Economic Integration of the Socialist Countries,” Zagadnienia i materialj, 01 15–28, 1969, reprinted in Radio Free Europe, Polish Press Survey, 04 16, 1969 (No. 2129), p. 14.Google Scholar See also Yuryev, N., “Aggressive Essence of the ‘Peaceful Infiltration’ Strategy,” International Affairs (Moscow), 12 1968 (No. 12), p. 17:Google Scholar Proposals are made to draw the East European countries into other economic organisations (OECD, IMF, IBRD) and to include them in the plans for “technological cooperation” within the NATO framework so as to bind them to the capitalist economy. Special emphasis is laid on the need to draw individual Socialist countries into the IMF, which would enable the West to control their economy from gold reserves to the budget and finances.… Proposals were also made to admit Czechoslovakia into the IMF and the IBRD.

²⁴ See especially Remington, Robin, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, forthcoming);Google ScholarIonescu, Ghita, Communism in Romania, 1944–1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964);Google ScholarFischer-Galati, Stephen, The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic (Studies in International Communism, No. 10) (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1967);Google ScholarMontias, John Michael, Economic Development in Communist Rumania (Studies in International Communism, No. 11) (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1967); and Jowitt.Google Scholar

²⁵ This is the case, at least, if we are to take Ceauscescu's statement of May 7, 1967, at face value. See Scinteia, May 7, 1967, as translated in “Ceauscescu Reasserts Rumanian Party Independence” (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 05 22, 1967).Google Scholar (Mimeographed.)

²⁶ Siotis, Jean, “ECE in the Emerging European System,” International Conciliation, 01 1967 (No. 561), p. 66.Google Scholar Other than Romania, the nine included Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.

²⁷ Cattell, David T., “The Politics of the Danube Commission under Soviet Control,” American Slavic and East European Review, 10 1960 (Vol. 19, No. 3), pp. 380–391.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁸ This entailed, among other things, a policy of carefully chosen demonstrative votes at variance with the Soviet Union; these acts bore directly on the United States' decision to vote for a Romanian to become the first communist president of the General Assembly.

²⁹ Snejdarek, Antonin, “Male zeme a evropska bezpecnost,” Mezinarodni politika, November 1966,Google Scholar as cited in Andras, Charles, “Neighbors on the Danube: New Variations on the Old Theme of Regional Cooperation” (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 12 1967), p. 21.Google Scholar (Mimeographed.) I have relied heavily on Andras's monograph in summarizing the exchange of views published in Mezinarodni politika.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., p. 22, quoting J. J. Plumovski, “Mohou male zeme skutecne hrat nejakou roli?” Mezinarodni politika, January 1967.

³² On the ECE see Siotis, International Conciliation, No. 561.

³³ See, for instance, the attack on Ota Sik's, “technocratic concepts” and on those “‘technocratic elites thinking in a European manner,’” by Kolczynski, Janusz, “Anti-Communism—Theory and Practice (2),” Prawo i zycie, 06 1, 1969,Google Scholar translated in Radio Free Europe, Polish Press Survey, 07 10, 1969 (No. 2212), p. 19.Google Scholar

³⁴ Sedivy, Jaroslav, “European Cooperation—European Security,” Literarni noviny, 02 25, 1967,Google Scholar in Radio Free Europe, Czechoslovak Press Survey, 04 3, 1967 (No. 1907 [special], p. 5.Google Scholar

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ From Nepszabadsag, February 12, 1965, as cited in Andras, p. 63.

³⁷ Magyarorszag, 04 18, 1965, as cited in Andras, p. 67.Google Scholar

³⁸ Nograd, 01 21, 1967, as cited by Andras, p. 69.Google Scholar

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 44–45.

⁴¹ For examples of Hungarian initiatives within the Comecon context see Csikos-Nagy, B., “For Forint Convertibility,” Figyelo, 12 2, 1969,Google Scholar as translated in Radio Free Europe, Hungarian Press Survey, 04 2, 1969 (No. 1998);Google ScholarNyers, Rezso, in Nepszabadsag, 01 23, 1969,Google Scholar in Radio Free Europe, Hungarian Press Survey, 02 3, 1969 (No. 1982);Google Scholar and Csikos-Nagy, B., “The Monetary Framework of a Socialist Economy,” New Hungarian Quarterly, Spring 1969 (Vol. 10, No. 33), pp. 46–59.Google Scholar

⁴² K.K., , “Czechoslovak-Hungarian Hydro-Electric Project in Danube Valley Dropped” (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 01 17, 1969), p. 1.Google Scholar (Mimeographed.) The likelihood that the decision to achieve a power line linkage with Austria was informed in part by a political calculus is enhanced by the conclusion of “K.K.” that it was the Hungarians who dropped the proposed hydro-electric project with Czechoslovakia as well as by such items as the decision in 1968 to buy $40 million of Iranian crude oil.

⁴³ Becsky, Gyorgy, Hungarian Review, 07 1969,Google Scholar as quoted in Schaefer, Henry, “Hungary Seeks to Expand Its Foreign Economic Relations” (Munich: Radio Free Europe, 08 1, 1969), p. 63.Google Scholar (Mimeographed.)

⁴⁴ Morawiecki, Wojciech, “Institutional and Political Conditions of Participation of Socialist States in International Organizations: A Polish View,” International Organization, Spring 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 2), pp. 494–507.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁵ New York Times, 04 13, 1971, p. 49.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Gitelman, Zvi Y., “Power and Authority in Eastern Europe,” in Change in Communist Systems, ed. Johnson, Chalmers (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 235–264.Google Scholar